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EVALUATING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
NEW GENETIC IDENTIFICATION
TESTS: LESSONS
FROM THE "DNA WAR"
WILLIAM C. THOMPSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of forensic tests for "typing" DNA was
greeted with enormous enthusiasm. Heralded as "the greatest ad-
vance in crime fighting technology since fingerprints,"' the new
DNA typing tests were introduced swiftly into the legal system.2 Re-
cently, however, a serious scientific controversy has erupted over
the reliability and specificity of DNA tests. Scientific critics have
charged that the new technology was rushed to court before it was
ready.3
The scientific dispute has led to confusion and conflicting rul-
ings in the legal system. Although DNA evidence initially faced little
opposition and has already been used to obtain convictions in hun-
* Associate Professor, Department of Criminology, Law & Society, School of Social
Ecology, University of California, Irvine, California; J.D., University of California, 1982;
Ph.D., Stanford, 1984.
The author thanks Professors Peter D'Eustachio, Laurence Mueller, Barry Scheck
and William Shields for helpful comments on the manuscript, and Professor Simon Ford
for helpful discussion of numerous technical issues.
I People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988), aff'd, 589 N.Y.S.2d
197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
2 A number ofjournalistic accounts have heralded DNA typing as a "breakthrough"
that "could revolutionize law enforcement." See Debra Cassens Moss, D.VC-The \eu'
Fingetprints, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1988, at 66; Ricki Lewis, DX.A Fingerprints: llitnessfor the
Prosecution, DISCOVER, June 1988, at 44; Jean L. Marx, DVA' Fingerprinting Takes the Il'itness
Stand, 240 SCIENCE 1616 (1988).
3 For reviews of the controversy, see William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DA
Testing: Debate Update, TRIAL, Apr. 1992, at 52 [hereinafter D.V- Testing]; Leslie Roberts,
Fight Erupts Over DAA Fingeiprinting, 254 SCIENCE 1721 (1991); Peter Neufeld & Neville
Colman, Ilhen Science Takes the Witness Stand, 262 Sc. AM. 46 (1990); William C. Thomp-
son & Simon Ford, Is DAA Fingerprinting Ready for the Courts?, 125 NEwV SCIENTIST 38
(1990) [hereinafter D.A. Fingerprinting]; Eric S. Lander, D.V4 Fingerprinting On Trial, 339
NATURE 501 (1989); Rorie Sherman, DAA4 Unraveling, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1991, at I.
LESSONS FROM THE "DNA WAR"
dreds of cases,4 a number of courts have recently ruled DNA evi-
dence inadmissible on grounds that it is not generally accepted as
reliable by the scientific community.5 Some commentators have
called for reexamination of the DNA evidence in closed cases. 6 The
dispute has generated such heated exchanges, both inside and
outside the courtroom, that commentators 7 and participants have
called it a "war.
' 8
Not surprisingly, proponents of forensic DNA evidence offer
very different accounts of the controversy than do critics. Propo-
nents claim that an excellent forensic procedure has been unfairly
maligned by a small group of scientists who have garnered large
fees for expert testimony by making exaggerated criticisms. 9 Ac-
4 For a review of the early cases, see Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of
DNA Identification Evidence, 84 A.L.R. 4TH 313 (1991). Several excellent reviews of subse-
quent caselaw developments (as well as scientific issues raised in court) have been pub-
lished in the BNA Criminal Practice Manual. SeeJudicial Tide Turns Against Admission of
FBI's DNA Tests, 7 BNA GRIM. PRAC. MAN. 16 (1993); DNA Typing Critics Say Report I'ali-
dates Their Concerns, 6 BNA CRIM. PRAC. MAN. 195 (1992).
5 Appellate decisions holding DNA evidence inadmissible include, State v. Schwartz,
447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 1991);
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311 (Mass. 1992); People v. Barney, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1992);
State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d 135 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d
629 (D.C. 1992); People v. Atoigue, No. CR 91-95A, 1992 WL 245628 (Guam Dist. Ct.
App. Div. Sept. 11, 1992); People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993);
State v. Bible, No. Cr-90-0167-AP, 1993 WL 306544 (Ariz. filed Aug. 12, 1993) (en
banc). Trial court decisions holding DNA tests inadmissible include People v. Castro,
545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); State v. Wheeler, No. C89-0901CR (Wash. Co.,
Or. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 1990); State v. Despain, No. 15589 (Yuma Co., Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb.
12, 1991); State v. Fleming, No. 90-CR-2716 (Cook Co., Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 1991);
State. v. Watson, No. 90-CR-5546 (Cook Co., Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 1991); State v. Pas-
sino, No. 185-1-90 Fcr (Franklin Co., Vt. Dist. Ct. May 13, 1991); People v. Halik, No.
VA00843 (Los Angeles Co., Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 1991); United States v. Porter, 120
DAILY WASH. L. RPTR. 477 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 1991); People v. Keene, 591
N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
Recently, DNA evidence has been ruled inadmissible by two trial courts in the
United Kingdom as well. Regina v. Levy, No. 920188 (Central Crim. Ct. Dec. 7, 1992);
Regina v. Borham, No. 920857 (Central Grim. Ct. Nov. 3, 1992). These cases are dis-
cussed in William Brown, DNA Fingerprinting Back in the Dock, NEw SCIENTIST, Mar. 6,
1993, at 14.
6 Neufeld & Colman, supra note 3.
7 Edward Humes, DNA Jl'ar, L.A. TIMES MAC., Nov. 29, 1992, at 29. For other ac-
counts of the heated nature of the dispute, see Leslie Roberts, Science in Court: A Culture
Clash, 257 SCIENCE 732 (1992) ("Vituperative arguments over DNA fingerprinting epito-
mize the difficulties of settling scientific disagreements in a highly charged legal environ-
ment."); Roberts, supra note 3, at 1721; Christopher Anderson, DX.W Fingeprinting
Discord, 354 NATURE 500 (1991).
8 "This is no [longer] a search for the truth, it is a war, the way people are behav-
ing." Roberts, supra note 7, at 736 (quoting John Hicks, head of the FBI's Laboratory
Division).
9 Andre Moenssens, D.VA Evidence and Its Critics-How Valid Are the Challenges?. 31
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cording to proponents, the major lesson of the controversy is that
the legal system offers powerful incentives for ersatz scientific dis-
sent and that courts take such dissent too seriously when evaluating
the admissibility of new scientific techniques. By this account, the
hostility surrounding the dispute arises from frustration over an un-
tenable situation in which a few dissenting scientists are able to hold
a new technology hostage by voicing ill-conceived objections to it.
On the other hand, critics claim that the new DNA tests were
poorly validated and may be considerably less probative than juries
have been led to believe.' 0 According to critics, the major lesson of
the controversy is that forensic laboratories are lacking in scientific
rigor and that new forensic techniques receive inadequate scientific
scrutiny before they are presented in court." By this account, an
atmosphere of hostility surrounds the issue because promoters of
forensic DNA tests have responded to legitimate criticisms by at-
tacking the critics rather than heeding their message.
The National Research Council ("NRC") of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences has made an important effort to resolve the under-
lying scientific controversy, but has not been entirely successful.
Responding to a "crescendo of questions concerning DNA typing,"
the NRC established a distinguished panel of experts in 1990 to ex-
amine the use of DNA technology in forensic science.' 2 The panel's
report, based on a two-year study, was released in April 1992.
Although the report firmly endorsed the general principles behind
forensic DNA testing and said such testing should continue, it ac-
knowledged that there have been problems with the implementation
of the new technology and declared that improvements are neces-
sary. A number of its recommendations for improvements are at
JURIMETRICS 87 (1990); George Clarke, D.VA Fingeiprinting Critics Have Run Afoul of Sci-
ence, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 28, 1992, at 5 (editorial comment of a prominent California
prosecutor, arguing that scientific criticism of forensic DNA testing is "counterfeit dis-
sent"). See generally Roberts, supra note 7; Leslie Roberts, Hired Guns or True Believers, 257
SCIENCE 735 (1992).
10 Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DX.4 Typing,
254 SCIENCE 1745 (1991); William M. Shields, Forensic D.4 Typing as Evidence in Criminal
Proceedings: Some Problems and Potential Sohltions, in PROCEEDINGS FROM THE THIRD INTER-
NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN IDENTIFICATION 1 (1992); William C. Thompson & Si-
mon Ford, The .1eaning of a .Mlatch: Sources of Ambiguity in the lntepretation of D.4 Prints, in
FORENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 93 (Mark Farley &James Harrington eds., 1991).
11 Neufeld & Colman, supra note 3; Lander, supra note 3;Janet Hoeffel, The Dark Side
of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV.
465 (1990).
12 COMMITTEE ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE vii (1992) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].
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odds with the current practices of most forensic laboratories 13 and
consistent with the suggestions of critics. Although the report clari-
fies the issues, it has generated further controversy, including
charges that the committee was biased and subject to improper in-
fluence, 14 and that some sections of the report are scientifically
flawed.' 5 Its recommendations have generally been hailed by critics
as essential for assuring the accuracy of DNA tests, and have been
dismissed by proponents of the tests as unnecessary and
unworkable.
The scientific and legal issues involved in the DNA war warrant
close examination because they can tell us much about the evalua-
tion of new techniques in forensic science. The current DNA tests
are the first spin-offs of the molecular revolution in genetics to reach
the courtroom, but they will not be the last.' 6 The lessons taken
from the current DNA war will shape the response of the legal sys-
tem to battles over the DNA technology of the future. These les-
sons may also influence the legal system's response to disputes
about the reliability of other scientific techniques.' 7
This article provides a detailed account of the controversy over
forensic DNA testing and suggests some lessons that might properly
13 See State v. Alt, No. K4-90-1437 (Olmsted Co., Minn. Dist. Ct. May 29, 1992)
("The FBI Laboratory procedures are not totally defective, but neither do they meet the
criteria of The National Research Council and others."). See also Richard Lewontin, The
Dream of the Human Genome, N.Y. REv., May 28, 1992, at 17. Lewontin notes that the NRC
report contains "numerous recommendations which, taken seriously, will lead any mod-
erately businesslike defense attorney to file an immediate appeal of any case lost on
DNA evidence." Id. at 39. The NRC Report cannot properly be read as an endorsement
of current laboratory practices, Lewontin argues, "[s]ince no laboratory currently meets
[the NRC's] requirements" for reliable'DNA testing. Id.
14 Christopher Anderson, Coiiflict Concerns Disrupt Panels, Cloud Testimony, 355 NATURE
753 (1992); Celia Hooper, Rancor Precedes National Academy of Science's D.4 Fingeprinting
Report, 4 J. NIH RES. 76 (1992); Leslie Roberts, D.\;- Fingeiprinting: Academy Reports, 256
SCIENCE 300 (1992).
15 For an account of scientific attacks on the NRC Report, see Peter Aldhous, Geneti-
cists Attack VRC Report as Scientifically Flawed, 259 SCIENCE 755 (1993). Scientific articles
criticizing the NRC's position include, Bernard Devlin et al., Statistical Evaluation of DNA.
Fingerprinting: A Critique of the NRC's Report, 259 SCIENCE 748 (1993); Bruce S. Weir,
Population Genetics in the Forensic DA.4 Debate, 89 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 11654 (1993).
16 A number of new technologies are being developed. See i'fra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text.
17 See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, ll'hat D.\4 "'Fingeprinting" ani Teach the
Law About the Rest of Forensic Scince, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 361 (1991):
The most important legacy of DNA "fingerprinting" and the debate surround-
ing it will likely be a spillover of standards of empirical testing and statistical rigor to
many other forensic sciences which, somehow, have exempted themselves from the
conventional standards of scientific rigor. In short, the debate over DNA finger-
printing may compel the rest of forensic science to become more recognizably
scientific.
1993]
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be taken from it. It discusses the nature of the disagreements
among experts and analyzes how courts should respond to such
disagreements.
A. OVERVIEW OF DNA TECHNOLOGY
The DNA tests discussed here are the product of basic advances
in molecular biology over the past fifteen years that have revealed a
number of potential methods for detecting genetic differences
among individuals.'
Two of these methods have been developed and used for foren-
sic testing so far, and additional methods are currently being devel-
oped. Continuing advances in molecular biology and genetics will
undoubtedly prove a wellspring for more technology, sending a
continuing stream of new genetic tests toward the courtroom.
The most widely used method at present, and the method that
is the primary focus of this article, is commonly called DNA finger-
printing or DNA profiling. It employs a technique known as restric-
tion fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis in which long
strands of DNA are extracted from biological material and broken
into fragments, and then measurements are made of the length of
certain fragments that tend to vary in length from person to per-
son.' 9 If two samples have fragments of different lengths, they
could not have a common source; if they have fragments of the same
18 Unlike traditional serology tests, which detect genetic differences by examining
proteins and enzymes in bodily fluids, the new tests examine the DNA itself. DNA is a
long, double-stranded molecule found in the chromosomes carried in all cell nuclei.
The structure of DNA is similar to a long, twisted ladder in which the "rungs" consist of
pairs of molecules called base-pairs. There are four different bases, labeled A, T, G and
C which always form into the base-pairs A-T and C-G; the sequence of these base-pairs
on the DNA strand constitutes the genetic code. Although most sections of the DNA
molecule vary little from individual to individual within a species, some sections are
polymorphic, which means that they have different forms in different individuals. The
different forms are called alleles. See generally NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 78; William
C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the .\eu, Genetic Identifi-
cation Tests, 75 U. VA. L. REV. 45 (1989).
19 In this process, DNA is broken into fragments through the use of restriction en-
zymes, and the resulting fragments are called restriction fragments. Hence, the
polymorphic areas are known as restriction fragment length polymorphisms ("RFLPs")
and examination of these areas is called RFLP analysis. For a detailed discussion of
these techniques, see infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
About three thousand RFLPs have been identified. Since the early 1980s, geneti-
cists have relied heavily on RFLPs as genetic markers for studying heredity. Most of the
major advances in detecting disease genes that have occurred during the last decade
have resulted from this application of RFLP analysis. For a general background on the
development of RFLP analysis, see Jan Witkowski, .Mlilestones in the Development of D.\A
Technolog,, in FORENSIc DNA TECHNOLOGY 1 (Mark Farley & James Harrington eds.,
1991) and NRC REPORT, snpra note 12, at 78.
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lengths, they might have a common source (although they might
also match by chance). To reduce the likelihood of a chance match,
laboratories attempt to measure six or more distinct fragments. 20
Although RFLP analysis has been used in scientific research since
the early 1980s, it became useful for identification of individuals
only with the discovery of certain areas of DNA, known as variable
number tandem repeats ("VNTRs"), where there is a great deal of
variability in the length of DNA fragments, and thus a low likelihood
that any two people will match with regard to the length of six or
more fragments. By some accounts, RFLP analysis of VNTRs pro-
duces DNA profiles that are virtually unique to each individual, and
thus are akin to fingerprints.
2'
DNA profiling was swiftly introduced in the legal system.
Although the term "DNA fingerprint" did not enter the scientific
lexicon until 1985,22 two commercial laboratories in the United
States were offering DNA profiling services by 1987;23 and by 1988
the FBI laboratory began offering such services to law enforcement
agencies nationwide.
There was almost no opposition to the tests at first, but critics
gradually began to emerge. No one has questioned the theory un-
derlying DNA testing nor the fundamental validity of RFLP analysis.
Critics' concerns focus solely on forensic applications of RFLP anal-
ysis which, they argue, are more demanding than other applications
of the technique. 24 The three major issues that have consistently
20 In some cases, fewer fragments are measured due to limitations imposed by tech-
nical problems or the limited quality of samples.
21 When DNA profiling tests were first introduced, it was frequently reported that the
likelihood two people would be found, by chance, to have matching DNA prints was
around one in thirty billion. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 2, at 66. Considering that the
population of the earth is approximately five billion, this is a rather impressive claim.
The true likelihood is currently the subject of serious scientific debate.
22 The term "DNA fingerprint" was coined by British scientist AlecJ.Jeffreys and his
colleagues in 1985. Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Individua-Specific Fingelprlnts of Humadi DNA,
316 NATURE 76 (1985). It has been used in the United States as a trade name for foren-
sic and paternity tests marketed by Cellmark Diagnostics Corp., a subsidiary of ICI In-
ternational, which holds a license for the use of the genetic probes developed by
Jeffreys. This article will use the generic term DNA profiling to refer to forsenic tech-
niques that employ RFLP analysis of VNTRs.
23 The two laboratories were Cellmark Diagnostics of Germantown, Md., and
Lifecodes Corporation, formerly of Valhalla, N.Y., now in Stamford, Conn.
24 See Lander, supra note 3, at 501:
[T]rial judges have raced to admit DNA fingerprinting as evidence on the grounds
that the methods are "generally accepted in the scientific community," citing the
application of RFLPs in DNA diagnostics and accepting claims that false positives
are virtually impossible.
With due respect, the courts have been too hasty. Although DNA fingerprint-
ing clearly offers tremendous potential as a forensic tool, the rush to court has ob-
1993]
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been raised are: (1) the adequacy of standards and controls for as-
suring the reliability of the forensic tests, (2) the adequacy of the
procedures used by forensic laboratories to determine whether
DNA profiles "match," and (3) the accuracy of the procedures used
to determine the statistical frequency or rarity of DNA profiles. In
subsequent sections, these concerns, and the reactions of courts to
them, will be discussed in detail.
A second method for DNA testing, less widely used than DNA
profiling, employs a technique known as polymerase chain reaction
(PCR). PCR tests identify an area of DNA in which there tends to be
variation from one person to another and then "amplify" that area
by causing the DNA strands to replicate themselves multiple
times. 25 Once it is amplified, the DNA can be "typed" through the
use of genetic probes. 26 If two samples have the same type, they
may have a common source; if they do not have the same type, they
could not have a common source.
The first technique to be developed for "typing" amplified
DNA, and the one that has been most widely used in forensics, ex-
amines the HLA DQ-alpha gene.27 DQ-alpha typing is not as dis-
criminating as DNA profiling: there are twenty-one different DQ
alpha types28 which range in frequency from about one to fifteen
scured two critical points: first, DNA fingerprinting is far more technically
demanding than DNA diagnostics; and second, the scientific community has not yet
agreed on standards that ensure the reliability of the evidence.
25 DNA is extracted from samples and "primers" are used to locate a section of the
DNA to be studied. This section of DNA is "amplified" by a process known as polymer-
ase chain reaction ("PCR"), which mimics the natural process by which DNA copies
itself. Even if the sample initially contains only a few copies of the fragment of interest,
PCR will rapidly increase that number to about ten million, which is sufficient for analy-
sis. The polymerase chain reaction was discovered by Kary B. Mullis, an employee of
Cetus Corporation, a biotechnology firm, and was developed as a technology by Cetus.
See generally NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 63-70; Thompson & Ford, supra note 18, at
76-81.
26 The probes are engineered to detect specific forms (alleles) of a given gene, and
are therefore called "allele specific oligonucleotide probes." See Russell Higuchi et al.,
D,A Typingfriom Single Hairs, 332 NATURE 543, 544 (1988); Thompson & Ford, supra note
18, at 76-81.
27 To be useful for criminal identification, the section of DNA chosen for analysis
must be polymorphic and must have alleles (forms) that can reliably be identified. The
HLA DQ-alpha gene was the first to be used in forensic PCR tests because it is the first
polymorphic gene that could be identified with primers for which reliable allele-specific
probes were developed. See Higuchi et al., supra note 26, at 544.
28 The DQ-alpha gene has six alleles. People have two copies of this gene in their
DNA, one inherited from the mother and one from the father. Hence, there are 21
differentt "genotypes" in the HLA DQ-alpha system, representing all combinations of
the six alleles. Each person has 1 of the 21 genotypes. Catherine T. Comey & Bruce
Budowle, Validation Studies on the Analysis of the HL4 DQ-alpha Locus Using the Polynierase
Chain Reaction, 36J. FORENSIC SCI. 1633 (1991).
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percent,29 making the likelihood of a coincidental match between
different samples far higher than with DNA profiling tests. But the
PCR DQ-alpha test is far more sensitive than DNA profiling, al-
lowing it to "type" samples that are much smaller and older.30
The first forensic analysis employing the PCR DQ-alpha system
was performed in 1986 by Dr. Edward Blake of Forensic Science
Associates ("FSA"), a private forensic laboratory.3' FSA was the
first laboratory, and for several years was the only laboratory, to of-
fer forensic PCR DQ-alpha tests. However, the technology has re-
cently been licensed to a number of other forensic laboratories.
Hence, evidence from PCR DQ-alpha tests is likely to be offered in
court with increasing frequency.
The reliability of the PCR DQ-alpha test has been subject to a
great deal of debate.3 2 Although no one questions the theory un-
derlying the procedure, concerns have arisen about its susceptibility
to errors caused by inadvertant contamination of samples or poor
"fidelity" of DNA amplification. 33 Concerns have also been raised
about some of the procedures used by FSA for interpreting results3 4
and for estimating the frequency of DQ-alpha types.3
5
29 The frequency varies across the different types, and the frequency of each type
varies somewhat across different reference populations. Id. at 1643.
30 See Higuchi et al., supra note 26, at 545.
31 See Edward Blake et al., Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) Amplification and Human Len-
kocyte Antigen (HIA) DQ-alpha Oligonucleotide Typing on Biological Evidence Samples: Casework
Experience, 37 J. FORENSIC Sm. 700 (1992); George Sensabaugh & Cecilia von Berold-
ingen, The Polymerase Chain Reaction: Application to the Analysis of Biological Evidence, in Fo-
RENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 63 (Mark Farley &James Harrington eds., 1991).
32 Like DNA profiling tests, these tests are subject to artifacts that can complicate the
interpretation of results in forensic cases. As with DNA profiling, there is considerable
debate about the susceptibility of PCR procedures to artifacts, the conditions under
which artifacts might occur, and the reliability of the procedures used by forensic ana-
lysts to detect artifacts and avoid being misled by them. See NRC REPORT, supra note 12,
at 63-70; Comey & Budowle, supra note 28, passim.
33 "In some cases, PGR can be qualitatively faithful but quantitatively unfaithful, be-
cause some alleles amplify more efficiently than others. A sample might contain a 50:50
mixture of two alleles and yield an amplified product with a 90:10 ratio." NRC REPORT,
supra note 12, at 64 (citing Catherine Comey et al., Use of Formamide to Inprove Amnplifica-
tion of HLA DQ Alpha Sequences, 10 BIOTECHNIQUES 60-61 (1991)).
34 An important point of controversy is whether PCR DQ-alpha tests provide a relia-
ble basis for determining which alleles belong to which donor in a mixed sample. Ana-
lysts frequently assign multiple alleles in a mixed stain to "primary" and "secondary"
donors based on the intensity of the "dots" indicating the presence of the alleles. The
reliability of these assignments is of crucial importance in many cases. However, the
NRC Report expresses concern about the reliability of such determinations. NRC RE-
PORT, supra note 12, at 65. Another important set of issues involves the adequacy of
controls used to detect contamination and the manner in which the controls are
interpreted.
35 FSA uses a statistical estimation procedure that is based on the assumption that
1993]
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A number of new techniques, currently at the experimental
stage, will soon reach the courtroom. Several new techniques em-
ploy PCR but use methods for "typing" amplified DNA that afford
greater specificity than the DQ-alpha system. 36 Another new
method allows analysis of mitochondrial DNA.3 7 Still another al-
lows analysis of another type of variation in DNA called a minisatel-
lite variant repeat ("MVR"). 38 The latter two techniques represent
fundamentally different approaches to typing DNA than the current
RFLP and PCR-based methods. All of these new techniques will re-
quire independent validation and review. Hence, the challenge
posed to the legal system by the need to evaluate new genetic tech-
nology is unlikely to diminish, and may well increase, over the fore-
seeable future.
B. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The results of new DNA tests are reviewed by courts for admis-
sibility in pretrial evidentiary hearings. These hearings have been
the primary arena in which the DNA war has been fought. In the
majority ofjurisdictions, courts have applied the rule established in
Frye v. United States,39 under which evidence derived from a novel
scientific technique may be presented to a jury only if the court first
the frequencies of the various DQ-alpha alleles are statistically independent. The as-
sumption of independence is problematic, however, because there is evidence of popu-
lation structure-that is, evidence that some combinations of alleles (genotypes) are far
more common in some groups than others. See, e.g., Rhea Helmuth et al., HLA-DQ alpha
Allele and Genotype Frequencies in Varions Human Populations, Determined by Using Enzyme Am-
plification and Oligonucleotide Probes, 47 AM. J. HuM. GENETICS 515 (1990); Comey &
Budowle, supra note 28, at 1642-44. For a general discussion of the problem posed by
population structure for statistical estimation, see notes 171-87 and accompanying text;
NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 74-95.
36 Recently, primers and probes have been developed for other polymorphic genes.
Methods for measuring the length of polymorphic fragments of amplified DNA known
as amplified fragment length polymorphisms ("AMP-FLPs") and short tandem repeats
("STRs") are also under development and promise to increase the specificity of PCR-
based tests. Chantal J. Fregeau-Aubin et al., An Evaluation of STRs and MVRs for Fo-
rensic DNA Typing, Abstract of Paper presented at the meeting of the American Acad-
emy of Forensic Science (Feb. 1993) (on file with William C. Thompson). However, the
use of these newer methods in forensic identification appears to be still at the experi-
mental stage. Most forensic PCR tests conducted to date have examined only the HLA
DQ-alpha gene.
37 See Mark D. Stoneking et al., Population Variation of Human .Mlitochondrial D.\-l Control
Region Sequence Detected by Enzymatic Amplification and Sequence-specific Oligonucleotide Probes,
48 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 370 (1991). This novel technique was recently used for the
first time in a case in San Diego, California.
38 Alec J. Jeffreys et al., .Minisatellite Repeat Coding as a Digital Approach to D.4 Typing,
354 NATURE 204 (1991).
39 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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determines that the technique has "gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs."'40 In other jurisdictions, courts
have followed the "relevancy" approach, under which novel scien-
tific evidence is admitted if the judge determines that it will be more
helpful than misleading to the jury.4 1
These admissibility rules primarily serve to shield juries from
misleading or prejudicial scientific testimony. A common theme in
appellate opinions and commentary is that, because lay jurors are
overawed by science and lack the capacity to evaluate it critically,
unreliable scientific testimony is likely to be given more weight than
it deserves. There is also concern that efforts to challenge un-
reliable scientific evidence through cross-examination and expert
testimony will be inordinately time-consuming, expensive and con-
fusing, and, particularly in criminal cases where the prosecution
presents novel evidence, that the defense may be handicapped by an
inability to find experts who are knowledgeable about the new
technique.
The Frye rule is generally viewed as a more restrictive standard
for admissibility than the relevancy standard,42 and has proved to be
so with respect to DNA evidence. It is in Frye jurisdictions that DNA
evidence has received the most thorough scrutiny during pretrial
admissibility hearings and has most often been ruled inadmissible.
The Frye standard will be used less commonly in the future,
however, due to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,43 which abrogated the Frye standard
in federal trials. Daubert held that Frye had been superseded by the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which do not require that scientific evi-
dence meet the test of general acceptance to be admissible.
44
40 Id. at 1014. For a general discussion of the application of the Frye rule to forensic
DNA testing, see Thompson & Ford, supra note 18, at 53-60.
41 For a general discussion of the evaluation of DNA evidence under relevancy rules,
see Hoeffel, supra note 11, at 507-19.
42 In relevancy jurisdictions, there is no need to show that scientists generally regard
the procedure as reliable. Hence, new procedures about which there is substantial sci-
entific controversy may nevertheless be admitted if the court either finds scientific pro-
ponents more persuasive than critics or finds that, notwithstanding the dispute, the jury
will be able to evaluate the evidence appropriately. A necessary consequence of the
greater discretion granted courts in relevancy jurisdictions is that judges bear the bur-
den of making a correct assessment of both the reliability of scientific evidence and the
jury's competence to evaluate that evidence, which, in the case of forensic DNA evi-
dence, is a formidable task indeed.
43 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
44 Expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
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Although Daubert is binding only on federal courts, it may have sig-
nificant persuasive effect at the state level, particularly in states that
have adopted evidence codes paralleling the Federal Rules. 45
But Daubert will not necessarily assure the admissibility of DNA
evidence. Although the Federal Rules do not require that scientific
evidence be "generally accepted," the Supreme Court emphasized
that the Rules do require that scientific evidence be valid and that it
assist the trier of fact.
The validity requirement stems partly from the language of
Rule 702, which states that the subject of an expert's testimony be
"scientific knowledge": "[I]n order to qualify as 'scientific knowl-
edge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific
method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate val-
idation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known."' 46 Rule 702
also requires that the evidence or testimony "assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
47
Whether forensic DNA tests have been appropriately validated is
the heart of the dispute over DNA evidence. Parties opposing DNA
evidence will find plenty of scientific support for claims that the sci-
entific validation is inadequate for at least some aspects of the foren-
sic tests. Judges will need to weigh this evidence against the claims
of scientific supporters that the techniques are valid.
The Supreme Court mentioned a number of factors that should
bear on the admissibility of scientific evidence under Rule 702, not-
ing that no single factor is dispositive.48 The factors include
"whether [the theory or technique] can be (and has been) tested," 49
"whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review
and publication," 50 "the known or potential rate of error," 5' "the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's
operation," 52 and, finally, whether the theory or technique is gener-
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
45 For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court, following the example of Daubert,
recently abandoned the Frye standard. The Court noted that the state's rules regarding
scientific evidence are identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence. State v. Alberico, No.
20,282, 1993 WL 387950, at * 1 (N.M. Aug. 30, 1993) ("Today we abandon the F-ye test
as a predicate for the admissibility of scientific evidence ... relying instead on our Rules
of Evidence.").
46 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
47 FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
48 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
49 Id.




LESSONS FROM THE "DNA WAR"
ally accepted in the relevant scientific community. 53 Parties sup-
porting and opposing the admissibility of DNA evidence have
disagreed with respect to each of these factors.
Rule 702 also requires that scientific evidence or testimony "as-
sist the trier of fact." 54 According to Daubert, this helpfulness stan-
dard "requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry
as a precondition to admissibility." 55 Some scientific testimony
about forensic DNA tests may well be challenged on grounds that it
lacks a valid scientific connection to facts properly at issue. 56
Finally, the Daubert court emphasized the authority of the judge
to exclude scientific evidence under Rule 403, which permits the ex-
clusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusions of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury. .... -57 The Court noted the special
dangers of prejudice surrounding scientific testimony, which "can
be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in
evaluating it."58 Following Daubert, opponents of DNA evidence are
likely to place special emphasis on its potential for prejudice.
II. MATCHING OF DNA PROFILES: SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL ISSUES
DNA profiling tests have three distinct steps: creating DNA
prints, determining whether DNA prints match, and (if a match is
declared) estimating the frequency of such a match in a reference
population. This section discusses the scientific and legal issues sur-
rounding the first two steps. The third step (frequency estimation)
is discussed below in Section III.
A. CREATING A DNA "PRINT" OR "PROFILE"
A DNA print (or profile) is a pattern of dark bands on an X-ray
plate, known as an autorad (short for autoradiogram). The posi-
tions of the bands on the autorad indicate the lengths of the DNA
fragments being compared. The techniques for creating DNA
prints are drawn from the field of molecular biology and biochemis-
53 Id. at 2798.
54 FED. R. EvID. 702.
55 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
56 For example, testimony about the frequency of matching DNA types in a reference
population, even if valid, may be unhelpful if the reference population is inappropriate
or if other factors suggest a tenuous connection between the reported frequency and the
probability of a false match in the case at hand. See infra part IV.
57 FED. R. EvID. 403.
58 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (citing Jack Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is Sound, it Should not be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).
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try and are known, collectively, as restriction fragment length poly-
morphism ("RFLP") analysis.
The procedures involved in forensic RFLP analysis are illus-
trated in Figure 1.59 DNA is first extracted from biological samples
and then exposed to a restriction enzyme, which cuts the long chain-
like DNA molecules into restriction fragments. The restriction frag-
ments are separated and sorted by length using a process known as
electrophoresis 60 and then bound to a nylon membrane using a pro-
cess known as Southern Transfer. At this point, DNA fragments are
arrayed across the membrane according to their length, with the
larger fragments at the top and the smaller fragments at the bottom.
To determine the length of the fragments containing a particular
VNTR, one need only locate their position in the array. This is
done through the use of radioactive probes which selectively bind to
fragments of interest. When X-ray film is placed on the membrane,
the radioactive probes expose the film (known as an autorad), pro-
ducing dark bands. The position of the bands on the autorad corre-
sponds to the position of the VNTR fragments in the array, and thus
reveals their length.
Because humans have two copies of most chromosomes, one
from the mother and the other from the father, each DNA sample
exposed to a single probe will ordinarily show two bands.6' In Fig-
ure 1, Suspect 2 and the biological stain have bands in different lo-
cations, which indicates that the samples have VNTRs of different
lengths and therefore must have come from different individuals.
Suspect 1 and the stain have bands in the same positions, indicating
that the two samples could have come from the same individual.
To reduce the chances of a coincidental match, forensic labora-
tories typically use three or four different probes, each of which de-
tects a different VNTR. 62 Because VNTRs are highly variable in
59 A good general discussion of test procedures may be found in NRC REPORT, supra
note 12, at 27-49; see also Thompson & Ford, supra note 18.
60 In electrophoresis, the DNA samples are placed at one end of an agarose gel, an
electric current is applied, and the DNA, which carries a negative charge, is drawn
through the gel. The shorter restriction fragments move more quickly than the longer
fragments so that, after a time, the fragments are arrayed across the gel according to
their length. Typically a number of DNA samples are run together in separate lanes on
the same gel.
61 A person who inherits an identical fragment of DNA from both parents, however,
will show only one band. Individuals who have two bands are called heterozygotes;
those with one band are called homozygotes.
62 Sometimes the probes are mixed together in a cocktail, which produces DNA
prints of six to eight bands on a single autorad. Figure 2 is an example of a DNA print
produced by a cocktail of probes. Other times, the probes are run separately, producing
two bands per sample on each of three or four autorads. In some cases, fewer fragments
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Electrophoresis on Agarose Gel
Separates and Sorts DNA Fragments
By Length
S1 BS S2 Long
-v / DNA Fragments
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DNA Fragments
DNA fragments are transferred to a nylon membrane.
A radioactive probe binds to "target" fragments, which
vary in length among individuals.
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1 -
The radioactivity exposes an X-ray film placed over the
membrane, producing dark bands.
FIGURE 1. Schematic representation of the creation of DNA prints for RFLP analysis.In the example shown here, DNA of two suspects is compared to DNA in a biologicalstain using a single -probe. DNA is extracted from specimens, broken into fragmentswith restriction enzymes and sorted by length using agarose gel electrophoresis. TheDNA fragments in the agarose gel are then imprinted on a nylon membrane and ex-posed to a radioactive probe. The probe binds to fragments containing VNTRs, whichtend to vary in length among individuals. When an X-ray film is exposed to the mem-brane, the radioactivity creates dark bands, indicating the position (and thus the length)of the variable fragments. In the example, Suspect 2 has fragments that differ in lengthfrom those of the biological stain, and he is therefore excluded as a possible contributor.Suspect I has bands of similar lengths, indicating he might have been the contributor.Exposing the membrane to additional probes can reduce the likelihood of a coincidentalmatch, thereby increasing confidence that a suspect with a matching pattern of bands is
the contributor of the stain.
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length, there presumably is a low likelihood that any two people will
match with regard to the length of six or more of them.
In order to adapt RFLP analysis for use in criminal identifica-
tion, forensic scientists had to modify existing procedures and intro-
duce several novel elements. Techniques had to be adapted to the
special requirements of crime scene samples, which sometimes pro-
duce ambiguous results because they are old, contaminated, or com-
posed of the DNA of more than one individual.63 Quality control
procedures needed to be tightened due to the need, in forensic
DNA testing, to make decisions of critical importance based on a
single result.64 New procedures had to be developed for measuring
and matching bands because forensic tests require greater precision
than other applications of RFLP analysis. 65 Also, methods had to be
developed for estimating the rarity of DNA prints,66 a task not re-
quired for research or genetic diagnosis.
The adaptation occurred quickly (too quickly, some critics sug-
gest) and RFLP-based forensic tests were rapidly introduced in the
legal system. Some observers have suggested that Lifecodes and
Cellmark, the two commercial laboratories that introduced forensic
DNA profiling in 1987,67 engaged in a "race to the courthouse,"
each hoping to gain a competitive advantage by more quickly estab-
lishing the admissibility of its DNA test.68 There is some evidence
that the FBI, which began accepting casework in 1988, introduced
its test precipitously as well.
69
are measured due to limitations imposed by technical problems or the limited quality of
samples.
63 See Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 94; NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 51-73.
64 "In research and medical diagnostics, scientists have ample samples and can re-
peat experiments that produce equivocal results. In many instances, conclusions are
based on multiple samples; an error in one observation is of little consequence because
it is averaged out. In forensic DNA testing, however, limited samples often make it im-
possible to run a test more than once." Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 95.
65 See infra Part II.B. for a discussion of the matching proceduress used in DNA
profiling.
66 See infra Part III. for a discussion of these procedures.
67 See supra note 23.
68 Neufeld & Colman, supra note 3, at 46-53. By this account, each laboratory hoped
to licence its testing procedure to as many crime laboratories as possible in order to gain
a lucrative market for its proprietary reagents and testing materials. Although both
DNA tests employed RFLP analysis, they used different reagents and materials and pro-
duced incompatible results-that is, the DNA print of the Lifecodes test looks different
from and cannot be compared to the DNA print of the Cellmark test.
69 InJanuary 1988, the FBI published a "validation protocol," developed at the FBI's
Forensic Science Research Unit, that listed a number of steps "that should be ascended
at the research level before DNA typing techniques will be certified for use on case evi-
dence .... Bruce Budowle et al., An Introduction to the Methods of D.V-4 Analysis U nder
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No one questions that RFLP analysis is reliable and generally
accepted within the scientific community for some purposes. Scien-
tific criticism has focused solely on forensic applications of RFLP
analysis, which are more demanding than other applications of the
technique.70 The criticism primarily concerns the steps of the fo-
rensic tests that are unique to forensic applications-that is, the pro-
cedures for matching and statistical estimation. Although the way
forensic laboratories go about producing DNA prints (the first step)
has been questioned as well, these questions largely stem from con-
cerns that unreliability in the first step will complicate the process of
matching and statistical estimation. 71 Critics also charge that inade-
quate safeguards in the procedures for producing DNA prints create
a potential for false positives-that is, matches between samples
with different DNA profiles-and that such events should be taken
into account (but are not) when estimating the statistical likelihood
of a match between different people.
72
The NRC Report provided a measure of support for these criti-
cisms. Although the report concluded that "[t]he current laboratory
procedure for detecting DNA variation . . . is fundamentally
sound," 73 it declared a need for standardization of laboratory proce-
dures, proficiency testing and accreditation of laboratories in order
to assure the quality of forensic analyses.74 It also recommended
that laboratory error rates as determined by proficiency testing
should be disclosed to juries. 75
Investigation in the FBI Laboratory, CRIME LABORATORY DIG., Jan. 1988, at 19. However,
the FBI began accepting casework later that year before completing those steps.
There has been speculation that the FBI rushed its test into service in order to
promote a national standard for DNA testing that would allow development of a na-
tional index of DNA prints. Such an index would have been impossible if crime labora-
tories had adopted a hodgepodge of incompatible DNA testing procedures. By offering
free training and other assistance to state and local crime laboratories, the FBI has per-
suaded them to use its test, thereby creating a defacto national standard that has enabled
the creation of a national DNA index, which will be administered by the FBI.
70 For good reviews of the positions taken by defense experts in early DNA litigation,
see People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411,419 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), and People v. Castro,
545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). See also Lander, supra note 3.
71 Some critics charge that the procedures used to produce forensic DNA prints in-
troduce unnecessary and unpredictable variability in the position and number of bands,
making the process of matching more complicated and less reliable. One issue, for ex-
ample, concerns forensic laboratories' use of the chemical ethidium bromide during the
electrophoresis process. Some critics have suggested that this chemical causes unpre-
dictable shifts in the position of bands in DNA prints. See NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at
57, 58, 63; see also discussion infra note 122.
72 See infra part III.B. for further discussion of this issue.
73 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 149.
74 Id. at 16, 98, 108-09.
75 Id. at 88-89.
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B. DETERMINING WHETHER DNA PRINTS MATCH
In the second step of DNA profiling, an analyst determines
which samples should be declared to match. Under the procedures
currently followed in all forensic laboratories, pairs of samples are
typically classified as either a match or non-match (exclusion),
although some laboratories allow a third category, inconclusive, for
comparisons that do not meet the formal criteria for a match, but
come close. 7
6
Matching is difficult in some cases due to uncertainty about the
number and position of bands. Bands may partially be obscured
due to technical problems; spurious dark spots, easily mistaken for
bands, may appear on the autorads; and the prints themselves may
be faint or blurry.77 Forensic laboratories have no objective stan-
dards for "scoring" bands; this task is left to thejudgment of labora-
tory analysts. 78 An example of the ambiguities that can arise is
shown in Figure 2.
Most forensic laboratories use computer-assisted imaging de-
vices to help score bands. These devices scan the autorads and de-
termine the number and position of bands based on fixed criteria.
79
76 Alternative approaches are possible and have been proposed. Some experts con-
sider the match/no match dichotomy arbitrary and favor, instead, a so-called likelihood
ratio or Bayesian approach in which the weight given to a particular result would vary
according to how close the correspondence is between the DNA patterns being com-
pared-there would be no bright-line cut-off between categories. I.W. Evett, Evaluation
of DVA Profiles: Sense and Nonsense, 31 J. FORENSIC ScI. Soc'Y 205 (1991) ("a rigid cut off
point where the evidence switches from good positive to exclusionary negative is quite
illogical"); I.W. Evett et al., An Efficient Statistical Procedure for Inteipreting DA.4 Single Locus
Profiling Data in Crime Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. Soc'Y 307 (1992).
77 Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 93-95.
78 Critics have faulted the laboratories for leaving the scoring of bands to subjective
judgment and for allowing analysts to exercise that judgment without being blinded to
the identity of the samples or the expected outcome of the comparison. Whether a sus-
pect is incriminated or exculpated by the test sometimes depends on the scoring of a few
ambiguous bands. It is inappropriate, say the critics, that the forensic analysts who per-
form this task not only know the identity of the samples (i.e., which sample is the sus-
pect's) but also often know details of the underlying case that could color their view of
the likelihood the suspect is guilty. For a review of this issue, see Thompson & Ford,
supra note 10.
Forensic analysts respond that the scoring of bands is clear and unambiguous in
most cases and that in every case the autorads are available for examination by other
experts should anyone wish to question theirjudgment. Mark D. Stolorow & George W.
Clarke, Forensic D.A4 Testing: A .Vew Dimension in Criminal Evidence Gains Broad Acceptance,
25 PROSECUTOR 13, 23 (1992).
79 By comparing the position of a band in a DNA print with the positions of
"marker" bands produced by DNA fragments of known length, it is possible to estimate
the length of the polymorphic fragments represented by the band. This process is
known as sizing the bands; the estimated length of the DNA fragment represented by a
band is often called the band size and is expressed as a number of base pairs. A DNA
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FIGURE 2. Ambiguous DNA Print Comparison. This figure shows two DNA prints of
the same individual processed by Cellmark Diagnostics as part of a proficiency test.
Lane 18n is a relatively fresh blood stain; lane 25n is a five year-old blood stain from the
same individual. Lane M is DNA from a different individual and is being used as a con-
trol. Cellmark employed a cocktail of four probes, producing patterns with multiple
bands. In an initial report, Cellmark reported that samples 18 and 25 were suitable for
comparison but did not match. A subsequent report corrected the error. The compari-
son of 18 and 25 is complicated by degradation of the DNA in 25, which reduced the
intensity of the upper bands, and by artifactual dark spots in the lower half of the print,
which may have been mistaken for bands.
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However, all forensic laboratories allow the analyst to override the
computer's determinations manually and to cause the computer to
reassign bands to whatever locations the analyst chooses.80 Reas-
signment of bands through manual override can convert exculpa-
tory results into incriminating ones, and vice versa.8'
Matching is also made difficult by the potential for variability in
DNA prints. The number and position of bands in someone's DNA
print may change a bit depending on the quality of the biological
samples and the testing conditions.8 2 Hence, DNA prints of the
same person are not always identical.
Forensic matching procedures are designed to take the variabil-
ity of DNA prints into account. Two DNA prints may differ some-
what but nevertheless be declared to match if the discrepancies are
thought to be within the normal range of variation for prints of the
same individual. DNA prints are declared not to match only if the
observed discrepancies are thought to exceed the normal range of
variation in light of the testing conditions and quality of the sam-
ples. Hence, the match/no match determination depends on knowl-
edge (or assumptions) about the range of variation possible in the
results of the particular test.8 3
To deal with discrepancies in the position of bands, the forensic
laboratories have all developed "quantitative matching rules" that
specify how closely the bands in two DNA prints must align in order
to be called a match.8 4 If the bands in a pair of samples appear to
align, the bands are "sized"-that is, an estimate is made of the
length (in number of base-pairs) of the DNA fragment represented
profile is the set of band sizes that characterize a given DNA sample. Band sizing can be
done by ruler measurement and hand calculation, but is laborious. The major advan-
tage of the computer-assisted imaging devices is that they save time.
80 Records of these manual overrides are sketchy or non-existent; hence it is impossi-
ble to tell from laboratory reports how much role the analyst's judgment played in scor-
ing bands in a particular case.
s An interesting example was uncovered in State v. Despain, No. 15589 (Yuma Co.,
Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 1991). After an expert retained by the defendant expressed
concern about the accuracy of the FBI's band sizings, the court, upon a motion by the
defendant, ordered the FBI to rescore the autorads using its computer imaging device
but without any manual override. The computer's sizing of the autorads differed in a
number of respects from the results the FBI had reported (which had been based on
manual override of a previous computer sizing). Several bands that the FBI relied upon
to establish a match between two key samples were placed in a different position by the
computer than by the analyst. Had the computer's sizings been accepted, the FBI would
have reported an exclusion rather than a match. Record at 1-98, Despain (No. 15589)
(testimony of Dr. Simon Ford on Oct. 10, 1991).
82 See generally Thompson & Ford, supra note 10; Shields, supra note 10.
83 See generally NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 51-73.
84 Id.
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by each band.8 5 The sizes of all corresponding bands must fall
within a specified tolerance for the prints to be declared a match.
Each laboratory has a different tolerance based, supposedly, on the
possible range of variation of its results. For example, the FBI de-
clares two DNA profiles to match only if the sizes of all correspond-
ing bands are within approximately five percent of each other,86 and
Lifecodes requires that the band sizes differ by no more than 1.8%,
although exceptions are sometimes made.8 7
To deal with discrepancies in the number of bands, laboratory
analysts rely on the interpretation of indicators and controls
designed to detect problems that could cause the disappearance of
85 To say that the "size" of a band is 1000 base-pairs, for example, means that the
band is thought to reflect a DNA fragment of that length. Bands are "sized" by compar-
ing their position on the autorad with the positions of "marker" bands resulting from
fragments of a variety of known sizes. Based on the position of the markers, the labora-
tory computes a mathematical function relating band position and size that is used to
translate the former to the latter.
86 The FBI has described its match criterion as a "±2.5% window." Bruce Budowle
et al., Fived Bin Analysis for Statistical Evaluation of Continuous Distributions of Allelic Data from
I'VTR Loci, for Use in Forensic Comparisons, 48 AM.J. HUM. GENETICS 841, 844-45 (1991).
This rather ambiguous characterization has left some commentators with the erroneous
impression that the FBI requires the measured sizes of two bands to be within 2.5% of
each other to be declared a match. In fact, the FBI protocol specifies that the ±2.5%
window be drawn around each band and that a match may be called if these windows
overlap. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Procedures for the Detection of Restriction
Fragment Length Polymorphisms in Human DNA at 21 (Dec. 4, 1989) (unpublished
laboratory protocol); Shields, supra note 10, at 11. Hence, bands that differ in measured
size by up to 5% may be declared to match. Moreover, one defense expert has charged
that there are "fudge factors" in the FBI's matching procedure that expand the range of
potential matches even beyond 5%. Record at 1-98, State v. Despain, No. 15589 (Yuma
Co., Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 1991) (testimony of Dr. Simon Ford). Among the "fudge
factors" is the ability of the analyst to override the computer scoring system if it showed
band comparisons to be slightly outside the FBI's match "window" and to manually
reassign the position of bands to make them match, an event that apparently occurred in
that case. See supra note 81; see also State v. Bruno, Nos. CR 89-7443, 7444, & 7445 (New
Hanover Co., N.C., Super. Ct., 1990), aft'd, 424 S.E.2d 440 (N.C. 1993) (band measure-
ments declared to match by FBI).
87 See Lander, supra note 3, at 502. Critics have questioned whether there is an ade-
quate scientific foundation for the quantitative matching rules-that is, whether the fo-
rensic laboratories know enough about the variability of their own procedures to devise
appropriate quantitative criteria for a match. Eric Lander, Invited Editorial: Research on
D.V4 Typing Catching Up with Courtroom Application, 48 AM. J. HuM. GENETICS 819 (1991);
Shields, supra note 10, at 8-17. Critics have also charged that some laboratories use
quantitative matching rules that are too broad, such that prints so discrepant that they
are unlikely to be from the same individual may nevertheless be declared to match. Id.;
see also infra note 121 and accompanying text. Proponents generally respond that con-
cerns about matching are of marginal importance. The precise size of the matching
standard matters little, they say, because the tests are so discriminating that DNA prints
of different individuals are unlikely even to come close to matching under the matching
standards currently in use. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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true bands or the appearance of spurious extra bands.88 The analyst
may need to review the entire process of creating the DNA print, or
conduct additional experiments, to determine whether the observed
discrepancies were caused by technical problems rather than true
genetic differences between the samples. To make such determina-
tions accurately, analysts must have a sophisticated knowledge of
both the procedures used to create the prints and factors that could
cause variability in the results.
89
A third factor complicating the determination of matches is the
potential, in forensic work, for samples to contain the DNA of more
than one individual. In rape cases, for example, vaginal swabs may
contain DNA of both the rapist and the victim, as well as the DNA of
other sexual partners of the victim. Blood stains at crime scenes
occasionally are mixtures, containing more than one person's DNA.
Samples can also become mixed if mishandling by police or labora-
tory technicians causes cross-contamination. Interpretation of fo-
rensic DNA tests often requires analysts to distinguish the extra
bands or alleles that indicate a mixed sample from extra bands and
alleles that result from laboratory artifacts or accidental cross-con-
tamination. The adequacy and reliability of the forensic procedures
used to make such distinctions has also been questioned.90
C. THE DEBATE OVER MATCHING IN THE COURTS
The difficulty of distinguishing matching and non-matching
DNA prints first came to public attention in the widely publicized
case of People v. Castro.9 1 Lifecodes Corporation had declared a
match between blood samples from a homicide victim and a blood
stain on the defendant's watch. This evidence was offered to prove
the defendant's identity as the killer. In a pretrial hearing on the
admissibility of the DNA evidence, several prominent scientists ini-
88 See Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 110.
89 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 52-63. Critics have charged that forensic analysts
sometimes make these determinations in a cavalier manner, without adequate scientific
foundation. See, e.g., Lander, supra note 3, passin. The failure of forensic laboratories to
"blind" analysts to the identity of the samples and the expected outcome of the analysis
is also an issue for these judgments. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 110-14.
Proponents respond that misinterpretations have been rare and represent, at worst, a
misuse of DNA technology rather than a problem with the technology per se. Moen-
ssens, supra note 9, at 107; Stolorow & Clarke, supra note 78, at 24-25. These propo-
nents assert that misinterpretation of DNA tests, if and when it occurs, can be dealt with
appropriately in the adversarial process by allowing criminal defendants to hire their
own experts to give a second opinion.
90 Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 116-20; NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 55,
58-59.
91 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
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tially vouched for the reliability of Lifecodes' findings. But experts
retained by the defendant criticized Lifecodes' procedure on a
number of grounds.9 2 First, there were disagreements about the
scoring of bands. According to the defense experts, Lifecodes drew
conclusions from ambiguous data, and did so in a seemingly biased
manner-scoring faint bands that helped incriminate the defendant
while ignoring bands that would have exculpated the defendant.
Lifecodes' rationale for ignoring potentially exculpatory data was ad
hoc and lacked scientific foundation. Lifecodes had not used ade-
quate controls to verify that its interpretations were correct and had
ignored the failure of some of the controls it did use. Finally,
Lifecodes had disregarded discrepancies between the bands it had
scored that exceeded its quantitative match criteria. Consequently,
the defense argued that there was inadequate scientific basis for
Lifecodes' conclusion that the victim's blood and the blood on the
watch had a matching genetic characteristics.9 3
These criticisms proved persuasive even to some of the prose-
cution's expert witnesses. In an unusual move, two scientists who
had testified for the prosecution met privately with two experts for
the defense. The group issued a statement saying that the results in
the case "are not scientifically reliable enough" to support the con-
clusion that the two key samples matched.94 Thereafter, the two
prosecution experts retook the stand and recanted their previous
testimony in support of the test.9 5
The Court ruled the evidence of a DNA match inadmissible
92 Excellent summaries of the scientific issues in Castro may be found in Lander, supra
note 3, and Hoeffel, supra note 11.
93 There was also extensive criticism of Lifecodes' procedures for estimating the fre-
quency of the matching DNA prints, which will be discussed inlfra at part III.
94 Lander, supra note 3, at 504.
95 Id. After the DNA evidence was ruled inadmissible, defendant Castro pleaded
guilty. Moenssens, supra note 9, at 98-99. In discussions of the case, some commenta-
tors have cited the guilty plea as evidence that criticisms of Lifecodes' techniques were
overblown and incorrect. Id.; Stolorow & Clarke, supra note 78, at 18-19. This claim is
fatuous. The defense experts did not argue that Lifecodes' results were exculpatory;
they argued that Lifecodes' conclusions were inadequately grounded in science. That
Lifecodes' conclusions happened to be correct (if that is indeed what Castro's negoti-
ated plea means) is not a response to these criticisms. A conclusion reached in a slap-
dash, haphazard manner does not suddenly become intellectually rigorous if it turns out
to be correct.
A related claim, frequently made, is that the problems that created ambiguity in the
Castro case were unique and have not occurred in other cases. Moenssens, supra note 9,
at 107. This claim is demonstrably wrong. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 128-
30 (documenting numerous examples from forensic casework of problems similar to
those in Castro); Shields, supra note 10, at 14-16 (citing examples from casework);
Thompson & Ford, Is the Probative Value of Forensic D.V.4 Evidence L'ndennined by Subjectivitv
in Deternmination oflatches, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
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under an innovative legal theory. 96 Despite the spectacular clash of
experts that had occurred before him, the judge found that the pros-
ecution had met its burden under Frye of proving that "DNA foren-
sic techniques and experiments are generally accepted in the
scientific community and can produce reliable results." 97 Thejudge
construed the scientific clash as a dispute over how properly to ap-
ply a technique that "can produce reliable results" rather than a dis-
pute about whether the technique is inherently unreliable. The
DNA evidence of a match was ruled inadmissible because "[t]he
testing laboratory failed in several major respects to use the gener-
ally accepted scientific techniques and experiments .. ."98 In sum,
Castro held that DNA profiling meets the Frye standard, but imposed
an additional foundational requirement on the proponent of the
technology of demonstrating that the correct techniques had been
used, and held that the prosecution had failed to meet that founda-
tional requirement. 99
Following Castro, disputes over Lifecodes' matching procedures
have continued to surface in litigation.'0 0 Scientific critics have
questioned the scientific basis for Lifecodes' quantitative matching
ON FORENSIC STATISTICS (forthcoming) (documenting examples from recent casework).
See also cases discussed infra part II.C.
96 Lifecodes' conclusion that the blood on the watch did not match Castro was not
challenged by the defense; the challenge focused solely on the conclusion that the blood
matched the victim in the case.
97 People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
98 Id.
99 A number of courts have followed Castro in requiring proponents of DNA evidence
to make a foundational showing that "correct procedures" were used in the particular
case. United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Deppish, 807
P.2d 144 (Kan. 1991); People v. Fishback, 829 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Perry v.
State, 586 So. 2d 242 (Ala. 1991). See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the
DNA Cases Over the Foundation for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human
Error as a Cause of Forensic .isanalysis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). In some
jurisdictions, proof that "correct procedures" were used is considered part of the re-
quired showing under Fye. See People v. Axell, I Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991);
People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (1992). For arguments in favor of the Castro
approach, see Hoeffel, supra note 11, at 503-07.
However, other courts have taken a more limited view of the requirements for ad-
missibility under Frye. See People v. Wesley, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992) ("[A]ncillary issues regarding integrity of the particular forensic sample from
which the DNA fingerprint was obtained and whether the laboratory followed the ac-
cepted procedures in carrying out the tests on the particular sample at issue speak to the
weight the evidence is accorded and thus are not relevant to the initial determination of
admissibility .... ); Hopkins v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1297 (Ind. 1991).
100 See Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 98-1 10 (discussing technical details of
several cases); Alun Anderson, D.\-I Fingnprinting on Trial, 342 NATURE 844 (1989);
Colin Norman, Maine Case Deals Blow to D.4 Fingerprinting, 246 SCIENCE 1556 (1989).
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rule01 and have criticized Lifecodes for relying on ambiguous data
and for calling matches between bands that differ in size more than
allowed by Lifecodes' quantitative match criteria.10 2 Disputes have
arisen in some cases over Lifecodes' use of "monomorphic probes"
(which produce a band of the same size in every sample) to adjust
for spurious misalignment of bands caused by technical
problems. 0 3 In the majority of cases, courts have held that disputes
over the matching procedure raise issues going to the weight, rather
than the admissibility, of the DNA evidence.
At least one court, however, has held that DNA evidence is
inadmissible where the "match" did not meet Lifecodes' quantita-
tive matching rule. In People v. Keene,104 experts for the prosecution
''testified that there was a 'satisfying impression of a match'
here. . " 105 But two experts retained by the defendant were
neither satisfied with the match, nor impressed by Lifecodes' use of
monomorphic probes to "adjust" for the misalignment of bands.
They testified that the use of monomorphic probes for this purpose
is not generally accepted in the scientific community, and that
Lifecodes had performed the adjustment improperly in any case.
Acknowledging the complexity of the issue, the court declared "it
would be judicial foolhardiness to submit the issue... to the jury to
determine the weight of such evidence."' 06 A key factor in the
court's decision was the NRC Report, published shortly after the
hearing in the case, which advised against the use of monomorphic
probes to "adjust" for misalignment of bands, pending further
101 The reproducibility studies on which Lifecodes based its match criteria were per-
formed on fresh, clean blood samples. See Michael Baird et al., Allele Frequency Distribution
of Two Highly Polymorphic DNA Sequences in Three Ethnic Groups and Its Application to the Deter-
mination of Paternity, 39 AM. J. Hum. GENETICs 489, 494 (1986). Some experts find such
studies inadequate because they neglect "the artifacts that can arise with degraded and
contaminated evidence samples" and may therefore give an inaccurate picture of the
actual variability of the DNA typing system. Lander, supra note 87, at 820. See also NRC
REPORT, supra note 12, at 61-62 ("The match criterion must be based on reproducibility
studies that show the actual degree of variability observed when multiple samples from
the same person are separately prepared and analyzed under typical forensic conditions.")
(emphasis added).
102 See, e.g., Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1990). See also Anderson, supra note
100, at 844 (discussing such a case); Norman, supra note 100, at 1556 (discussing such a
case).
103 For a discussion of the problem of spurious band misalignment (sometimes called
"band shift") and the use of monomorphic probes to correct for it, see NRC REPORT,
supra note 12, at 59-61; Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 98-110; Lander, supra note
87, at 821 (characterizing use of monomorphic probes to correct for band shift as
"venturesome").
104 591 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
105 Id. at 737.
106 Id. at 740.
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study, 10 7 and thus strongly supported the defense claim that this
procedure is not generally accepted in the scientific community.
Disputes have also arisen over the admissibility of Cellmark's
test.'08 Cellmark has been criticised for failing to publish research
on the reproducibility of measurements in its DNA typing system, 109
for failing to take the variability of measurements into account when
it established its quantitative match criterion," 0 and for calling
matches in cases where the discrepancies between bands exceeded
its quantitative match criterion."' Cellmark has also been accused
of drawing conclusions in some cases in a cavalier manner, without
adequate scientific foundation. 1 2 So far, all challenges on these
grounds have been held to go to the weight rather than the admissi-
bility of Cellmark's DNA test." 3
The FBI's matching procedure has been similarly disputed."
14
The most extensive and important clash occurred in United States v.
Yee." 5 A central issue in Yee was the adequacy of the FBI's research
107 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 60-61.
108 People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Barney, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
109 Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 426; Barny, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 739.
110 Cellmark did not perform reproducibility studies before establishing its match cri-
terion. It initially based its match criterion on the amount of variability in band mea-
surements that its system could reliably detect, rather than the amount of variability that
actually occurred. Lander has declared this to be an invalid basis for a match criterion
because it "ignor[es] all sources of experimental variability other than the final step of
[scoring the band]." Lander, supra note 87, at 820. In response, Cellmark's scientific
staff noted that they have since performed a reproducibility study. Robin W. Cotton et
al., Response Letter, Research on DNA Typing Validated in the Literature, 49 AM. J. HuM.
GENETICS 898 (1991). Lander replied that Cellmark's reproducibility study "remains
unpublished to my knowldege and thus is not yet in the scientific literature." Eric
Lander, Lander Reply, 49 AM.J. HUM. GENETICS 899 (1991) [hereinafter Lander Reply]. See
also Shields, supra note 10, at 11 ("It is at least possible that [Cellmark's match criteria]
can be validated statistically ... but until they publish their studies this remains an open
question."). Cellmark's Laboratory Director refused a request by the author of this arti-
cle for a copy of its unpublished reproducibility data. Interview with Dr. Daniel Garner,
Cellmark Laboratory Director, in Anaheim, Cal. (Feb. 21, 1991). These data remain
unpublished and are apparently available only by court order.
II' See, e.g., State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989) ("[T]he Cellmark
report opined that the DNA samples from the stained blue jeans and from [the victim's]
blood 'are from the same individual,' even though the banding patterns did not fit their
match criteria.").
112 See Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 116-120 (discussing technical details of
several cases); Thompson & Ford, supra note 95, at 11-15 (manuscript)(discussing a
case).
113 See, e.g., Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 411. But see Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731, and
discussion thereof, infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
1 14 For a particularly cogent critique of the FBI's matching standards, see Shields,
supra note 10.
1'5 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
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to validate its matching procedure-research that is described in
several published articles. 1 6 Concerned about ambiguities and in-
consistencies in these articles," 1 7 the defense in Yee sought access to
the underlying data. After protracted litigation, access was
granted. "18
The defense in Yee made a multi-pronged attack on the FBI's
matching standards based on evaluations of these data by experts
they had retained. First, they argued that the FBI's validation re-
search was inadequate and, indeed, that many of the conclusions in
the FBI's published articles were either groundless or wrong."19
Second, they argued that key findings reported in the FBI's valida-
tion research could not be replicated.' 20 Third, they argued that the
FBI's system for DNA profiling is subject to unpredictable variabil-
116 The key publications are Bruce Budowle et al., Validation with Regard to Environmen-
tal Insults of the RFLP Procedure for Forensic Purposes, in FORENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY (Mark
Farley &James Harrington eds., 1991); Budowle et al., supra note 86, at 841.
117 Prepublication copies of these articles were available in manuscript form during
the Yee hearing in 1990.
118 In United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990), the court granted de-
fendants' motion for discovery.
119 For example, Professor Peter D'Eustachio, a molecular biologist at New York Uni-
versity, in an Expert's Report placed in evidence in Iee, stated:
I have reviewed the two FBI manuscripts [Environmental Insult Article and
Fixed Bin Article] as well as the lab notebooks and autoradiograms from which the
results reported in these manuscripts were taken. Based on this review, I find no
scientific basis for their conclusions. Many of the key experiments were badly
designed and poorly executed, and many interpretations of data appear to be arbi-
trary, often because key controls failed or were omitted entirely ....
Thus, instead of concluding that the FBI has developed and validated a relia-
ble, sensitive procedure for identification of forensic DNA specimens, I conclude
that they have not, and that the validation procedures themselves are badly flawed.
Report of Professor Peter D'Eustachio, An Evaluation of the FBI's Environmental Insult Vali-
dation Study and the FBI's Quantitative Matching Criteria at 5-7, ee, 129 F.R.D. 629 [herein-
after D'Eustachio Report].
120 The data that the FBI's scientific staff characterize as "most important for determi-
nation of a tolerance window for matching criteria for forensic analysis" are contained in
Table 3 of Budowle et al., supra note 86, at 842. This table compares the measurement
of DNA fragments in different samples known to have come from the same person (the
victim) in actual forensic cases. When the defense in Ie sought to discover the data
underlying this table, the FBI could not produce it. The agency reported that it had not
kept adequate scientific records. Instead, the FBI produced more recent data of the
same type. However, these new data did not replicate the findings of Table 3. The data
in Table 3 indicate that the measured size of bands in evidentiary samples (vaginal
swabs) tends to be slightly larger than the measured size of the same bands in blood
samples. The new data also showed such a measurement bias, but in the opposite direc-
tion. Professor D'Eustachio's evaluation of this finding was scathing:
The data from which the FBI derived their plus or minus 2.5% matching win-
dow reveal a significant bias in DNA band size measurements that furthermore has
1993]
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ity12 1 that can affect the sizing of bands and greatly complicate the
task of distinguishing matching and non-matching samples.122 The
changed over time for reasons that are not apparent. These data simply do not
provide a reliable and reproducible basis for making decisions as to window sizes.
This unrepeatable bias means that there is no objective, reproducible standard
for comparison of known and questioned DNA specimens.
In terms of good science this leaves us nowhere .... The validation studies for
devising a quantitative matching rule should be done again, and done right this
time. D'Eustachio Report supra note 119 at 16, 18, 26.
121 During the Yee hearing, much was made of an unpublished FBI study in which 225
FBI agent-trainees were each DNA typed on two occasions. When defense experts ex-
amined the data they made a startling discovery: by the FBI's own standards many of
the agents did not match themselves. According to a report filed with the Court by
Professor Daniel Hartl of Washington University Medical School:
My analysis of the FBI test and retest data implies that the binning procedure as
carried out by the FBI makes egregious errors at a truly incredible rate. In a re-
search laboratory such quality control would be totally unacceptable, and in a medi-
cal diagnostic laboratory it would be criminally negligent. In consideration of these
data, no reasonable case can be made that the FBI procedures, as presently applied,
are reliable and generally acceptable.
Report of Professor Daniel Hartl, Expert s Report in the case of United States v. lee, at 2, Yee,
129 F.R.D. 169 [hereinafter Hartl Report].
The FBI's scientists responded that it is unfair to treat the comparison as a repro-
ducibility study, because "the samples were not analyzed under identical conditions."
Bruce Budowle & John Stafford, Response to Hartd, Expert's Report in the Case of United
States v. Yee, et al., 18 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 101 (1991). Critics of the FBI argue
that there is also uncontrollable variability in the conditions under which actual forensic
samples are analyzed.
122 Another expert for the defense in Yee, Dr. Paul Hagerman of the University of
Colorado Medical School, placed in evidence a report that is highly critical of the FBI's
methods for "isolation and quantitation" of DNA and of the FBI's use of a chemical
called ethidium bromide ("EtBr') in its gels during electrophoresis of DNA. Report of
Dr. Hagerman, Loading Variability and the Use of Ethidium Bromide: Implications for the Relia-
bility of the FBI's Methodology for Forensic DNA Typing at 1, 1ee, 129 F.R.D. 629. According
to Hagerman, these problems are relevant to the FBI's matching procedure, because
they interfere with the FBI's ability to measure bands accurately by creating "significant
and unpredictable shifts in band position" which can "result in serious problems in the
interpretation of bands." Id. These and other problems in the FBI's procedures "call
into question [the FBI's] ability either to size an individual band accurately against
known standards, or to make an accurate comparison between two bands representing
DNAs from different sources." Id. at 12. These problems also undermine the validity of
the studies the FBI performed to determine the appropriate size for its matching win-
dow. Id. at 13. In particular, the problems "call into question the scientific reliability of
the lane-to-lane comparisons described in Table 3 of the 'Fixed Bin' paper ... from
which the FBI's quantitative matching rule was derived." Id. Hagerman expresses con-
cern that "the match criterion is too broad (excessively high rate of apparent inclu-
sions)" and notes that the FBI's match criteria (window) is much broader than that of
either Lifecodes or Cellmark. Id. Hagerman concludes that these considerations
"render highly problematic [the FBI's] match window of 5%" and "lead to the conclu-
sion that the match window is too large, i.e., that it will result in too many apparent
matches." Id. at 16. He also expresses concern that "differential shifts may be occurring
in a manner that would not be readily apparent, thus leading to potential misidentifica-
tions." Id. at 16-17.
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defense took the position that too little is known about the variabil-
ity of the FBI's DNA typing system, or its susceptibility to artifacts,
to allow adequate assessment of the FBI's matching procedure, but
suggested that available evidence indicated the FBI's quantitative
match standards are generally too broad.1 23
Experts for the prosecution were unable to refute these criti-
cisms directly,' 24 but managed to persuade the federal magistrate
(whose conclusions were adopted by the court) that they raise issues
going to the weight rather than the admissibility of DNA evidence.
The court, as did the magistrate, acknowledged that there is signifi-
cant disagreement about the reliability of the FBI's test: "Scientists
of indisputable national and international repute and stature, aided
and confronted by lawyers of unusual skill and understanding of the
issues, took diametrically opposed views on the issue of general ac-
ceptability, and those views reflected the division of opinion on the
merits of the underlying scientific disagreement."' 125 Nevertheless,
the court ruled that the FBI's DNA test met the Frye standard. 26
123 Professor Hart states that the FBI's window "should be scaled down by approxi-
mately one half" to be consistent with accepted scientific practice. Hartd Report, supra
note 121, at 3. He notes that "[t]he problem with using the [FBI's] window is that too
many false matches are declared" and concludes that "the matching criteria employed
by the FBI would not be considered as generally accepted and reliable in the scientific
community." Id.
Prof. D'Eustachio agreed:
[F]actors causing bands that are in fact of the same size to migrate differently
on gels must be understood, or at least well controlled and reproducible... [and]
the window size should be chosen so that it does not exceed the level of risk for
false positives (matches) that is generally accepted as reliable in the research and
clinical communities for similar applications of this technology .... The FBI fails to
meet either standard.
D'Eustachio Report, supra note 119, at 16.
124 The magistrate generally credited the defense expert's criticisms of the validation
underlying the matching standard, concluding that there were "troublesome questions
about the quality of the Bureau's work." United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 207
(N.D. Ohio 1991). "I do not either disregard or discount the accuracy of many of the
criticisms about the remarkably poor quality of the FBI's work and infidelity to impor-
tant scientific principles." Id. at 210. The magistrate found, for example, that "Dr.
Budowle [of the FBI] did not respond persuasively to Dr. D'Eustachio's criticisms, and
he refused to acknowledge the potential significance or merit of a competent scientist's
critique and to consider the desirability for further experimentation and confirmation."
Id.
125 Id. at 206.
126 Although ee purported to apply the Frye standard, the case was decided under the
law of the Sixth Circuit, which "has overruled Frye sub silento." United States v. Porter,
120 DAILY WASH. L. RPTR. 477, n.79 (Super. Ct. D.C. 1991), vacated and remanded, 618
A.2d 629 (D.C. 1992) (citing C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203, at 606 (3d ed. 1984)).
Under the lenient standard of admissibility applied in 1ee, the proponent of novel evi-
dence need only produce "a set of experts" to testify "that the procedure [is] generally
accepted." Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 165. If the court finds them persuasive, the novel proce-
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A major theme of the prosecution experts in Yee, which the
magistrate (and court) found persuasive, was that a multiple probe
match (within the FBI's standards) is unlikely to occur if two sam-
ples are from different people, 127 and therefore the test is unlikely
to incriminate an innocent person falsely, notwithstanding any un-
certainties about match criteria.
128
The issues raised in Yee have been replayed in several subse-
quent hearings on the admissibility of the FBI DNA test, with mixed
results. Some courts have concluded that challenges to matching
"involve considerations of the reliability of particular test results
and not whether the FBI's techniques are generally accepted as ca-
pable of producing reliable results."' 129 Consequently, such consid-
erations "go to either the admissibility or the weight to be given the
evidence in a particular case, not admissibility under Frye."'
130
Only one court has held that the dispute over the FBI's match-
ing procedure precludes the admissibility of the test under Frye. In
dure is admissible "despite thefirmly held countervailing views of the opponent's experts." Id.
By contrast, under orthodox Frye analysis, a judge who observes a significant number of
opposing experts with firmly held countervailing views should conclude that the scien-
tific technique is not generally accepted and rule it inadmissible. See, e.g., People v. Shir-
ley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1377 (Cal. 1982) ("[T]he burden is on the proponent of the new
technique to show scientific concensus supporting its use; if a fair overview ... discloses
that scientists significant in number or expertise publicly oppose [the technique] as un-
reliable, the court may safely conclude there is no such consensus at the present time.").
127 Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 174-77.
128 The prosecution position, adopted by the court, was that the value of a DNA
match is necessarily high because the likelihood of a coincidental match is low. The
defense position was that the value of a match on the FBI's system is impossible to
evaluate because insufficient data exist to assess the likelihood of any particular match if
the samples are from the same source, and there is reason to think the FBI could call
matches between samples unlikely to be from the same source. For further discussion of
this point, see infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
129 State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 492 (N.H. 1992) (FBI's DNA test inadmissi-
ble because statistical techniques fail Fye standard). The defense had raised challenges
regarding the size of the FBI's match window, the lack of an objective criteria for match-
ing, and the insufficiency of the FBI's validation. Id.
130 Id. at 492-93. A similar conclusion was reached in United States v. Jakobetz, 747
F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990), aft'd, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992) (FBI DNA test held admis-
sible under relevancy standard). In that case, the district court noted that the concern
that the FBI's matching criteria may allow poor quality matches "does not, in itself,
render the matching criteria unreliable as a whole but rather provides fodder for effec-
tive cross examination when that condition occurs." Id. at 257. The defense expert
"conceded that if the autorad matches in this particular case were within plus or minus
1% of the number of base pairs, he would have more confidence in the conclusion that
there was in fact a match." Id. The prosecution pointed out that all comparisons that
incriminated defendant Jakobetz were indeed within 1%, thereby sidestepping the criti-
cism in that case.
[Vol. 84
LESSONS FROM THE "DNA WAR"
People v. Halik,t31 a Los Angeles trial court concluded that "match-
ing is an integral part of the total technology which, in a forensic
setting, must pass the test of Kelly-Frye. . . . [Consequently,]
[m]atching is the keystone in the archway to admissibility."13 2 To
determine whether the FBI's matching procedure passed muster,
the court reviewed "perhaps the most comprehensive compilation
of judicial and scientific materials ever assembled for a pre-trial
hearing on these issues"13 3 and found that scientific opinion on the
FBI's matching procedure is split, with a majority of scientists who
have publicly spoken on the issue taking the position that the FBI's
matching procedures are unreliable and unacceptable.' 3 4
There is a profound, significant and honestly-held disagreement
among these men of science as to whether the protocol employed by
the FBI to declare a match of DNA fragments between a known and an
unknown source has gained general acceptance in their scientific
community.' 35
No other court has followed Halik; however, no other defense
counsel have raised challenges to the admissibility of the FBI's
matching procedures based on such an extensive record. Thus, the
debate over appropriate matching procedures is probably not re-
solved. Indeed, the NRC Report, with its emphasis on the impor-
tance of empirical validation of matching standards, is likely to add
fuel to the debate about current procedures. Moreover, because the
NRC Report makes it clear that the matching standards for each
DNA typing system must be validated independently, 36 the debate
is likely to arise anew as new systems are developed.
How should courts view disputes over matching? To address
this question, we must consider two fundamental issues that under-
lie the matching debate: (1) whether objective match criteria are
even necessary, and (2) what kind of empirical research, if any, is
needed to validate the match procedure.
'3' People v. Halik, No. VA00843 (Los Angeles Co., Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 1991)
(Ruling and Order of C. Robert Simpson, Jr., J.).
132 Id. at 16-17.
133 Id. at 2. The court took judicial notice of the complete records of the Frye hearings
in several previous cases, including State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d 135 (N.M. Ct. App.),
cert. granted, 848 P.2d 531 (N.M. March 11, 1993); United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161
(N.D. Ohio 1991); and State v. Despain, No. 15589 (Yuma Co., Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb. 12,
1991), as well as hearing live testimony.
134 Halik, No. VA00843, at 39.
135 Id.
136 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 54 ("The match criterion must be based on the
actual variability in measurement observed in appropriate test experiments conducted
in each testing laboratoiv.") (emphasis added).
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D. THE NEED FOR OBJECTIVE MATCH CRITERIA
Proponents of DNA testing often argue that a trained analyst
can reliably determine whether DNA prints match by simple visual
inspection. 137 They suggest that objective match criteria, although
perhaps helpful, are not really necessary.' 3 8 Hence, concerns about
whether matching rules have been adequately validated or appropri-
ately followed have little to do with the fundamental reliability or
validity of forensic tests.' 39
But many scientists think objective matching standards are nec-
essary, and their position. has been strongly endorsed by the NRC
Report. The NRC Report declared that objective standards are "es-
sential" both for scoring DNA prints 140 and for determining
matches. 14 1 It acknowledged that subjective matching rules (e.g.,
comparison by eye) and the failure to adhere to a stated matching
rule had been a source of considerable controversy, and rejected
these practices as inappropriate for forensic DNA testing.1
42
Objective standards are needed, in part, because the results of
forensic DNA tests may turn on distinctions among DNA prints too
subtle to be reliably detected by visual inspection.' 43 Objective
137 See, e.g., Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 442 (Ga. 1990) ("Lifecodes contended
that a visual observation was adequate to declare a match."); Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d
144, 157 (Ka. 1991) ("One method of declaring a match is simply by visual determina-
tion .... ).
138 A common argument is that formal match criteria are generally not used by scien-
tists who perform RFLP analysis for research and genetic diagnosis and therefore should
not be necessary in forensics. See Lander, supra note 3, at 501; Thompson & Ford, supra
note 10, at 94-97; NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 53-54.
139 "Whether or not there is a match between patterns produced by DNA samples
extracted from two or more sources is primarily a qualitative judgment by a knowledge-
able investigator based on a careful review of all information pertinent to the tests un-
dertaken." Statement of the FBI Working Group on Statistical Standards for DNA
Analysis (Aug. 13, 1990) (on file with William C. Thompson).
140 "There must be an objective and quantitative procedure for identifying the pat-
tern of a sample." NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 53.
141 "The match criterion ... must be objective, precise and uniformly applied." Id. at
54.
142 Id. The NRC Report seems to imply that the concerns about matching arose only
"in early cases." Id. But such concerns continue to be raised in litigation and in schol-
arly articles. The NRC Committee did not attempt a thorough review of the procedures
actually in use in particular forensic laboratories. Committee members may not have
realized the extent to which the subjective standards, which the Committee condemned,
continue to be used and to cause problems in actual casework.
143 In research and diagnostics, scientists generally need to distinguish only three or
four possible DNA prints, each of which is quite distinct and known in advance. In
forensics, by contrast, there are, in theory, billions of possible DNA prints and the relia-
bility of the test may depend on making fine grade distinctions among patterns that are
quite similar. See NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 53-54; Lander, supra note 3, at 501;
Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 94-95.
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match criteria are also needed in order to estimate the frequency of
a match in a reference population. One cannot determine accu-
rately what percentage of the DNA prints in a data base would
"match" the print of a given individual, unless one can specify with
precision what constitutes a match. 144
The most important reason for using objective standards, how-
ever, is to prevent analysts from engaging in inappropriate boot-
strap logic when evaluating DNA evidence. Commentators have
noted a disturbing tendency for forensic analysts to resolve ambigu-
ities in DNA patterns in a manner consistent with the expected re-
sult.' 45 The analyst may, for example, infer that a discrepancy
between two DNA profiles on one autorad must be an artifact (rather
than a true genetic difference) because there is a match on the other
autorads or, worse yet, because other evidence in the case suggests
the two profiles have a common source.' 46 Professor Eric Lander
has condemned this kind of bootstrap interpretation in forensics be-
cause "one runs the risk of discounting precisely those differences
that would exonerate an innocent defendant."1 47 An analyst who
too readily dismisses discrepancies in a DNA test that do not fit with
other evidence can mistakenly conclude that weak, equivocal evi-
dence is quite powerful, and thereby mislead the trier of fact.148
144 "[W]ithout an objective definition of a match, there is no meaningful way to deter-
mine the probability that a declared match might have arisen by chance." Lander, supra
note 3, at 502-03. "[Ihe probative value of the evidence is best gauged not by the
frequency of prints that would match perfectly, but by the frequency of prints that would
match under the looser standards actually used by the analyst." Thompson & Ford,
supra note 10, at 97.
145 For example, Lander has suggested that Lifecodes' analysts failed to score poten-
tially exculpatory bands in the Castro case because they were "influenced by making di-
rect comparisons between lanes containing different DNA samples, rather than by
considering each lane in its own right." Lander, supra note 3, at 502. Recognizing this
danger, the NRC Report declared that "[i]t is not permissible to decide which features
of an evidence sample to count and which to discount on the basis of a comparison with
a suspect sample, because this can bias one's interpretation." NRC REPORT, supra note
12, at 53.
146 "Analysts not only know which samples are expected to match, but often are famil-
iar with details of the case wholly unrelated to the forensic samples, such as the past
criminal history of the suspect and the opinions of the police regarding likelihood of
guilt. Where samples are submitted by a law enforcement agency, direct communication
between the analyst and the detective handling the case frequently occurs. Fears have
been voiced that when faced with ambiguity (whatever its technical cause), it may be
difficult for the analyst not to be influenced by this type of information." Thompson &
Ford, iupra note 10, at 141.
147 Lander, supra note 3, at 502.
148 An analyst who ignores an otherwise troubling discrepancy on one autorad be-
cause there are good matches on other autorads is not treating the various bands in
DNA prints as independent data. This practice invites overvaluation of the evidence,
because the trier of fact receives statistics in connection with the DNA evidence that are
19931
WILLIAM C. THOMPSON
Bootstrap interpretation, whether intentional or unintentional, can
best be prevented by the use of objective standards that remove the
subjective component of matching.
A key issue now facing courts is whether to exclude DNA evi-
dence from laboratories that fail to comply with the NRC Report's
call for "objective and quantitative rules for identifying the pattern
of a sample" and "a precise and objective matching rule for declar-
ing whether two samples match."' 49 In light of the NRC Report,
litigants challenging the admissibility of DNA evidence can make a
powerful showing that subjective interpretation of DNA prints is not
generally accepted in the scientific community. They may also be
able to show that subjective interpretation undermines the accuracy
of statistical estimates and creates a serious danger of prejudice
by allowing analysts in some cases to engage in inferential
bootstrapping.
Such challenges have generally been unsuccessful so far, but
have been deflected by arguments that fail to withstand close analy-
sis. For example, in State v. Jobe,I50 the Minnesota Supreme Court
dismissed concerns about subjectivity in the FBI's matching proce-
dures with the observation that "each sample is also examined by a
second trained examiner and ultimately the 'match' is confirmed or
rejected through computer analysis using wholly objective crite-
ria." 51 By this analysis, defendants have no cause to complain
about subjectivity in the determination of matches because a match
is not called unless it meets the "objective" quantitative match stan-
dards as well as the analyst's subjective standards; hence, subjectivity
can never work against the defendant. This analysis is misleading
for two reasons.
First, the "wholly objective" quantitative standards are applied
computed based on the assumption that the bands provide independent data. An ana-
lyst who takes into account the apparent strength of the case against the suspect when
making critical judgments, such as what to make of an "extra band," is not treating the
DNA evidence as if it were independent of other evidence in the case. This practice also
invites overvaluation of the evidence in the case, because the trier of fact is unlikely to
appreciate that what the analyst says about the DNA evidence depends partly on the
strength of other evidence in the case. See generally Thompson and Ford, supra note 95.
Such practices are not only prejudicial; they invade the province of the jury as well.
Whether a discrepancy between two DNA prints should be discounted in light of other
evidence incriminating the defendant, for example, is ajudgment appropriately made by
by the trier of fact, not by an analyst who is providing a putatively objective, independ-
ent interpretation of the DNA test.
149 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 72. The NRC Report characterizes such objective
standards as "requirements" for DNA testing. Id.
150 486 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1992).
151 Id. at 420.
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by the computer to data (band sizings) that are themselves deter-
mined subjectively.' 52 For example, whether samples 18 and 25 in
Figure 2 would be declared a match or not by a laboratory's "wholly
objective criteria" depends entirely on how an analyst chooses to
score the bands-which is to say that it depends on the analyst's
subjective discretion. To label this process "wholly objective" is to
give objectivity a new and perverse meaning.
Second, the use of quantitative match criteria does not elimi-
nate the need for subjective judgments regarding the reasons for
discrepancies in the number of bands. 153 Such discrepancies are
common and require careful review because they are potentially ex-
culpatory. The use of quantitative match criteria will not prevent an
analyst from mistakenly attributing to experimental artifact a dis-
crepancy that actually reflects a genetic difference between samples,
nor will it prevent the analyst from making such determinations
through inappropriate and prejudicial bootstrap inferences. In such
cases, the analyst's subjective judgment clearly can work against the
defendant, notwithstanding the application of quantitative match
criteria.
On the other hand, problematic subjective calls may play a piv-
otal role only in a minority of cases.' 54 If the case before a court is
one in which experts all agree about the "match," it seems unrea-
sonable to exclude the evidence on grounds that the match criteria
are subjective. The best resolution to this dilemma may be the ap-
proach recommended in Castro: holding a pretrial hearing to deter-
mine, as a foundational matter, whether correct procedures were
152 The FBI arguably does not have the "objective and quantitative rules for identify-
ing the pattern of a sample" called for by the NRC. See, e.g., supra note 81 and accompa-
nying text concerning State v. Despain, No. 15589 (Yuma Co., Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb. 12,
1991). But see The FBI's Responses to Recommendations by the Committee on DNA Technology in
Forensic Science of the National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, 19 CRIME LABO-
RATORY DIG. 49, 51 (1992) ("The [FBI] protocol include [sic] matching guidelines which
are both objective and quantitative. However, the experience and expertise of the ex-
aminer remains an integral part of the interpretive process."). Subjectivity in the scor-
ing of bands creates the potential for "fudge factors" in the determination of matches.
See supra note 86.
153 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
154 While testifying in People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 429 (1991), Professor George
Sensabaugh opined that two independent analysts, interpreting forensic autorads,
would reach the same conclusions "[m]ore than nine out often times." Id. at 865. Pro-
fessor Simon Ford, who has reviewed autorads in over 100 forensic cases, estimates that
substantive disagreements about interpretation would occur in one-quarter to one-third
of cases, with a higher rate for some laboratories than others. Telephone Interview with
Professor Simon Ford (March 16, 1993). Thus, in the majority of cases, the match/no
match determination may be straightforward, requiring minimal subjective analysis.
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followed in the case at hand.' 5 5 This approach was recently en-
dorsed by the California Court of Appeal in People v. Barney. 156 The
court acknowledged the NRC panel's call for objective matching
standards, but concluded that the NRC report "does not equate the
absence of a standardized rule with a lack of general acceptance as
to the matching step of DNA analysis"' 15 7 and hence does not render
subjective tests inadmissible per se under the Frye standard.15 8 How-
ever, the court left open to litigants the opportunity to raise founda-
tional challenges to the admissibility of DNA evidence in particular
cases on grounds that the laboratory failed to use "correct scientific
procedures" for declaring a match. 159 Under this rule, a defendant
presumably could challenge the admissibility of a result that de-
pended heavily on a contested subjective call by an analyst. In light
of the significant danger of prejudice that may arise from subjective
interpretation of DNA tests, such challenges deserve to be taken
very seriously by the courts.
E. THE NEED FOR EMPIRICAL VALIDATION OF THE MATCH CRITERIA
A second fundamental issue for courts considering the admissi-
bility of DNA profile evidence is what kind of research, if any, is
necessary to validate the laboratory's quantitative match criteria. A
number of commentators have argued that validation research is es-
sential, 160 and the NRC Report strongly endorsed this position.
The match criterion must be based on reproducibility studies that
show the actual degree of variability observed when multiple samples
from the same person are separately prepared and analyzed under typ-
ical forensic conditions.... Each testing laboratory must carry out its
own reproducibility studies, because reproducibility varies among
155 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
156 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
157 Id. at 739.
158 This conclusion is, of course, debatable. It seems difficult to maintain that subjec-
tive matching procedures are acceptable when a distinguished national panel, appointed
by the National Research Council to examine the issue, has stated that objective stan-
dards are "necessary" and "required". On the other hand, the NRC panel also recom-
mended that DNA analysis "be continued while improvements and changes suggested in
this report are being made." NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at x. The NRC Report can be
read to suggest that the "improvements and changes" suggested therein are not neces-
sary for general acceptance of forensic DNA tests at present but may become necessary
in the near future: "[a]fter a sufficient time for implementation of quality-assurance pro-
grams has passed, courts should view quality control as necessary for general accept-
ance." Id. How soon that future will come, if ever, remains to be seen.
159 "The use of match criteria in a given case is properly addressed as part of the
inquiry whether " 'correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case.' " Bar-
ney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 739-40.
i6o See, e.g., Shields, supra note 10; Lander, supra note 3; Lander, supra note 87.
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laboratories. 161
But some proponents of DNA evidence have dismissed such re-
search as unimportant.1 62 It is foolish to quibble about the precise
size of the matching criterion, they say, because under any criterion
now in use there is an extremely low likelihood of a false match.
Consequently, a match provides powerful evidence that the samples
are from the same person regardless of whether the match criterion
has been "validated." According to this argument, validation of the
match criteria has little to do with the fundamental reliability or va-
lidity of forensic DNA tests.
The problem with this argument is that it focuses on only one
of two factors that affect the probative value of DNA evidence. The
value of DNA evidence for proving that two samples came from the
same person depends, in part, on the probability of a particular test
result if the samples are from different people-a probability likely to
be low if the test indicates that the samples "match." But its value
also depends on the probability of a particular test result if the sam-
ples are from the same person; if this probability is equally low, then
the DNA evidence deserves no weight. 63
161 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 61-62.
162 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
163 This argument casts the evaluation of DNA evidence in a Bayesian framework. See
generally RICHARD LEMPERT & STEVEN SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
148-53 (1st ed. 1977); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L.
REV. 1065 (1969); Richard Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977);
David H. Kaye, What is Bayesianism? A Guide for the PerpleVed, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 161
(1988); David Schum & Anne Martin, Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded Inference in
Jurisprudence, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 105 (1982). It posits two mutually exclusive and
exhaustive hypotheses about the relationship between two samples: Hi-the samples
are from the same person; H2-the samples are from different people. In accordance
with standard Bayesian analysis, it is proposed that the value of a particular DNA test
result, D, depends on the likelihood ratio p(D/Hi)/p(D/H2). The higher this ratio, the
greater the probative value of the evidence.
If D indicates that the two samples have DNA prints that are similar, then p(D/I12)
will probably be low because DNA prints are so variable that different people are un-
likely to have similar ones. However, p(D/HI1) may be as low or lower than p(D/H2) if
the two prints, although similar, have discrepancies that are unlikely to be observed in
prints of the same person. To evaluate DNA evidence, then, one must know whether the
discrepancies between two DNA patterns are within the normal range of variation (and
therefore likely if the samples are from the same source), or beyond the normal range of
variation (and therefore unlikely if the samples are from the same source).
The need to vary the likelihood ratio to take into account the quality of the match
has been recognized by a few experts working within a Bayesian framework. See Evett et
al., supra note 76, at 314-315 (1992); Donald Berry et al., Statistical Inference in Crime Inves-
tigations Using DVA Profiling, 41 APPLIED STAT. 499 (1992); Donald Berry, D.4 Fingerprint-
ing: What Does It Prove, in 3 CHANCE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMPUTING AND STAT. 15
(1990) ("If all the suspect's band weights are very close to the criminal's, then the nu-




DNA PROFILES OF VICTIM, DEFENDANT AND EVIDENTIARY
SAMPLE IN STATE v. BRUNO
Defendant Evidentiary % Difference
Probe Victim (Bruno) Sample (Bruno v. Evid)
D2S44 3020 2352 2328 + 1.03
1613 1643 1619 + 1.47
D4S139 7268 11948 12622 - 5.49
2789 5602 5457 + 2.62
D17S79 1532 1539 1525 + 0.91
1429 1352 1337 + 1.11
D1S7 2461 11072 11139 - 0.60
1532 5342 5296 + 0.86
Suppose, for example, that the FBI declares a match between a
band in defendant's DNA profile and a band in an evidentiary sam-
ple and that the two bands differ in measured size by 4% (putting
them well within the agency's quantitative matching criteria). Sup-
pose further that only one person in twenty in a suitable reference
population has a band that would "match" the band in the eviden-
tiary sample by the FBI's criteria. 6 4 Is this match incriminating?
That depends on how common a 4% discrepancy is between bands
in two profiles from the same source. If discrepancies as large as
4% are common, then the match is certainly incriminating. If, how-
ever, discrepancies as large as 4% are rare, the "match" may have
little value, or even be exculpatory.
A similar analysis is necessary to evaluate multi-band matches.
Let us consider the DNA profiles represented in Figure 3, two of
which were declared to match by the FBI in a North Carolina case,
State v. Bruno. 165 The profiles show the estimated "size," in number
of base-pairs, of the bands in the defendant's DNA print, in a print
of an evidentiary stain, and in the victim's DNA print. Four probes
were used, each of which produced two of bands in each sample. It
decrease the numerator... by an amount that depends on the degree of discrepancy.").
However, these experts have, thus far, focused their Bayesian modeling solely on dis-
crepancies in the estimated size of bands; they have not yet dealt with the potentially
more severe problems arising from inconsistencies in number of bands and uncertain-
ties in the initial scoring of bands.
164 For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that only one band can be visualized in the
evidence.
165 Nos. 89 CR 7443, 7444 & 7445 (New Hanover Co., N.C., Super. Ct., 1990). Band
sizes are those indicated in the FBI's report on the case, dated August 30, 1989 (FBI File
No. 95-288752).
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is undoubtedly true that the profile of a person who was not the
source of the evidentiary sample would be unlikely to "match" as
well as did Mr. Bruno's profile.' 66 But the analysis cannot stop
there. To know what to make of the evidence, one must also know
how likely is it that the two "matching" patterns would be so dis-
crepant if Mr. Bruno is the source of the evidence. If this probability
is also low, the evidence may have little value.
Forensic laboratories do not attempt to make such probability
estimates in each case. Instead, they trust the quantitative match
rules to assure that a match is not called between samples unlikely to
be from the same person. One cannot determine whether the quan-
titative rules perform this function adequately, however, unless one
knows the results of empirical reproducibility studies of the kind de-
manded by the NRC Report.
Consequently, courts should take very seriously challenges to
DNA evidence that allege that a laboratory's match criterion is inad-
equately validated. Such challenges go to the fundamental value of
the evidence. Without reproducibility studies of the type specified
in the NRC Report, one cannot determine the likelihood of a given
"match" if the samples are from the same person, and one therefore
has no scientific foundation for assessing the value of the evidence
in a given case. In light of the NRC Report, a strong argument can
be made that such evidence fails to meet the standards of the scien-
tific community and is inadmissible under the Frye standard. Such
evidence arguably should be inadmissible under the Daubert stan-
dard as well because it is inadequately validated. 67
A somewhat different issue is raised by the claim that a labora-
tory's match criteria is too broad. This claim is usually raised
against a laboratory that has done some reproducibility studies but
has failed to draw its match criteria as narrowly as critics think is
appropriate in light of those studies. Courts should consider care-
fully whether such claims go to the admissibility or merely the
166 Just how unlikely such a coincidental match might be is an issue on which experts
may well disagree. See infra Part III for a discussion of this issue.
167 "Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation-i.e., 'good
grounds' based on what is known." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 113 S.
Ct. 2786 (1993). See also supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that an expert testified that the evidence in the Bruno case was powerfully incriminat-
ing. If the expert had no scientific basis for evaluating the likelihood of the observed
discrepancies between the evidentiary DNA profile and Mr. Bruno's profile (if Bruno
was the source of the evidence), then such testimony would be based on speculation
rather than scientific knowledge. Such testimony should be inadmissible because it is
unscientific and it may greatly overstate the value of the DNA evidence, thereby proving
prejudicial.
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weight of the evidence. The proper analysis may vary depending on
the facts of the case.
In some cases, a defendant may argue that the match criteria
should have been drawn in a narrower manner that excludes him. If
the defendant makes a strong showing prior to trial that the ob-
served discrepancies are unlikely to have arisen if the "matching"
prints have a common source,1 68 then exclusion of the DNA evi-
dence might well be appropriate. In such cases, the DNA evidence
is likely to deserve considerably less weight than a jury would give
it. 169 To challenge the DNA evidence before the jury would be a
formidable task, and arguably would impose an unfair burden on a
criminal defendant. 170 The evidence could properly be excluded
under Federal Rule 403.171
168 In formal terms, the defendant should make a preliminary showing that p(D/H) is
quite small.
169 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
170 The defendant would need to present complex testimony concerning the operat-
ing characteristics of the DNA typing system, the variability of band measurements in
the system, and the consequent statistical likelihood of the observed data assuming a
common source. The defendant would also need to educate the jury concerning the
implications of such data for the value of the DNA evidence-a challenging task in itself.
To judge the probative value of the DNA evidence, the jury would need to estimate the
probability of the observed data, assuming a common source, and then balance that
probability against estimates of the probability of a "match" if the samples have a differ-
ent source. Whether lawyers and lay jurors are up to such a task is an important issue to
consider when evaluating the admissibility of such evidence.
171 A contrary position was taken by the court in United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161
(N.D. Ohio 1991), which concluded that such arguments go to weight rather than admis-
sibility: "defendants who would be outside a smaller window but are within the FBI's
larger window can make that point at trial." Id. at 208. Professor David Kaye goes even
farther. He has argued, in a widely circulated but as yet unpublished manuscript, that
such testimony should be excluded altogether because it is irrelevant. "If the match, as
determined by the prosecution's rule, would be rare among innocent people, then the
evidence proves something, and its probative value is unaffected by the tautology that
the same measurements would not match under some even more stringent rule." David
H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics and the Courts, 12 (1993) (on
file with William C. Thompson).
Whether the Yee approach is correct is an issue on which reasonable people may
differ, depending on how confident they are in the ability of lawyers and jurors to deal
with complex scientific and statistical arguments. See supra note 166. But Professor
Kaye's argument is wrong. If the defendant can show that the discrepancies that place
him outside the "more stringent rule" are so large as to indicate a low likelihood that the
samples are from the same source, then the value of the DNA evidence is significantly
reduced. See supra note 163. In a personal conversation, Professor Kaye recently ac-
knowledged this point and promised to rethink his position. Telephone interview with
Professor David Kaye (Sept. 20, 1993).
Professor Kaye's equivocation on this issue is instructive. He is a leading authority
on scientific and statistical evidence and has written a number of influential articles
about the use of genetic evidence in court. That someone of his intellect and training
can be uncertain about a question going to the fundamental value of DNA evidence
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In other cases, defendant may be able to show that there is a
controversy about the appropriate size of the matching window but
be unable to show that the narrower window advocated by critics
would have excluded him. 172 Such a showing should not, by itself,
preclude admissibility of the DNA evidence. Informing the jury that
the defendant is a member of an overly broad class is not unfair, so
long as the size of the class is accurately reported.
III. THE DEBATE OVER THE VALIDITY OF STATISTICAL
ESTIMATION METHODS
A. OVERVIEW
The third step of DNA profiling is statistical estimation. After
determining that two DNA samples match, forensic analysts esti-
mate the statistical frequency of such matches in a reference popula-
tion. The purpose of the statistical estimates is to provide meaning
to the match by showing the likelihood that an unrelated person in
the reference population would match by chance.
Statistical estimation has been the most controversial aspect of
DNA testing. The great majority of courts that have held DNA evi-
dence inadmissible have done so based on the existence of a scien-
tific dispute over the validity of the forensic laboratories' frequency
estimation methods.
To estimate the frequency of a DNA profile in a reference pop-
ulation, forensic analysts first estimate the frequency of each allele
(band) in the DNA profile by determining its frequency in a data
base containing DNA profiles of a number of individuals.173 These
data bases consist of convenience samples drawn primarily from
blood banks, with separate data bases for major racial and ethnic
groups (Hispanics, non-Hispanic Caucasians, African-Americans,
Asians). Analysts then combine the estimated frequencies of the in-
dividual alleles to determine the overall frequency of the DNA
profile, using formulae that assume the alleles are statistically
independent. 74
demonstrates just how difficult it is to evaluate such evidence. It also demonstrates the
strong potential for prejudice that exists when problematic DNA matches are allowed to
go to the jury. A juror who adopted the seductive but erroneous reasoning in Kaye's
article might greatly overvalue DNA evidence in a case like State v. Bruno, Nos. 89 CR
7443, 7444 & 7445 (New Hanover Co., N.C. Super. Ct., 1990), af'd, 424 S.E.2d 440
(N.C., 1993), where the "quality" of the match is poor.
172 See discussion of United States v.Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990), aff'd,
955 F.2d 786 (2d. Cir. 1992), supra note 126.
173 See generally NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at ch. 3.
174 Statistical independence means that the likelihood of a person having a particular
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Critics have challenged these procedures on several grounds.
One problem, say critics, is that the forensic laboratories tend to
underestimate the frequency of matching alleles in their databases,
and thereby greatly underestimate the overall frequency of DNA
profiles.175 A more fundamental concern is that the procedure fails
to take into account the possibility that there is significant variability
among population subgroups in the frequency of alleles. Critics
suggest that within major groups, such as Caucasians, Hispanics and
Blacks, the frequency of alleles may differ among various ethnic,
religious or geographic subgroups. If such variability exists, there
are two important implications. 176 First, the convenience samples
used by the forensic laboratories may be unrepresentative of the
population in particular locales. Second, the assumption that the
frequency of alleles is statistically independent would be invalid.
Concerns about the accuracy of statistical estimates were raised
in early litigation on the admissibility of forensic DNA evidence,1
77
but were voiced by only a few experts in a handful of cases and had
little impact. Before 1991, statistical estimates of forensic laborato-
ries were routinely ruled admissible in most cases; 178 typically, the
defense failed to present a single expert to challenge them. In cases
where the defense did muster experts, courts often found them less
persuasive than the supporting experts presented by the prosecu-
tion, and concluded that the critics represented the viewpoint of
only a small minority.
allele is not affected by what other alleles the person has. The probability of a series of
independent events is the product of their frequencies, and hence will be quite low when
all the frequencies are low. For example, the probability of rolling "one" eight times in
a row with a fair die is (1/6)8 = .000000595, or approximately one in 1.6 million. The
probability might be considerably higher if the probability of rolling "one" on each
throw is not independent of the other throws, as would be the case, for example, it it
were not a fair die. Whether the alleles in DNA profiles are in fact statistically independ-
ent is a central issue.
175 See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
176 See generally NRC REPORT, snpra note 12.
177 See People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (Lifecodes' test);
State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989) (Cellmark's test); see also Christopher
Joyce, High Profile: DNA in Court Again, NEW SCIENTIST, July 21, 1990, at 24 (describing
the population genetics issues raised in early 1990 in State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d 135
(N.M. Ct. App. 1991), regarding the FBI's test).
178 One exception was Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 422, in which the Minnesota Supreme
Court held statistical estimates inadmissible in connection with a Cellmark test. The
defense in Schwartz mounted a serious challenge to the statistical estimates. However,
this ruling may stem primarily from Minnesota's longstanding rule limiting the use of
statistical evidence in connection with genetic evidence based on fears that such evi-
dence will be misused by thejury. See generally William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent
to Evaluate Statistical Evidence? 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 26-28 (1989) (reviewing
Minnesota caselaw on this issue).
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In People v. Axell, 179 for example, the court chose to credit three
experts who testified that Cellmark's statistical procedures are gen-
erally accepted over three experts who testified that they are not,
suggesting that the prosecution experts had convincingly responded
to the defense experts' concerns.1 0 In United States v. Yee, a federal
magistrate took a similar tact:
[D]espite the prestige, standing, and expertise of the witnesses who
share the view that the scientific community could not and would not
find the FBI's database and resulting probability estimates acceptable,
the view of the government's witnesses about the level of acceptance,
when all factors are taken into account, is more likely to be the accu-
rate view.' 8 1
Over time, however, the ranks of the scientific critics grew
1 82
and their concerns began to be taken more seriously by courts. In
1991, a number of trial courts 83 and one state supreme court I8
4
ruled DNA evidence inadmissible based on concerns about the sta-
tistical procedures.
This trend gained momentum after two leading population ge-
neticists, Richard Lewontin and Daniel Hartl, published an article in
179 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
180 It is ironic that the court, in reaching this conclusion, cited Dr. Kidd's unpublished
(and at that time unavailable) data on the "very small differences" in allele frequencies
among various subgroups-the very data that, when later reanalyzed by Dr. Mueller,
showed rather large differences among American Indian groups. See infra note 253 and
accompanying text. Defendant Axell was partly American Indian. The court also relied
on testimony by Professor Conneally who "opined that the probes used by Cellmark are
in linkage equilibrium because they are on different chromosomes .... ." Id. at 852.
This position, however, is no longer widely accepted. See NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at
79-80.
181 United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 206 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
182 In July 1991, Professor Charles Taylor, a population geneticist at UCLA, con-
ducted a survey of others in his field to determine their positions on the acceptability of
the statistical estimation methods used by forensic laboratories. Charles Taylor, Survey
of Population Geneticists Concerning Methods for Calculating Matches in Forensic Ap-
plications of VNTR Loci (July 9, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with William C.
Thompson). Taylor identified 30 academic scientists with expertise in population genet-
ics who had taken a position on the issue. By his count, 11 supported the forensic labs
and 19 did not. Moreover, the ratio of critics to supporters was higher among those
whom Taylor rated as better known in the field (based on'their work having been cited
in major textbooks). Id. The results of the survey were introduced in evidence in People
v. Halik, No. VA 00843 (Los Angeles Co., Cal. Dist. Ct. May 13, 1991), and later were
made part of the record before the California Court of Appeal in People v. Barney, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
183 State v. Despain, No. 15589 (Yuma Co., Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 1991); State v.
Fleming, Nos. 90-CR-2716 & 90-CR-5546 (Cook Co., Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 1991); State
v. Hummert, Nos. CR 90-05559 & CR 90-03684 (Maricopa Co., Ariz. Super. Ct. Apr. 16,
1991); State v. Passino, No. 185-1-90 (Franklin Co., Vt. Dist. Ct. May 13, 1991); United
States v. Porter, 120 DAILY WASH. L. RPTR. 44 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 1991).
184 Commonwealth v. Curnin, 565 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 1991).
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Science, in December 1991, that raised concerns about population
structure and concluded, in light of those concerns, that the statisti-
cal estimation methods used by forensic laboratories are "unjusti-
fied and generally unreliable."1 85 Because of the prominence of the
authors, this article attracted a great deal of attention and ignited a
furious academic debate over how much population structure exists
and the extent to which population structure undermines the valid-
ity of the statistical estimation methods used by forensic
laboratories. 186
Further debate was inspired by the publication of the NRC Re-
port in April 1992. The NRC panel did not take sides in the dispute
over population structure; it found existing empirical data insuffi-
cient to resolve the question. But the report concluded that the
concerns raised by Lewontin, Hartl and others were sufficiently seri-
ous that the statistical estimation methods developed by the forensic
laboratories should not continue to be used because these methods
might greatly underestimate the frequency of DNA profiles. In-
stead, the NRC proposed a more conservative method that it
dubbed "the ceiling principle."1 87
A number of courts thereafter held DNA evidence inadmissible
on grounds that the statistical methods of the forensic laboratories
were not generally accepted.' 88 Some expressed hope that a scien-
tific consensus would soon emerge in favor of methods based on the
NRC's ceiling principle. 18 9 Those hopes, however, now seem to be
fading as it "appears that the level of debate has only increased as a
result of [the NRC] report."' 90
185 Lewontin & Hartd, supra note 10, at 1745.
186 See Roberts, supra note 3, at 1721.
187 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 82-85.
188 Opinions citing the NRC Report as evidence of a dispute over the validity of foren-
sic statistical estimation methods include Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311
(Mass. 1992); People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1992); State v. Anderson, No. 12899, 1993 WL
135835 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 1993); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629 (D.C.
1992); People v. Atoigue, No. CR 91-95A (Guam Dist. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 11, 1992);
People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Bible, No.
CR900167AP, 1993 WL 306544 (Ariz. filed Aug. 12, 1993).
189 See Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 745 ("The NRC report on DNA analysis appears
to point the way to... common ground."). In Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d at 311; Viandebogarl,
616 A.2d at 843; and Porter, 618 A.2d 629; the courts remanded cases in which defend-
ants had been convicted based on standard statistical estimates to determine whether
the ceiling principle is generally accepted and, if so, whether it would have produced
different numbers than those used against the defendant.
190 Laurence Mueller, The Use of DA4 Typing in Forensic Science, AcCOUNTABIL.ITY RE-
SEARCH 2 (1993); see also People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725 (-recent develop-
ments have shown that general acceptance may not be easily achieved").
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In retrospect, the judgment of the court in Axell court and the
magistrate in Yee appear premature. Over time, as increasing num-
bers of critics emerged, and as their views gave rise to serious de-
bate in the academic community, the conclusion that the
prosecution experts speak for the scientific community, and that the
defense experts do not, has become more difficult to maintain.19'
Recently, courts in Frye jurisdictions have been more hesitant about
deciding which scientific views to credit in the face of this dispute.
The views of the District of Columbia Court of Appeal reflect this
new, and overdue, trend toward judicial humility:
We specifically decline the government's invitation to hold that the
position of one group of distinguished scientists (those favoring the
government's position) is more persuasive, as a matter of molecular
biology or population genetics, than the position of an apparently
equally distinguished group of scholars who have reached an opposite
conclusion; indeed, we view the government's position on this issue as
contrary to Frye.1
92
Courts in relevancy and Daubert jurisdictions do not have the
option of waiting for scientific consensus to emerge. They must
shoulder the burden of assessing the validity and helpfulness of
proferred statistical estimate in the midst of the current scientific
turmoil. The following sections lay out the major scientific and legal
issues.
B. DETERMINING THE FREQUENCY OF INDIVIDUAL BANDS
To determine the frequency of each band (allele) in the DNA
print, forensic analysts estimate the percentage of bands in a data
base that would "match" the band in question. Typically, the labo-
ratory counts all bands in the data base that fall within a range of
sizes; this range is designated a "bin." Some laboratories use "float-
ing bins" keyed to the band in question. For example, to estimate
191 The issues raised by the defense have been quite consistent over time. The
change in judicial attitude would appear to stem solely from the growing number and
prestige of the scientists voicing critical views. See, e.g., Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731
(noting that "the challenges asserted by Howard and Barney [based on the testimony of
Laurence Mueller in 1989] are essentially the same as the points raised by Lewontin and
Hartl").
192 United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629 (D.C. 1992). In Porter, the government ar-
gued that the weight of scientific authority favored current statistical procedures, be-
cause over 18 peer-reviewed articles and 10 published letters, written by 45 scientists,
supported the methodology used by the government, while only six articles and seven
letters, authored by only 12 scientists, questioned the approach. Id. at 638. The court
properly responded that "the government asks this court to choose between scientists
on the basis of rather unimpressive numbers, and thus to make precisely the kinds of
determinations as to which Frye requires a consensus of experts." Id.
1993]
WILLIAM C. THOMPSON
the frequency of a band of 1000 base pairs, Lifecodes counts all
bands that fall within ± 1.8% of its size-that is, all bands in the
data base which have an estimated size between 982 and 1018 base
pairs.' 93 Because all of these bands fall within Lifecodes' match cri-
teria, they all are bands that potentially could be "matched" with the
band in question. Other laboratories use "fixed bins" which are es-
tablished in advance and used in each case. For example, the FBI
divides the full range of band sizes into 31 fixed bins.' 94 A band of
1000 base pairs would fall into bin number five, which includes
bands from 964 to 1077 base pairs. 195 To estimate the frequency of
the 1000 base pair band, the FBI would count all bands falling in bin
number five.
A major concern of critics is that forensic laboratories underes-
timate the frequency of matching bands. Some forensic laboratories
have been criticized for using bins that are narrower than their
match criteria,' 96 a practice the NRC Report called "unaccept-
able."' 97 For example, Lander reported that in People v. Castro,
Lifecodes used a bin for allele frequency estimates of only ±2/3
standard deviation, while using a matching criteria of _±3 standard
deviations.' 98 Similarly, the FBI has computed statistics in some
cases based on floating bins of ±2.5%, while employing a matching
criteria of ±5%.199 Because the frequency of each allele is multi-
193 Shields, supra note 10, at 19.
194 The FBI championed the fixed bin method. See Budowle et al., supra note 86, at
845-48. However, more recent FBI publications indicate that the Bureau will abandon
the fixed bin approach in favor of smaller floating bins (±-2.5%) if it is required to com-
ply with the "conservative" statistical estimation procedure recommended by the NRC.
Bruce Budowle & Keith Monson, The Approach Used by the FBIfor Calculating Ceiling Fre-
quencies, 19 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 84 (1992). The floating bins have been used to
compute statistical frequencies in some recent cases.
195 The FBI's fixed bins do not correspond exactly to the FBI's quantitative match
criteria. For example, the 1000 base pair bands could potentially be called a match with
bands from 950 to 1050 base pairs under the FBI's 5% criterion.
196 Mueller, supra note 190, at 3 ("The size of the floating bins that have been used by
some labs are only about half the appropriate size, thereby producing allele frequency
estimates that are too small.").
197 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 78.
198 Lander, supra note 3, at 504. Following People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1989), Lifecodes abandoned this practice and adopted a floating bin the same
size as its quantitative match standard.
199 If a band of 1000 base pairs is found in an evidentiary sample, for example, the
FBI's quantitative match rule allows a match to be declared to bands falling within the
range 951-1050 base pairs. But in some cases the FBI has estimated allele frequencies
using floating bins of ±42.5% of the average value of the bands being compared. See
supra note 175. Thus, if the 1000 base pair band were matched to a band at 1050 base
pairs, the FBI's bin would range approximately from 999-1051, a range only half as
large as the range within which a match would be called. By one account, the FBI has
recently acknowledged this problem and has doubled its bin size to avoid repeating this
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plied to obtain the frequency of the overall DNA print, systematic
underestimates of the frequency of each allele can cause severe er-
rors. With regard to Lifecodes' procedure in Castro, Lander states:
"[flor a three-locus genotype, the error may thus be about 8000
fold." 200 Lander analogized the practice to "catching a match with a
10-foot-wide butterfly net, but then attempting to prove the diffi-
culty of the feat by showing how hard it is to catch matches with a 6-
inch-wide butterfly net."
20 1
Although most laboratories have now adopted bins that are the
same size as their match criteria, some critics question whether even
that is sufficient. To count all bands in the data base that would
"match" a given band, say critics, it may be necessary to use bins
larger than the match criteria. They base this claim on evidence that
the variability of band measurement (measurement error) is signifi-
cantly greater among bands in data bases than among bands ex-
amined in forensic casework. Two samples that would produce
bands within 5% of each other in case work may produce bands that
are more than 5% apart if the samples were part of the data base
because measurements taken on samples in the data base are more
variable. 20 2 Hence, to capture all bands that would be within a lab's
±5%o match criteria, it may be necessary to use a bin larger than
±-75% when searching the data base for matching bands.20 3 In rec-
ognition of this problem, one laboratory, Cellmark Diagnostics, has
recently begun using bins that are larger than its match standards.
Other laboratories have not chosen to follow this example.
error in future casework. Interview with Professor Bruce Weir, Dept. of Statistics, N.C.
State Univ., Tempe, Ariz. (Mar. 19, 1993).
200 Lander, supra note 3, at 504.
201 Id.
202 The greater variability is due in part to the fact that samples in the data bases were
typed over time, often by different analysts, in a series of separate assays on separate
gels. By contrast, in most forensic casework, all samples are run by the same analyst as
part of the same assay on the same gel.
203 This claim appears to have been first raised in State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d 513 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1989). Experts for the defense argued, and the court agreed, that Cellmark
should use a larger bin for allele frequency estimation than it used for declaring a match
between DNA prints run on the same gel, because "the data base was generated using
different gels." Id. at 518. Cellmark had tacitly acknowledged that its measurement er-
ror is greater across samples run on different gels than among samples run within the
same gel by adopting a broader matching criteria for between-gel than within-gel com-
parisons.
This claim was also raised in People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991). A Cellmark expert testified that using a larger bin in order to account for be-
tween gel variability in the data base would change the frequency from one in six billion
to one in three or four million. The court stated that this matter "would appear to go to
the weight of the evidence more than its admissibility." Id. at 429.
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Finally, some critics argue that forensic laboratories may under-
estimate allele frequencies by failing to take into account sampling
error-that is, the tendency for the allele frequency observed in a
sample to differ from the true frequency due to the operation of
chance in the selection of a sample. Lander's comments are particu-
larly relevant:
Sampling error poses a particularly serious problem when estimating
the frequency of a very rare event, such as an allele at a hypervariable
RFLP locus. In a sample size of 500, an allele whose observed fre-
quency was 1 in 500 might have a true frequency (taking a 99% confi-
dence interval) of nearly 7 in 500. If this correction were neglected,
the odds of finding the allele would be underestimated by a factor of
nearly 7. If this were neglected for both alleles at [three loci] the total
chance of finding the observed genotype would be underestimated by
a factor of 76 = 118,000.
Fortunately, statistical methods for incorporating sampling error
are well developed. If conclusions must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, it might be wise to use the 99% upper limit of the confi-
dence interval for each allele.
20 4
Whether such adjustments for sampling error are necessary and
appropriate has been controversial. Some forensic scientists have
argued that upper confidence limit estimates are not necessary be-
cause the procedure for allele estimation is sufficiently "conserva-
tive" to overestimate the frequency of matching alleles even without
such a correction. 20 5 Furthermore, some statisticians disagree with
Lander's suggestion that the upper confidence limit of the fre-
quency of each allele be used in computing the frequency of the DNA
profile, prefering to make the adjustment for sampling error after
the allele frequency estimates are combined, rather than before, 20 6 a
procedure likely to produce smaller adjustments.
C. DETERMINING THE FREQUENCY OF GENOTYPES
After determining the frequency of each band, the next step is
to determine the frequency of genotypes. A genotype is the pair of
204 Eric Lander, Population Genetic Considerations in the Forensic Use of DNA Typing, in DNA
TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 146-47 (Jack Ballantyne et al. eds., 1989); see also
Shields, supra note 10, at 20.
205 For example, the FBI has taken the position that its fixed bins overestimate allele
frequencies by a sufficient margin that it is unnecessary to apply upper confidence limits
to them. Defense experts point out, however, that some of the FBI's bins are in fact not
much larger than its matching criteria. Shields, supra note 10, at 24. For example, the
size of bin five differs little from the match criteria around a band of 1000 base-pairs.
206 Weir, supra note 15, at 11657 ("Setting confidence limits on estimated profile fre-
quencies is the best way to convey the effects of the sizes of the databases on which the
estimates are based."). In other words, Weir would compute an upper confidence limit
for the DNA profile, not for the constituent alleles in the profile.
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alleles (bands) produced by a given probe. As noted earlier, one of
these alleles is inherited from the mother and one from the father.
To determine the frequency of heterozygous (two band) genotypes,
forensic DNA laboratories use the formula 2pq, where p and q are
the frequency of the two alleles in the genotype.20 7 For example, if
the frequency of band A is .03 and the frequency of band B is .05,
the laboratory will multiply .03 X .05 X 2 and conclude that the
frequency of the genotype AB is .003 (three in 1000).208 This
formula assumes the frequencies of band A and band B are statisti-
cally independent, and may significantly underestimate the fre-
quency of genotypes if the allele frequencies are not independent.
When alleles at any genotype are statistically independent in a
particular population, the population is said to be in Hardy-Wein-
berg equilibrium. 20 9 Whether U.S. populations are in Hardy-Wein-
berg equilibrium has been a major issue in the debate over DNA
statistics. Critics suggest that Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium may not
hold due to endogamous mating patterns-that is, a tendency for
people to mate with others having the same subset of possible al-
leles. For example, if people with allele A are more likely to mate
with those having allele B, than with those having alleles C or D,
then genotypes AA and AB would be more common (and genotypes
AC and AD less common) than suggested by the formula 2pq. En-
dogamous mating might occur without people having any awareness
of it. If alleles A and B were common in a particular population
subgroup, and if people in that subgroup tended to mate with each
other, genotype AB would be more common in the general popula-
tion, and much more common among members of that subgroup,
than predicted by applying the formula 2pq to allele frequencies for
the general population. 210
The final step in the statistical procedures is to determine the
frequency of the entire DNA profile, which is sometimes called a
multi-locus genotype. The forensic DNA testing laboratories do
this by multiplying together the frequencies of the genotypes. If
207 See generally NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 76-85.
208 The product of the individual allele frequencies is multiplied by two because there
are two ways a person can get a given genotype. A person may have genotype AB as a
result of receiving A from his father and B from his mother, or vice versa. By analog,
there are two ways to roll number eleven with a pair of dice: a five on the first die and a
six on the second, or vice-versa. Hence, the probability of rolling eleven is 2 X 1/6 X
1/6 = 1/18.
209 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 78.
210 Genotypes AA, AB, and BB would also be more common in the general popula-
tion than predicted by formula, although the effect might be difficult to detect if the
subgroup was small relative to the general population.
19931
WILLIAM C. THOMPSON
four probes were used, the laboratory would, during Step 2, have
computed four genotype frequencies. The product of these fre-
quencies would be presented as the frequency of the entire DNA
print. The use of the product rule (i.e., multiplication) to compute
the frequency of multi-locus genotypes assumes that the frequencies
of the genotypes are statistically independent, and may significantly
underestimate the frequency of the multi-locus genotype if the indi-
vidual genotypes are not independent.
When the genotypes at different loci are statistically independ-
ent in a given population, the population is said to be in linkage
equilibrium. 2 11 Whether the major racial groups in the U.S. popula-
tion are in linkage equilibrium is another major issue. Linkage equi-
librium and Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium are closely related issues
because endogamous mating patterns among heterogeneous groups
could undermine both. "Once a population is known to be hetero-
geneous, one also cannot assume linkage equilibrium even for loci
on different chromosomes; if an individual possesses an allele com-
mon among Puerto Ricans at one locus, it is more likely that he will
do so at a second locus as well." 2 12 Hence, the possibility of endog-
amous mating among heterogeneous groups, which is also called
population structure, is a key underlying issue in the debate over
the validity of the forensic laboratories' statistical estimation
methods. 2 1
3
D. THE COMPETING VIEWS ON POPULATION STRUCTURE
The scientific community has split into three camps on the issue
of population structure. One school of thought holds that concerns
about population structure can be dismissed on theoretical grounds.
Members of this "theoretical school" argue that deviations from
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and linkage equilibrium in the general
U.S. population are so implausible that empirical proof of the ab-
sence of such deviations is simply unnecessary. 2 14 A second group,
211 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 78-79.
212 Lander, supra note 3, at 504.
213 If there is such structuring, the multiplication of band frequencies could produce
severe errors. By analogy, if a population survey showed that 10% of Europeans have
blond hair, 10% have blue eyes, and 10% have fair skin, it would be a mistake to multi-
ply these frequencies to conclude that the frequency of Europeans with all three traits is
one in 1000. Because these traits tend to co-occur in Nordics, the actual frequency is
much higher, particularly if one happens to be in Scandinavia. NRC REPORT, supra note
12, at 76.
214 Members of the theoretical camp concede exceptions for such distinctive sub-
groups as the Amish, Hutterites and Mennonites, which may be "inbred." See People v.
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which has been labeled the statistical school, 21 5 "feels that the issue
[of population structure] can be resolved by studying population
samples of broad racial groups and applying statistical tests of
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium ("HWE") and linkage equilibrium
("LE") to detect substructure. ' 216
In other words, they believe the issue of population structure
must be addressed through empirical (rather than theoretical) anal-
ysis, but that statistical analysis of existing data is sufficient to re-
solve the issue. 217 The third group, which has been labeled the
empiricist school, "feels that the only way to resolve the issue is to
sample particular ethnic groups to ascertain the actual extent of va-
riation-i.e., how high or low allele frequencies might range." 218
The empiricists219 believe that no amount of statistical analysis on
existing data bases can resolve the issue because such analyses
"have insufficient statistical power to detect deviations, if pres-
ent" 220 and because existing data bases may not include members of
some endogamous mating groups. They favor collecting additional
data on a number of distinctive subgroups.
E. THE DEBATE OVER METHODS OF TESTING FOR POPULATION
STRUCTURE
Concerns about population structure were raised from the be-
Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing testimony by prosecu-
tion expert Michael Conneally).
215 See Lander Reply, supra note 110, at 901. Lander sees three schools of thought on
the issue of population structure, which he labels the "keep it simple school," the "sta-
tistical school" and the "empirical school." The present article follows Lander in distin-
guishing the statistical and empirical schools, but ignores the "keep it simple school"
(the existence of which Lander appears to infer from the comments of a single scientist),
and adds a "theoretical school" (which Lander fails to mention, but which has had an
influential presence in litigation).
216 Id.
217 See generally Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DVA Typing in
Forensic Work, 254 SCIENCE 1735 (1991); Bernard Devlin et al., Estimation of Allele Frequen-
cies for I'NTR Loci, 48 AM.J. HUM. GENETICS 662 (1991); Weir,supra note 15 at 11656-58.
218 Lander Reply, supra note 110, at 901.
219 The most prominent exponents of the empiricist school are Richard Lewontin and
Daniel Hard, both Harvard geneticists. See Lewontin & Hard, supra note 10, at 1745.
Other articles supporting this viewpoint include Laurence Mueller, Population Genetics of
Hyperzariable Human DNA, in FORENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 51 (Mark Farley & James Har-
rington eds., 1991); Mueller, supra note 190, at 2; Lander, supra note 87, at 819; Dan
Krane et al., Genetic Differences at Four DNA Typing Loci in Finnish, Italian, and M1ixed Cauca-
sian Populations, 89 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ScI. 10583 (1992);Jennifer R. Slimowitz &Joel E.
Cohen, Violations of the Ceiling Principle: Exact Conditions and Statistical Independence, 53 AM.
J. Hum. GENETICS 314 (1993); Shields, supra note 10, at 1.
220 Lander Reply, supra note 110, at 901.
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ginning of litigation on the admissibility of DNA evidence. 22 1 At
first, however, the discussion was dominated by theoretical argu-
ments. 222 The prosecution experts were generally members of the
theoretical school, who found analysis of data unnecessary. The de-
fense experts at first had difficulty gaining access to the data
bases. 2
23
Much time in court was wasted by a failure of both the prosecution to
establish that Hardy-Weinberg... held in their databases and the de-
fense to show it did not. Early trials did not consider any empirical
evidence on the issue .... 
224
As the data bases became available, the range of issues being
debated in the courtroom broadened. Defense experts began
presenting statistical analyses of the data bases which, they claimed,
supported the existence of population structure.225 Prosecution ex-
perts challenged these claims, and a debate erupted over the appro-
priate method for testing for substructure. According to Weir,
"[t]he problem was that population geneticists had little experience
221 See People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988), aff'd 589 N.Y.S.2d
197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (Lifecodes' test); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn.
1989) (Cellmark's test); see also Joyce, supra note 177, at 24 (describing the population
genetics issues raised in State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d 135 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. granted,
848 P.2d 531 (N.M. March I1 1993) regarding the FBI's test).
222 For example, in Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 443 (Ga. 1990), prosecution
experts characterized assumptions underlying Lifecodes' statistical procedures as "not
unreasonable." But, the court noted that "none of the state's witnesses had studied
Lifecodes' database to determine whether the relevant population is in Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium. Only a defense witness attempted to make that determination. [He] testi-
fied that he had analyzed Lifecodes' databases and concluded that the populations were
not in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium." Id. at 443.
223 In early cases, forensic laboratories provided tables of allele frequencies, but
sometimes refused to provide the complete data bases in a form that would allow tests of
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium or linkage equilibrium. See State v. Schwartz, 427 N.W.2d
422, 427 (Minn. 1989) ("The defense request for more specific information regarding its
methodology and population data base was denied by Cellmark."); see also Seymour
Geisser, Some Remarks on D.NA Fingerprinting, 3 CHANCE: NEw DIRECTIONS FOR STAT. AND
COMPUTING 8 (1990) ("Cellmark and Lifecodes use proprietary excuses for shielding
their data."). Cellmark first made its data bases available in 1989 under a court order
issued in pretrial procedings in State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502 (Wash. 1993), but only
after extensive litigation during which Cellmark hired a private law firm to assist the
district attorney in efforts to quash the discovery order.
The FBI also refused such requests at first, claiming that the data simply were not
recorded in a manner allowing tests for independence across loci. Some defense ex-
perts found this claim suspicious, but it effectively thwarted their efforts to obtain the
data. See Geisser, supra, at 9.
224 Weir, supra note 15, at 11655.
225 At first, these analyses tested only for Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium-that is, for
independence of the alleles produced by a given probe. Tests for independence across
loci were impossible for defense experts, because the necessary data were unavailable.
Geisser, supra note 223, at 9.
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in testing for Hardy-Weinberg for loci with many alleles." 226
Although tests for Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and linkage equilib-
rium were well established, 227 they had, to that point, been applied
only to genetic systems with few alleles. Extending these techniques
to VNTRs, with many alleles, posed problems that had not previ-
ously been discussed in the scientific literature, and that were first
addressed only recently.
One test for substructure compares the total frequency of ho-
mozygotes observed in a sample (data base) with the frequency ex-
pected if the sample is in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. 228 Because
substructure entails endogamous mating within subgroups, it in-
creases the likelihood that mating pairs will share the same allele
(band) and thereby produce homozygous offspring (who have only
one band, rather than two at a given loci). Hence, if the number of
homozygotes observed in a data base exceeds the number expected
to occur by random mating (by an amount unlikely to occur by
chance), it is evidence of substructure. Tests for "excess homozy-
gosity" were first performed on forensic data bases by experts re-
tained by defendants in criminal cases. They reported "spectacular
deviations from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium" 229 and argued that
these findings raised serious concerns about the validity of the sta-
tistical procedures of the forensic laboratories.
Prosecution experts responded that the "excess" of homozy-
gotes was more apparent than real. Technical problems in the assay
of samples in the data bases may have caused some individuals who
are in fact heterozygous to appear to have a single band. Hence,
they argued, the true frequency of homozygotes is undoubtedly
lower than indicated by the data. Some experts have argued that the
226 Weir, supra note 15, at 11655; see also Lander, supra note 87, at 821 ("The task is
made especially difficult by the large number of alleles and by the measurement error
inherent in hypervariable genetic systems.").
227 See generally BRUCE S. WEIR, GENETIC DATA ANALYSIS (1990).
228 If a population is in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, the expected frequency of ho-
mozygotes is the sum of the squared frequency of each allele. For example, if a popula-
tion has four equally common alleles-A, B, C and D-the frequency of homozygotes
(i.e., genotypes AA, BB, CC and DD), if mating is random, is expected to be
.252+.252+.252+.252 = .25, because a person with allele A, for example, is no more
likely to mate with another A than to mate with a B, C or D. Population structure means
that people are more likely to mate with others in their subgroup, hence people are
more likely to mate with someone sharing their same allele and the overall frequency of
homozygotes is higher.
229 See Lander, supra note 3, at 504; see also Mueller, supra note 219, at 57 ("My own
analysis [of forensic data bases] have shown consistent deviations from the Hardy-Wein-
berg law."); Geisser, supra note 223, at 9 ("an excess of homozygotes over Hardy-Wein-
berg expectations has often been found by defense experts").
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"excess" homozygosity disappears entirely when adequate correc-
tions are made for technical problems in the assays, 230 although this
conclusion is controversial.
23'
Debate about total homozygosity has faded over time as popu-
lation geneticists on both sides of the dispute have come to realize
that these analyses cannot adequately address the issue of substruc-
ture. Measurement error and uncertainty about the quality of the
data undermines confidence in any analysis suggesting substructure
is present;232 the limited sensitivity of these procedures undermines
confidence in any analysis suggesting it is absent.
233
Another way to test for substructure is to compare the distribu-
tion of allele frequencies in various subgroups. However, there has
been controversy about which subgroups allow relevant compari-
sons. For example, FBI scientists argued against the possibility of
substructure based on data that showed that, within major groups
(Caucasians, Blacks, Hispanics), similar allele frequencies were
found in samples drawn in Texas and Florida. 234 Lander re-
sponded: "One might analogously conclude that blond hair, blue
eyes, and fair skin are not correlated because such traits show simi-
lar frequencies in Florida and Texas; examining average frequencies
in mixed populations sheds no light on substructure." 235 According
to Lander and others of the empiricist school, what is needed is di-
rect comparison of distinct ethnic subgroups; differences among
such groups are difficult to detect in mixed populations. 236 The
230 Bernard Devlin et al., No Excess of Homozygosity at Loci Used for DNA Fingerprinting,
149 SCIENCE 1416 (1990).
231 See Lander Reply, supra note 110, at 901 (arguing that the conclusions of Devlin et
al. have "been disproved"); see also, Phillip Green & Eric Lander, Technical Comment, 253
SCIENCE 1038 (1991) and Joel Cohen et al., Technical Comment, 253 SCIENCE 1037 (1991)
(both challenging the conclusions of Devlin et al.).
232 Devlin et al., supra note 230, at 1418.
233 "Failure to reject the hypothesis that genotypes are well described by the Hardy-
Weinberg law does not mean that large errors cannot be made .... [t]he data set and
statistical tests have limited power to uncover deviations if they do exist." Mueller, supra
note 219, at 57, 62; see also Lander, supra note 87, at 821 (calling the failure to find excess
homozygosity "virtually meaningless because the tests have such low statistical power to
detect substructure even if it is present"); Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 10, at 1747
("Statistical tests for HWE are so lacking power that they are probably the worst way to
look for genetic differentiation between subgroups in a population.").
234 Budowle et al., supra note 86, at 851.
235 Lander, supra note 87, at 82 1.
236 Another methodological issue surrounding the comparison of subgroups concerns
the utility of "genetic distance" computations. Genetic distance is a statistic "designed
to express the genetic difference between two populations as a single number." WEIR,
supra note 227, at 163. Although some experts believe the genetic distance between two
subgroups provides "[a] useful quantification of the structure in a population," Id. at
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NRC Report adopted this position.237
Recently, courtroom debate has shifted as new analyses of the
data bases, using more sophisticated methods, have appeared.
These new analyses purport to find reassuring evidence of the statis-
tical independence of VNTR alleles, and thus to show that substruc-
ture is not a significant problem. Now it is primarily experts for the
prosecution who are relying on statistical analyses of data bases,
while experts for the defense are challenging the accuracy of the
data and the appropriateness of the statistical methods. The theo-
retical school, on which prosecutors initially relied, has largely been
abandoned and the main debate is now between proponents of the
statistical school, who testify on behalf of the prosecution, and pro-
ponents of the empiricist school, who testify on behalf of the
defense.
One of the "new" approaches has been simply to check within
data bases for matches between different individuals over several
loci. In 1991, the first published study of this type revealed ex-
tremely low frequencies of such matches in the data bases used by
the FBI.238 Although this study has been faulted for employing a
more stringent criteria for a match than the FBI uses in casework,239
subsequent research, employing more lenient match criteria, contin-
ues to show very low frequencies of multi-locus matches in forensic
data bases240 and, more importantly, to show that the frequency of
such matches does not signficantly exceed the number that would be
expected if the alleles are statigtically independent, an important in-
171, the application of this statistical method to the analysis of VNTR data has been
controversial.
237 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 80-82.
238 Neil Risch & Bernard Devlin, On the Probability of Matchitg DNA Fingerprints, 255
SCIENCE 717 (1991) ("an innocent defendant has little to fear from DNA fingerprinting
unless he has an evil twin").
239 PatrickJ. Sullivan, Letter, DVA Fingerprint Matches, 256 SCIENCE 1743 (1992).
240 See George Herrin, Probability of Matching RFLP Patterns fiom Unrelated Individuals, 52
AM.J. HUM. GENETiCS 491 (1993). Herrin used four different quantitative match criteria
when searching for multi-locus matches in data bases gathered by eight crime laborato-
ries in the Southeastern United States. Applying a 5% match criterion (approximating
the FBI's matching standard) in pairwise comparisons in which each of several hundred
individuals was compared to all others, he found relatively few matches: the highest
number of three-locus matches (for any combination of three probes) was three out of
377,146 comparisons, a match rate of approximately one in 126,000. Arguably, a 5%
match criteria may be too small for detecting potential matches in data bases (where
variability of band measurement is greater than in case work). Using a 10% match crite-
rion, the highest number of three-locus matches (for any combination of three probes)
increases to 83 out of 377,146 comparisons, a match rate of approximately one in 4500,
although the rate of matches is much lower for some three-probe combinations.
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dication of the absence of substructure, at least among the individu-
als in existing data bases.
Another "new" approach to analyzing existing data bases uses
sophisticated techniques for Hardy-Weinberg and linkage equilib-
rium pioneered by Weir. Although Weir first described these tech-
niques in 1978241, methods for applying them to VNTR data were
not worked out until 1991, and analyses of VNTR data using these
technique were not published until 1992.242 These tests purport to
show that "substructuring, at the geographic level, exists but is un-
likely to have a meaningful impact on multilocus genotypic
frequencies." 243
Critics from the empiricist school respond that analyses of ex-
isting data bases cannot rule out the possibility that there is sub-
structure within broad American populations. There may be
significant genetic variation among ethnic subgroups that goes un-
detected because members of discrepant subgroups are not in-
cluded in the data bases, or because they appear in numbers too
small for their differences to be noticed. 244 Most data bases consist
of "blood bank or hospital data from a narrow region" 245 and there-
fore may fail to capture the genetic diversity of the total
population. 2
46
The leading proponents of this viewpoint, Lewontin and Hartl,
argue that the large racial/ethnic groups for which laboratories
maintain data bases are in fact "conglomerates" of ethnic subgroups
24 I Bruce Weir & C. C. Cockerham, Testing Hypotheses About Linkage Disequilibrium with
Multiple Alleles, 42 HEREDITY 105 (1978).
242 Bruce Weir, Independence of J'NTR Alleles Defined as Fixed Bils, 130 GENETICS 873,
887 (1992) [hereinafter Fixed Bins]; Bruce Weir, Independence of I VTR Alleles Defined as
Floating Bins, 51 AM.J. HUM. GENETICS 992, 997 (1992) [hereinafter Floating Bins].
243 See Fixed Bins, supra note 242, at 887; see also Floating Bins, supra note 242, at 997
("whatever levels of dependence do exist are unlikely to have a meaningful impact on
forensic calculations").
244 See, e.g., R.A. Nichols & Dj. Balding, Effects of Population Structure on DA.A Fingerprint
Analysis in Forensic Science, 66 HEREDITY 297, 299-300 (1991) ("[H]uman populations are
known to be composed of large relatively outbred populations, typically in cities, and
smaller inbred populations. In a random sample from both, the effects of inbreeding in
the small populations will be swamped. We must examine studies of inbred populations
for estimates [of how much they vary].").
245 Weir, supra note 15, at 11656. Cellmark and the FBI draw their data bases from
blood banks. Lifecodes uses samples from paternity test casework, which "tend to be
from a wide geographic area," Id. Nevertheless, "[t]here have been arguments about
the ethnic composition of people becoming involved in paternity disputes and donating
blood, and these are unlikely to be resolved." Id.
246 Mueller, supra note 190, at 5 ("The people in the data base have not been sampled
at random and thus there is no expectation that the mixture of subgroups within these
samples is representative of any real population.").
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which stem from genetically differentiated ancestral populations247
and have not yet fully blended in the American "melting pot. '248
According to them and other empiricists, the way to resolve the is-
sue of substructure is "to sample ethnically distinct subpopulations
and to observe the actual degree of genetic differentiation. ' 249
Some data on the range of variation among distinctive population
subgroups already exist, and more is emerging all the time.250
Hence, a resolution to the issue of substructure may be in sight.251
In litigation, some experts have repeatedly asserted that allele
frequencies are similar across distinctive ethnic groups. 252 Efforts to
evaluate such claims have been impeded, however, by the failure of
the prosecution experts to grant access to the data. For example,
Professor Kenneth Kidd, a frequent prosecution witness, who began
testifying about the lack of variation among subgroups in 1988, re-
fused to allow access to some of the data on which he based his
testimony until 1991.253 At that point, critics challenged some of
Kidd's assertions about the data. Lewontin and Hartl reported that
there are striking differences in allele frequencies between some of
the groups Kidd examined. 254 In one American Indian group, the
Karitiana of Brazil, the entire sample of over fifty individuals had the
same allele at one VNTR locus and had one of two alleles at another
locus. Lewontin and Hartl note that a comparison of the Karitiana
247 Among Caucasians, for example, evidence from genetic markers other than
VNTRs show "more genetic variation among Irish, Spanish, Italians, Slavs, Swedes, and
other subpopulations, than there is on the average, between Europeans, Asians, Afri-
cans, Amerinds, and Oceanians." Lewontin & Hartd, supra note 10, at 1747.
248 See Kenneth Lange, Match Probabilities in Racially Admixed Populations, 52 AM. J.
Hum. GENErics 305, 306 (1993) ("What is lacking in these discussions [of match
probabilities] is an agreed-on method of computing match probabilities in admixed
populations typical of the United States.")
249 Lander, supra note 87, at 821; Philip Green, Letter, Population Genetic Issues in DVA
Fingerprinting, 50 AM. J. Hum. GENETICS 440, 441 (1992) ("For VNTR loci, there is no
obvious alternative to gathering community/ethnic-specific subpopulation data bases.").
250 See Krane et al., supra note 219, at 10583.
251 But see Weir, supra note 15, at 11656 (suggesting that "collecting such data may not
be feasible").
252 "InJakobetz, as here, Doctor Kidd testified that from looking at data from many
subgroups, i.e., Irish, Swedes, Amish, all have 'very small differences' in allele frequen-
cies." People v. Axell, I Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (citing United
States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 260 (D. Vt. 1990)).
253 Quite understandably, Kidd did not want to make public data he had collected at
great effort until he had had the first opportunity to analyze and publish it. He made the
data public after publishing an article on it in 1991.J.R. Kidd et al., Studies of Three Amer-
indian Populations Using Nuclear DNA Polymorphisms, 63 HUM. BIOL. 775 (1991). Before
then, the data was produced through discovery in United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629
(N.D. Ohio 1990) but was subject to a protective order that prevented the experts for
the defense from discussing it outside the courtroom.
254 Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 10 , at 1749.
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with another Brazilian group, the Surai, show that "certain three-
locus VNTR genotypes differ in frequency by a factor of more than
500 in these populations, even though they are separated by only
420 kilometers. ' 255 In response, Chakraborty and Kidd state that
despite inbreeding among the Karitiana "there were no two individ-
uals with identical VNTR profiles." 256 However, this assertion has
proven false. An analysis of Kidd's Karitiana data by Professor Lau-
rence Mueller found that over twenty percent of the individuals in
the sample matched another individual over four or more probes.
Two pairs of individuals matched over seven probes, although one
of the seven-probe matches appears to have been a "false positive"
caused by a laboratory sample handling error. 257 Mueller also dis-
covered a previously undetected six-probe match between one of
the Karitiana and a member of a different group, the Maya.
258
Defense experts have also had difficulty obtaining data on pop-
ulation subgroups from the FBI. FBI scientists began testifying
about data purportedly showing an absence of variation across sub-
groups in early 1990, and discussed the data (while presenting only
selected examples) in a published article in 1991,259 but have yet to
produce all of the underlying data in discovery.2 60 The problem of
access may have been resolved by the recent publication by the FBI
of a four-volume set of data compiled by the FBI. 26 1 However, this
1993 publication appeared over three years after the FBI first re-
fused to provide access to data that have played a role in litigation
and public debate262 in the interim. Given the stakes, three years is
255 Id. (citing Ine, 129 F.R.D. at 629).
256 Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 217, at 1738.
257 Mueller, supra note 190, at 4-5. A false positive is an event which is, itself, of con-
siderable interest and importance.
258 Id. at 5. In describing the differences between Kidd's assessment of his data and
the assessment of it by the defense experts, the author does not mean to imply that Dr.
Kidd, a distinguished scientist, intentionally misrepresented his findings. What the epi-
sode illustrates is that different scientists can draw differing conclusions from the same
data, and thus that it is very important that data be open to general scrutiny. It is dan-
gerous to rely on the unexamined conclusions of a single scientist (or a single group of
scientists), no matter how distinguished.
259 Budowle et al., supra note 86, at 85 1.
260 In one case with which the author is familiar, when defense lawyers requested the
data underlying claims made by Budowle et al. (the claims were supported by citations
to "authors' unpublished data," see Budowle et al., supra note 86, at 851), the FBI staff
responded that the article is incorrect-the data cited did not in fact belong to the au-
thors and therefore could not be produced.
261 VNTR POPULATION DATA: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, 1993. (available from the National
Technical Information Service, Washington, D.C.)
262 See, e.g., John Brookfield, Law ad Probabilities, 355 NATURE 207 (1992) (concluding
that "surveys of diverse populations" have not shown evidence of substructure).
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a long time to wait.
F. THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL'S CEILING APPROACH
The NRC report acknowledged the existence of the scientific
dispute over population structure and proposed a compromise. 263
The danger of population structure is sufficiently serious, the NRC
concluded, that current approaches should not be used. Additional
empirical studies of ethnic subgroups are needed (immediately) to
determine the extent of population structure. However, the NRC
asserts that it is not necessary, as some critics had suggested, to
abandon the use of the product rule altogether. Laboratories may
continue multiplying allele frequencies so long as they employ a
conservative approach for estimating those frequencies-an ap-
proach the NRC calls "the ceiling principle. ' 264 This principle is
designed to take into account the possibility that undetected popu-
lation structure may make allele frequencies far higher in some
groups than others.
[I]t is not enough to sample broad populations defined as "races" in
the U.S. census (e.g., Hispanics), because of the possibility of substruc-
ture. On the other hand, it is not feasible or reasonable to sample
every conceivable subpopulation in the world to obtain a guaranteed
upper bound. The committee strongly recommends the following ap-
proach: Random samples of 100 persons should be drawn from each
of 15-20 populations, each representing a group relatively homogene-
ous genetically; the largest frequency in any of these populations or
5%o, whichever is larger, should be taken as the ceiling frequency. 26 5
Pending the completion of the population studies, the NRC rec-
ommended the following approach to statistical calculation. First,
the laboratory should check to determine whether the DNA print
observed in casework matches any DNA prints in existing data ba-
ses. The frequency of such matches (and the size of the data bases)
should be reported to the trier of fact. Second, the laboratory
should estimate the frequency of the DNA print by applying the
product rule to "modified ceiling frequencies," consisting of the
95%o upper confidence limit of the highest frequency observed in an
existing data base or 10%, whichever is higher. '2G6
The NRC's modified ceiling approach was intended to provide
a reasonable, broadly acceptable basis for making statistical esti-
263 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 79-80.
264 Id. at 82-85.
265 Id. at 83. "Ideally, the populations should span the range of ethnic groups that are
represented in the United States-e.g., English, Germans, Italians, Russians, Navahos,
Puerto Ricans, Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, and West Africans." Id. at 84.
266 Id. at 91-93, 95.
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mates in the face of the current scientific uncertainty over popula-
tion structure.
In order to ensure the admissibility of this important technology, the
NRC committee sought to define common ground, namely a standard
of practice so conservative as to ensure that there would be no serious
scientific argument that the evidence could be said to overstate the case
against a defendant 26
7
But the modified ceiling approach has not yet proven to be an ac-
ceptable compromise. Some scientists have attacked the ceiling
principle as unnecessarily conservative, 268 some say it is unclear and
subject to conflicting interpretations, 269 some have defended it as a
workable compromise, 270 and some, confounding the expectations
of the NRC panel, have argued seriously that it may not be con-
servative enough. 271 A major theme of critics from all perspectives
is that the "ceiling principle" is not a principle of science. It is an
arbitrary policy statement, and can be accepted or rejected only as
such.
2 7 2
Another problem is that a dispute has arisen over how to apply
the NRC's modified ceiling approach. 273 Several points are in con-
tention. One issue is which data bases (and how many data bases)
should be consulted when estimating allele frequency. Some ex-
267 Eric S. Lander, letter, DKA Fingerprining: The NRC Report, 260 SCIENCE 1221
(1993). Lander was a member of the NRC panel.
268 See Aldhous, supra note 15 at 755; Bernard Devlin et al., Statistical Evahation of D.V4
Fingerprinting: A Critique of the VRC's Report, 259 SCIENCE 748 (1993).
269 Weir, supra note 15, at 11654; Bruce Weir, letter, DA-1 Fingeiprinting Report, 260
SCIENCE 473 (1993).
270 Lander, supra note 289; Krane et al., supra note 219, at 10587 ("the interim ceiling
principle is a significant improvement over the conventional product rule for estimating
the probability of matching DNA profiles").
271 Slimowitz & Cohen, supra note 219, 315 ("Before the ceiling principle is imple-
mented, more research should be done to determine ... whether the deviation would
cause the ceiling principle to be non-conservative in practice.")
272 In an affidavit filed recently in a case in Washington state, Professor Elizabeth
Thompson, Chair of the Department of Statistics at the University of Washington, de-
rided the ceiling principle as "data-driven, interest-ridden, voodoo, pseudo-statistical,
ad hoc methodology to which no statistician (or scientist) should be a party." State v.
DeFroe & Hollis, 92-1-03699-8 & 92-104-603-9 (King Co., Wash. Super. Ct. June 3,
1993)(Ruling and motion to exclude DNA evidence). Responding to the question of
whether the ceiling principle is generally accepted, she declared it, and other ad hoc
adjustment methods "are not principles and are not science. Hence it is useless to ask
concerning acceptance of these 'principles' by the "scientific community."
Similarly, Richard Lewontin, in an affidavit filed in a case in California, declared:
In my view, the "modified ceiling principle" has no rational basis and has been
chosen by entirely arbitrary means .... It is clear to me that the "modified ceiling
principle" was invented in the hope of maintaining the use of DNA pattern match-
ing for forensic purposes, despite the lack of the necessary statistical information to
allow a valid estimate of matching probabilities."
273 Mueller, supra note 190, at 2; Sherman, supra note 3, at 1.
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perts read the NRC recommendations to mean that all existing data
bases (for a given DNA typing system) should be consulted and that
the allele frequency should be the higher of .10 or the 95% upper
limit of the confidence interval above the highest frequency ob-
served in any data base. Others have taken the position that only
data bases for "major races" (i.e., the FBI's Caucasian, Hispanic and
Black data bases) should be consulted. Another issue is whether, in
return for adopting this "conservative" approach, labs may abandon
other "conservative" features of their estimation procedure. 274
What is at stake, obviously, is just how conservative the modified
ceiling numbers will be, and how much flexibility forensic laborato-
ries will have in implementing the NRC's recommendations. These
interpretive issues may have a dramatic effect on the results of the
calculations. 275 Hence, for courts considering the admissibility of
statistical estimates, the issue is not whether the NRC's modified
ceiling estimates are admissible, but which versions, if any, of these
numbers are admissible.
The National Research Council is currently planning a new
study that will make a second attempt to resolve the statistical de-
bate, drawing on new data that has emerged since the publication of
the NRC Report.276 The NRC's new effort was prompted by a re-
quest from FBI Director William Sessions, who declared that debate
over the ceiling principle has "created a climate of confusion for the
courts." 27 7 Sessions noted that since the release of the NRC Re-
port, eleven of thirty appellate decisions on the admissibility of DNA
evidence have ruled it inadmissible, and that "courts in Canada,
274 The FBI at one point took the position that the modified ceiling approach is ac-
ceptable only if used with floating bins (in the FBI system) of ±2.5% around each band.
It appears, however, that such a bin is smaller than the interval within which the FBI will
declare bands to match; hence it may not be broadly acceptable to other scientists. See
supra notes 116-20.
275 See Sherman, supra note 3, at 1.
In one case, an FBI Agent-Examiner purported to follow the modified ceiling prin-
ciple while computing the frequency of defendant's DNA profile six different ways. The
results ranged from one in 1.26 million (obtained by using floating bins smaller than the
FBI's matching criterion and four probes) to one in 877 (using fixed bins and three
probes--one probe was dropped due to concerns about Hardy-Weinberg dise-
quilibrium). FBI Computations produced in discovery in State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d
135 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 848 P.2d 531 (N.M. Mar. 11, 1993). But even this did
not represent the full possible range. A defense expert, using three probes and fixed
bins, but consulting a larger number of data bases, computed the frequency to be one in
84. Affidavit of Laurence Mueller in Anderson (No. CR-46255).
276 Telephone Interview with Eric Fischer, Project Director, National Research Coun-
cil, Sept. 15, 1993.
277 Letter from William S. Sessions, ex-Director of the FBI to Dr. Frank Press, Presi-
dent of the National Academy of Sciences (Apr. 16, 1993).
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Australia, and the United Kingdom began hearing challenges to
DNA evidence-citing the NRC report-immediately following its
release.278 Calling this situation "a crisis," Sessions urged the NRC
to "act quickly to resolve the controversy .. "279 The FBI, which
will help fund the new study, has been working closely with the NRC
to define the scope of the NRC's efforts. 2 0 Regardless of its conclu-
sions, the new NRC report, when it is delivered, is likely to be
influential.
G. DETERMINING THE RELEVANT REFERENCE POPULATION
Another area of scientific dispute, closely linked to the debate
over population structure, concerns the relevant reference popula-
tion to be used to estimate the frequency of a DNA profile. Forensic
laboratories typically assume that the relevant reference population
is the broad racial or ethnic group of which the defendant is a mem-
ber. Thus, if the defendant is a Caucasian, the laboratory reports
the frequency of the defendant's DNA profile among Caucasians
(basing its estimate on the frequency of defendant's alleles in the
laboratory's Caucasian data base). Much of the debate over popula-
tion structure has been framed in terms of the difficulty of estimat-
ing the frequency of the defendant's DNA profile, given that the
defendant may be a member of a distinctive subgroup. 281 Discus-
sion of the defendant's ethnic background has been a common
theme in judicial opinions.
Recently, some commentators have argued that focusing on the
defendant's ethnic background miscasts the issue. In a typical case,
the defendant's DNA profile is known and has been found to match
the DNA profile of an evidentiary sample. By denying that he is the
source of the evidentiary sample, the defendant implicitly raises the
possibility that the true perpetrator, whose identity is unknown, also
has the "matching" profile. Hence, "it is not the ethnicity of the
defendant that is the directly relevant question but rather the ethnic
composition of the pool of possible alternative suspects."
282
278 Id. at 1.
279 Id. at 3.
280 At one point, the FBI's Assistant Director in Charge of the Laboratory Division,
John Hicks, threatened to withhold funding unless the NRC limited the scope of its
inquiry to procedures for estimating the frequency of DNA profiles in a reference popu-
lation. Letter from John Hicks to Richard Rau, National Institute of Justice (May 27,
1993). Hicks was apparently reacting negatively to a May 11, 1993 NRC Prospectus that
suggested the new committee would also "[aissess and describe the degree of certainty
of DNA evidence in ways useful to the courts ......
281 See, e.g., People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990, 997-99 (Co. Ct. 1992).
282 R.C. Lewontin, Letter, Which Population?, 52 AM.J. HuM. GENETICS 205 (1993).
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Based on this conclusion, a few commentators have argued that
concerns about population structure are largely irrelevant to foren-
sic DNA testing.28 3 In most criminal cases, they argue, the pool of
alternative suspects includes individuals from a variety of ethnic
subgroups, not just individuals in the defendant's subgroup. It is
the aggregate frequency of the matching profile, across all such
groups, rather than its frequency within a particular group, that de-
termines the likelihood a person drawn at random from the pool of
possible suspects would match. Uncertainties about the frequency
of the matching profile in defendant's ethnic subgroup, and the fail-
ure of forensic laboratories to gather "community/ethnic specific
data bases" are not serious problems because it is aggregate fre-
quencies, rather than frequencies in specific subgroups, that matter.
This argument rests on the assumption that there is no correla-
tion between the ethnic background of the defendant and that of the
true perpetrator in cases where the defendant is falsely accused-an
assumption that is clearly wrong in some cases, and may be ques-
tionable in most. In some cases, for example, police will have infor-
mation about the appearance of the perpetrator which limits the
pool of possible suspects to individuals of the defendant's ethnicity.
Even if nothing is known about the appearance of the perpetrator,
however, the tendency of people to cluster and live in close proxim-
ity with others of similar ethnic background will, in many cases, as-
sure that the pool of alternative suspects is heavily weighted toward
individuals of the defendant's ethnicity. If a crime occurs in a neigh-
borhood with a heavy concentration of people of Puerto Rican an-
cestry, for example, the defendant is likely to be of Puerto Rican
ancestry, as is the majority of the pool of alternative suspects. 28 4
Hence, the need to know whether the frequency of a particular DNA
profile is higher among defendant's subgroup (the local community
of Puerto Rican immigrants) than among a larger aggregate group
for which the forensic laboratories has a data base (e.g., Hispanics),
will be unavoidable in many cases. 285 Whether the defendant's
283 Bruce Weir & Ian Evett, Letter, IWhose DN.A?, 50 AM.J. HUM. GENETICS 869 (1992);
Weir, supra, note 15, at 11656.
284 Consider, for example, United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990),
vacated for rehearing en banc but appeal dismissed due to death of defendant, 925 F.2d
1127 (8th Cir. 1991), where defendant was an Oglala Sioux and the crime, a rape, oc-
curred on an Indian reservation for Oglala Sioux.
285 There are some cases, however, in which the pool of alternative suspects is un-
likely to include individuals of the defendant's ethnicity. For example, in Mol hit, the de-
fendant was a Shiite Muslim of Iranian origin who was accused of rape in Westchester
County, New York. Although the court expressed concern about the frequency of de-
fendant's DNA profile within his ethnic subgroup, noting that defendant's "ancestors
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ethnicity is relevant or not in a given case will not always be appar-
ent, and will often be debatable.
2 6
H. WEIGHT OR ADMISSIBILITY?
A key issue for courts is whether the dispute over statistical
methods goes to the admissibility or merely the weight of the result-
ing statistical estimates. Prosecutors often contend that the accu-
racy of statistical estimates is a matter of weight to be considered by
the jury; defense lawyers respond that the statistical method is
neither generally accepted nor valid and therefore that the resulting
estimates are inadmissible.
A common argument by prosecutors is that the statistical
method is not properly reviewable under Frye because it is not
novel. 28 7 By their account, fears about population structure do not
over at least the past five generations were of Persian descent, and all from the same
town or a town close by.... inbreeding was very common in his family," such concerns
are appropriate only if other members of defendant's group were members of the pool
of possible alternative suspects, which seems unlikely given that the crime occurred in
New York rather than Iran. Whether cases like VIohit, where the defendant's ethnicity
appears irrelevant, outnumber cases like Two Bulls, where the defendant's ethnicity ap-
pears critical, is an empirical question on which we currently have no data. In any case,
the existence of cases like .3Iohit, even if they are a majority, will not eliminate the need
to address the issue of substructure for the remaining cases.
286 See e.g., Weir & Evett, supra note 283, and the response by Lewontin, supra note
283, at 205. This revealing exchange of letters concerns the relevance of the ethnicity of
the defendant in State v. Passino, No.185-1-90 (Franklin Co., Vt. Dist. Ct. filed May 13,
1991), where the trial court excluded the FBI's DNA test based on concerns that the
defendant "belongs to an ethnic group whose genotype frequencies may occur more
frequently than the FBI's estimate." (p. 26 of memorandum opinion). Defendant Pas-
sino, who was part Caucasian and part Abanaki Indian, had challenged the FBI's use of
its Caucasian data base. (p. 13, n. 5). Weir and Evett consider the result a mistake be-
cause the true perpetrator was not necessarily an individual who matched the defend-
ant's unusual background. Lewontin responds that the county where the crime occurred
"has the highest proportions of Indians, largely Abnaki, of any county in the state" and
notes that "[t]he victim, who was herself half-Abnaki, was assaulted and killed in a trailer
camp in which a large fraction of the other residents were also of Abnaki ancestry."
Hence, "the defense could make the entirely reasonable claim that it is indeed the
Abnaki who comprise 'the population' of potential suspects, of whom defendant is only
one." Lewontin concedes that the prosecution could make an alternative argument that
since the trailer park was near a state highway "the entire population of western Ver-
mont and eastern New York is the appropriate reference groups," but suggests that this
merely adds to uncertainty about the value of DNA evidence: "Rather than being faced
with objective science, we are faced with subjective arguments about the patterns of
people's lives."
287 Statistical evidence on the frequency of genetic characteristics has previously been
held admissible in connection with serology tests. See. e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes,
526 N.E.2d 1270 (Mass. 1988); People v. Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d 377 (1989). Prosecu-
tors point out that the "method" used for computing serology statistics is similar to the
statistical method used by forensic DNA laboratories-that is, the frequency of particu-
lar alleles is estimated with reference to a data base, and the joint frequency of alleles in
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concern the reliability of "the method" per se, but merely the accu-
racy of the results obtained by applying the method to particular
data bases; whether the correct data base was used is, they argue, a
matter for the jury.28 8 This characterization of the scientific criti-
cism, however, has been repudiated by one of the key critics 289 and
is inconsistent with the NRC Report as well.290
Of course, the underlying question in this battle of characteriza-
tions is whether courts should wait for a resolution of the dispute
among population geneticists before admitting statistical estimates
based on current methods, or should admit such estimates now and
allow the dispute to be aired and argued in front of juries. This
question raises important policy issues concerning the ability of law-
yers and experts to present scientific evidence effectively and the
ability of juries to understand and draw reasonable conclusions
from it. Semantic disputes over whether or not scientific criticisms
concern "the method," or whether it is or merely the application of
the method that is novel, do little to illuminate these issues. Empiri-
cal research on these issues has only just begun.29'
different marker systems is multiplied to determine the joint frequency of a set of char-
acteristics. Defense lawyers respond that the application of this technique to alleles gen-
erated by RFLP analysis of VNTRs is indeed novel, and is the very issue that is subject to
scientific dispute.
288 For example, in a brief filed with the California Supreme Court, requesting review
of People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (1992), deputy district attorney Rockne Har-
mon of Alameda County, California argued, inter alia, that Barney rested on the "mis-
taken belief that the SCIENCE article [by Profs. Lewontin and Hartl] questioned the
procedures themselves, rather than the actual resulting estimates." Letter brief filed
Sept. 15, 1992. Harmon was the prosecutor in both Barney and Howard and entered both
appeals as amicus curiae; his letter brief was filed under local rules allowing interested
parties to comment upon petitions for review filed with the California Supreme Court.
289 In an episode reminiscent of the scene from the movie ANNIE HALL in which
Woody Allen produces Marshall McLuhan while arguing with a pedant about McLuhan's
views, counsel for Barney and Howard asked Professor Lewontin himself to respond to
Harmon's characterization of the Lewontin & Hartl article. He did:
It is [Harmon who has] a 'mistaken belief' about the article in question. The con-
tent and stated intent of the article were to challenge the method used to calculate
probabilities of matches, and we concluded that the procedures themselves were
unreliable and invalid.
Letter brief of Richard C. Lewontin, dated Oct. 1, 1992 and filed with the California
Supreme Court Oct. 5, 1992. The California Supreme Court denied the petition to re-
view Barnie on November 25, 1992, letting stand the ruling of the Court of Appeal.
290 The NRC Report also suggests that the statistical dispute concerns "the method."
Noting that different methods of determining the frequency of DNA prints can produce
strikingly different estimates, the NRC Report suggests that "Itihe discrepancy not only
is a question of the weight to accord the evidence (which is traditionally left to the jury),
but bears on the scientific validity of the alternative methods used for rendering esti-
mates of the weight (which is a threshold question for admissibility)." NRC REPORT,
supra note 12, at 75.
291 See Jonathan J. Koehler, D.\A .Matches and Statistics: hiportant Questions, Surprising
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Appellate courts that have considered the issue have generally
held that the statistical methods are properly reviewable under Frye,
offering as a justification the crucial importance of the statistical es-
timates and the arcane nature of the scientific dispute:
To end the Kelly-Frye inquiry at the matching step, and leave it to
jurors to assess the current scientific debate on statistical calculation as
a matter of weight rather than admissibility, would stand Kelly-Frye on
its head. We would be asking jurors to do what judges carefully
avoid-decide the substantive merits of competing scientific opinion
as to the reliability of a novel method of scientific proof. We cannot
reasonably ask the average juror to decide such arcane questions as
whether genetic substructuring and linkage disequilibrium preclude
use of the Hardy-Weinberg equation and the product rule, when we
ourselves have struggled to grasp these concepts. The result would be
predictable. The jury would simply skip to the bottom line-the only
aspect of the process that is readily understood-and look at the ulti-
mate expression of match probability, without competently assessing
the reliability of the process by which the laboratory got to the bottom
line. This is an instance in which the method of scientific proof is so
impenetrable that it would " '... assume a posture of mystic infallibil-
ity in the eyes of a jury .... -292
I. ARE STATISTICS NECESSARY?
A number of courts have concluded that the procedures for
producing DNA prints and determining whether they match are
generally accepted but that procedures for statistical computation
are not. These courts face an interesting decision: whether to admit
evidence of a DNA test match in the absence of statistical data. A
few courts have allowed a forensic expert to testify that two DNA
patterns "match" but have barred the expert from presenting statis-
tics to quantify the rarity of the matching DNA pattern or the likeli-
hood of a coincidental match.2 9 3 Other courts have viewed DNA
evidence as meaningless and potentially prejudicial in the absence
of such statistics.2 94 They therefore exclude the evidence altogether
Answers, 76 JUDICATURE 222, 226 (1993)(reporting groundbreaking research examining
mock jurors' reactions to DNA evidence as a function of how the statistical estimates are
presented). Empirical research of this type is potentially very helpful in evaluating juror
competency, but no studies as yet have examined reactions to the complex sort of testi-
mony likely to arise in a clash of statisticians or population geneticists over statistical
methods. For general background on jurors' use of probabilistic evidence in criminal
trials, see Thompson, supra note 178, at 9; David H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, Can
Jurors tUnderstand Probabilistic Evidence, 154 J. ROYAL STATIST. Soc'Y 75 (1991).
292 People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (citing People v.
Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976)).
293 Rivera v. State, 340 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1992); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422
(Minn. 1989)
294 Commonwealth v. Curnin, 526 N.E.2d 440,443 (Mass. 1991) ("It is apparent from
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on finding the results of the statistical procedures inadmissible.
This position was strongly supported by the NRC Report:
To say that two patterns match, without providing any scientifically
valid estimate (or, at least, an upper bound) of the frequency with
which such matches might occur by chance, is meaningless. 295
The major danger of admitting DNA evidence without statistics
is that jurors may mistakenly assume that because each person's
DNA is unique, any DNA test showing a "match" provides a unique
identification. Unfortunately, this error may be encouraged by the
tendency of some forensic experts to use loose language which im-
plies, or even states outright, that a match between two DNA
profiles is equivalent to a unique identification.296 The NRC Report
recommends that, "[r]egardless of the calculated frequency, an ex-
pert should-given the relatively small number of loci used and the
available population data-avoid assertions in court that a particular
genotype is unique in the population. ' 29 7
J. WHO IS AN EXPERT?
One of the difficulties courts have faced in dealing with the sta-
tistical dispute is determining which scientists have relevant exper-
tise. This issue is important in every jurisdiction, but has special
significance under Frye, which requires that a novel technique be
generally accepted "in the relevant community." Disputes over the
the basis on which we decide the DNA testing issue that we would not permit the admis-
sion of test results showing a DNA match (a positive result) without telling the jury
anything about the likelihood of that match occurring."); Ex Parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242,
254 (Ala. 1991); People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)("The
statistical calculation step is the pivotal element of DNA analysis, for the evidence means
nothing without a determination of the statistical significance of a match of DNA
patterns.")
295 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 74.
296 For example, in State v. Pierce, No. 89-CA-30, 1990 WL 97596, (Ohio Ct. App.
July 9, 1990), aft'd, 597 N.E.2d 107, 113 (Ohio 1992), Dr. Daniel Garner of Cellmark
Diagnostics testified that in his "opinion, those two DNA banding patterns match. In
other words, it is the same DNA banding pattern. The DNA is from the same individ-
ual." Similarly, in State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502 (Wash. 1993), a case where the pros-
ecution presented evidence of a "match" between DNA profiles but chose not to present
any statistical estimates of the frequency of the matching profiles, Dr. Robin Cotton of
Cellmark testified: "The defendant Richard Cauthron using our test is the source of the
semen samples in the five cases that we got the result on. His pattern matches the pat-
tern from the semen stain in those cases." Id. at 515. And Ms. Amy Corey, a Cellmark
technician testified that Cauthron "was the donor of the semen in those five cases." Id.
at 516. The Washington Supreme Court quite properly reversed Cauthron's conviction,
finding that "[tiestimony of a match in DNA samples, without the statistical background
or probability estimates, is neither based on a generally accepted scientific theory nor
helpful to the trier of fact." Id. at 515.
297 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 92.
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scope and boundaries of the relevant scientific community have
been frequent as prosecutors have tried to define the community in
a manner that excludes or marginalizes scientific critics, while de-
fense lawyers have tried to make the critics central.
A number of the experts who have been called by the defense to
testify about theoretical issues in population genetics, such as the
implications of population structure for the independence of alleles,
are evolutionary biologists who do experimental work with fruit
flies. 298 Prosecutors have argued that these experts are not quali-
fied to comment on the frequency of DNA prints because their ex-
pertise concerns flies rather than humans. This boundary drawing
maneuver proved successful in some cases, 299 perhaps in part be-
cause it was supported by testimony from experts on the FBI's sci-
entific staff, although it has been disavowed by most scientists.
300
To assess such a challenge to the expertise of a scientific witness
obviously requires a court to delve rather deeply into the nature and
foundations of scientific expertise in esoteric fields. Thus, the no-
tion that the Frye rule is easy to apply and that it protects judges
from the need to delve deeply into scientific issues has not proven to
be true for forensic DNA evidence.
Other boundary disputes concern scientists' familiarity with
298 Because it breeds profusely, using diploid, sexual reproduction, with a very short
time between generations, the fruit fly is an ideal organism for studying the transfer and
distribution of genetic characteristics through large populations over multiple
generations.
299 In two Frye hearings in California, a judge issued written findings indicating that
"human population genetics" and "non-human population genetics" are distinct fields
and that "Non-human Population Genetics is not within this relevant scientific commu-
nity. Drosophila experts in the field of Evolutionary Biology are not within the relevant
scientific community." People v. Martinez, No. C-82183 (Orange Co., Cal. Super. Ct.
June 18, 1991) (findings of Theodore Millard, J., concerning the admissibility of a DNA
test performed by the Orange County, California Sheriff's Crime Laboratory). The
same findings were issued by Judge Millard in People v. Gross, No. C-75486 (Orange
Co., Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 1991) (a case concerning the admissibility of the FBI DNA
test).
300 For example, Professor Bruce Weir, who is perhaps the most distinguished popu-
lation geneticist to testify in favor of current statistical procedures, has denied that there
is any distinction between human and non-human population genetic. Record at 90,
People v. Halik, No. VA-000843 (Los Angeles Co., Cal. Super. Ct. July 23, 1991). Weir
stated that the techniques used for evaluating the presence of population structure are
the same for all diploid sexual organisms and that it would be wrong to conclude that a
population geneticist who studies fruit flies is not part of the relevant scientific commu-
nity for evaluating the assumptions underlying forensic DNA statistics. Id. Eric Lander
has gone even further, asserting that "there's a funny sense in which a drosophila popu-
lation geneticist is better qualified to talk about theory than a human population geneti-
cist can talk about theory." Record Vol. XVII at 191, United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D.
161 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
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pertinent facts. A common attack against scientists in an opposing
camp is that they are unaware of certain key facts (often recent, un-
published research findings) that would (or should) alter their opin-
ion. In theory, a court need not consider how well informed the
disputing scientific camps are in order to apply the Frye rule. The
court need only determine whether there is a dispute in the "rele-
vant scientific community." However, a number of courts have con-
sidered scientific knowledge a factor in defining the relevant
community, and have looked for general acceptance only among
"knowledgeable scientists."
This application of Frye can enmesh the court in complex tech-
nical disputes about whether particular scientific findings do or do
not resolve scientific concerns raised by critics. Moreover, carried
to its logical extreme, it can lead to ludicrously narrow requirements
for general acceptance.3 0' Yet courts have found it difficult to resist
the invitation to ignore ignorant voices, and have been all too will-
ing to undertake the assessment task that follows from accepting
such an invitation. The success of lawyers on both sides at discredit-
ing opposing experts by exposing gaps in their knowledge has pro-
vided an incentive for lawyers to rely on seasoned experts-repeat
players who stay on top of every new development.30 2
IV. WILL FREQUENCY-OF-MATCH STATISTICS ASSIST
THE TRIER OF FACT?
It may seem self-evident that statistics on the frequency of
matches in a reference population, if valid, will be helpful to a jury
evaluating DNA evidence. But these statistics can be misleading be-
cause, in some cases, they are an inaccurate index of the probative
value of the DNA evidence.303 In such cases, courts should consider
301 One population geneticist testified that the FBI's statistical technique was "univer-
sally accepted" among knowledgeable scientists. When confronted during cross-exami-
nation, with criticisms of the FBI's methods made by other population geneticists (Hartl,
Lewontin, Lander, Mueller), he acknowledged their expertise but discounted their opin-
ions because they were unfamiliar with an important set of data. Further cross examina-
tion revealed that the data in question had not been published, were not publicly
available, and had been analyzed only by the witness himself. Under the witness' narrow
definition of the relevant community, "universal acceptance" was tantamount to accept-
ance by a single individual, himself. Record at 99-120, People v. Halik, No. VA-00843
(Los Angeles Co., Cal. Super. Ct. July 23, 1991) (Testimony of Dr. Bruce Weir).
302 It also has placed a premium on strategic use of discovery proceedings, as each
side tries during the discovery phase to hold back information that can be used to am-
bush opposing experts in court, while trying to force disclosure of information that
might be used in similar fashion by the the other side.
303 See Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA As Criminal Identification Evidence:
With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 303, 325 (199 1); Koehler, supra 291,
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carefully whether this statistic will "assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" 30 4 and whether
the probative value of this statistic is "outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury
"305
A poor quality match is one circumstance in which a frequency
estimate might be misleading. As discussed earlier, the liberal
matching standards employed by some laboratories may allow a
match to be called between two prints unlikely to be from the same
person.30 6 In such a case, the DNA evidence may deserve relatively
little weight. Yet the statistic jurors typically receive in such cases is
the same as if the match were perfect.
The danger of prejudice may also arise where there is reason to
believe that the probability of a coincidental match in the case at
hand is higher than the frequency of matches in a reference popula-
tion. This would be the case whenever the defendant was selected
in a manner that renders him more likely to match than an average
member of the reference population. In a case where the true per-
petrator is likely to be a close relative of the innocent defendant, for
example, the frequency of matches in a reference population may
greatly understate the probability of a coincidental match.
30 7
Courts should consider carefully whether population frequency sta-
tistics would even be helpful to the trier of fact in such cases.
The population frequency of a particular profile also under-
states the probability of a coincidental match in cases where more
than one potential match could prove incriminating. In some cases,
for example, a defendant is matched to an evidentiary sample that
has more than one donor. If the evidence sample contains alleles A,
B, C and D, and defendant is genotype AB, he clearly is a possible
donor and so will be declared to match. (The additional alleles are
consistent with a second donor of genotype CD). In such cases, fo-
rensic laboratories all too often present statistics on the frequency
of the defendant's genotype. This practice is highly misleading be-
cause the defendant's is only one of a number of genotypes that
could be said to match. Defendant would also have matched had he
had genotypes AC, AD, BC, BD, CD, AA, BB, CC, or DD. Thus, the
at 222; Thompson & Ford, supra note 95, passim. See also infa notes 307-10 and accom-
panying text.
'04 FED. R. EVID. 702. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
305 FED. R. EvID. 403. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
306 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
307 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 86-87; Lempert, supra note 303, at 308-14.
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probability of a coincidental match in such cases may greatly exceed
the frequency of defendant's genotype.
Finally, frequency statistics are a misleading index of the value
of DNA evidence when there is a significant chance of a false posi-
tive. To evaluate evidence of a DNA match between two samples,
one must know the likelihood of finding such a match if the samples
are from different people-an event that could occur in two ways:
there could be a coincidental match between different individuals who
happen to have the same DNA profile, or there could be a false posi-
tive (false match) due to an error. Even if the frequency of matches
in a reference population accurately reflects the likelihood or a coin-
cidental match, it says nothing about the likelihood of a false posi-
tive. Consequently, the frequency is not an accurate index of the
value of DNA evidence where a false positive is possible. Indeed,
the frequency may not even be corrollated with the probability ju-
rors need to know in order to assess the value of the DNA evidence.
Hence, opponents of DNA evidence will argue that frequency statis-
tics, by themselves, are unhelpful and therefore excludable under
Daubert.
The probability of a false positive has received far less attention
than the frequency of DNA profiles, although having an accurate
estimate of the probability of a false positive may be more important
than having an accurate estimate of the frequency of matching
profiles, because the rate of false positive is likely to be much
greater than the rate of coincidental matches.308 Without an accu-
rate estimate of the false positive rate, one cannot evaluate the pro-
bative value of DNA evidence.
In courtroom testimony, forensic scientists and their academic
supporters often insist that the probability of a false positive is
zero-that is, that false positives are impossible.30 9 Although the
308 Koehler, supra note 291, at 22 ("based on the little evidence available to data, a
reasonable estimate of the false positive error rate is 1-4 percent"); Thompson & Ford,
supra note 10, at 141-46; Lempert, supra note 303, at 325 (the probability of a coinciden-
tal match "is usually dwarfed by the probability of a false positive error").
309 See People v. Shi Fu Huang, 546 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) ("Dr.
Baird testified that it is impossible to get a false positive."); People v. Wesley, 533
N.Y.S.2d 643, 652 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) ("[lIt is impossible under the scientific princi-
ples, technology and procedures of DNA Fingerprinting (outside of an identical twin), to
get a 'false positive'-i.e., to identify the wrong individual as the contributor of the DNA
being tested .... Under the undisputed testimony received at the hearing, no 'wrong'
person, within the established powers of identity for the test, can be identified."); Hicks
v. State, 860 S.W.2d 419, Tex. Crim. App. 1993), aff'g No. 88-134-CR (Freestone Co.,
Tex. 1989) ("According to Caskey, a false positive finding was impossible .. "); State v.
Cobey, 559 A.2d 391, 392 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) ("An incorrect match is an impos-
sible result."); see also Koehler, supra note 291, at 228 n. 16 (quoting a number of similar
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falsity of these claims has been demonstrated repeatedly,3 10 the
claims still continue to be made. Koehler suggests that such testi-
mony stems from "definitions of false positive error that exclude
consideration of human error .. . ." 311 Indeed, when confronted
with evidence that false matches have occurred in proficiency tests
and casework, 31 2 the standard response is that these events resulted
from "human error" by a technician executing the test, not from a
deficiency in the test itself. Be that as it may, the effort to distin-
guish "human error" from "test error" is pointless and potentially
misleading when humans are necessarily involved in the execution
of the test, when occasional human errors are inevitable, and when
it is the overall rate of error (from whatever cause) that is at issue.
Currently, juries often hear nothing about false positives, other
than broad assurances that they never occur. When such claims are
challenged, forensic experts typically concede that false matches are
possible but claim the likelihood of such an event is vanishingly
small and that a false match has never occurred in their laboratory
or, if it has, that it resulted from problems that have been corrected
and will not reoccur. Experts for the defense sometimes testify that
false positive are possible, but they typically do not attempt to quan-
tify their frequency. As a result, jurors hear impressive numbers
that appear to quantify with precision the frequency of the DNA
profile, accompanied (when the issue is raised at all) by a vague,
non-quantitative discussion of the chances of a false positive. The
danger of the current approach is that the possibility of a false posi-
tive will simply be ignored.3 13 Indeed, the considerable time de-
voted in some trials to discussion of the frequency of the DNA
profile, the methods for computing that frequency, and the contro-
statements from transcripts of expert testimony). Cf. Dan L. Burk, DNA Identification:
Possibilities and Pitfalls Revisited, 31 JURIMETICS J. 53, 80 ("Bald statements or broad hints
that DNA testing is infallible . . .are not only irresponsible, they border on scientific
fraud.").
310 Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 136, 143-44; Koehler, supra note 291, at 228;
Lempert, supra note 303, at 323-328.
311 Koehler, supra note 291, at 228.
312 See Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 143 (discussing a case where Lifecodes
found a perfect match between samples from the defendant and the victim!); NRC RE-
PORT, supra note 12, at 88-89.
313 "The syndrome is a familiar one: If you can't count it, it doesn't exist.... Readily
quantifiable factors are easier to process-and hence more likely to be recognized and
then reflected in the outcome-than are factors that resist ready quantification. The
result, despite what turns out to be a spurious appearance of accuracy and complete-
ness, is likely to be significantly warped and hence highly suspect." Lawrence H. Tribe,
Ttial By .lathemalics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1361-
62 (1971).
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versy surrounding those methods may reinforce the powerfully prej-
udicial suggestion that false positives are a minor issue and that the
frequency of the matching print is the issue on which the value of
DNA evidence will turn.
The NRC Report calls for laboratory error rates to be deter-
mined based on proficiency testing and disclosed to juries.314 Ac-
cording to the report, accurate estimates of error rates require
proficiency tests that are externally administered, blind, and based
on samples that are truly representative of case materials. 3 15 To
date, however, relatively little proficiency testing has been done, and
most of it has not been blind.316 Hence, there currently is not a firm
scientific basis for determining the rate of false positives.
V. LESSONS FROM THE DNA WAR
While debate has raged over DNA profiling, new genetic identi-
fication procedures are already being developed. Molecular biology
is advancing rapidly, and forensic scientists have been eager to
adapt the new DNA technology to their purposes. New forensic
tests involving more sophisticated techniques are already beginning
to appear.3t7 What lessons have we learned from the "war" over
the first round of DNA technology that will help in evaluating the
new tests?
A. NEW FORENSIC TECHNIQUES MUST BE VALIDATED
A major source of uncertainty about DNA profiling was the fail-
ure of forensic laboratories to validate the techniques adequately at
the outset.318 Proponents assumed too readily that the acceptance
of RFLP analysis for research and genetic diagnosis assured it would
be reliable for forensic identification. They failed to anticipate all of
the difficulties that would be raised by the transfer of RFLP technol-
ogy to forensics. In retrospect, it is clear that some widely cited
314 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 88-89.
315 Id. at 55, 88. In an ideal proficiency test, the samples simulate those processed in
actual casework and the analyst is "blind" both to the correct result and to the fact that
he or she is being tested.
Nonblind proficiency tests may not provide a good indicator of the error rate in
actual case work because the technicians may be unusually diligent and cautious
when they know they are being observed and tested. For example, the observed
technicians may be reluctant to declare matches in ambiguous situations to avoid
the stigma of having committed a false positive error.
Koehler, supra note 291, at 228.
316 Id. at 229; Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 141-45.
317 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
318 See NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at ch. 2.
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claims about forensic DNA tests were simply false, 31 9 while other
claims lacked an adequate scientific foundation.3 20 Courts have
been slow to catch and correct these errors. 3
2'
Whether all of the criticisms raised in court were valid remains
to be seen. Only time and additional research will tell, for example,
the extent of population structure or the rate of false positives in
forensic DNA testing. But regardless of whether the situation turns
out to be as good as supporters hope or as bad as critics fear, these
concerns should have been raised and evaluated. Indeed, recent de-
velopments have been kind to the critics. Leading scientists have
sided with the earliest critics and the NRC Report has acknowledged
the seriousness of their concerns.
Perhaps the most valuable and important aspect of the NRC
Report is that it sets forth, in considerable detail, the steps that a
laboratory should take to validate a new forensic DNA typing proce-
dure. The NRC's validation standards take into account not only
the range of problems that have arisen in connection with DNA pro-
filing, but also issues likely to arise in connection with newer tech-
nology. When evaluating the admissibility of current and future
DNA technology, courts should be very attentive to whether the val-
idation research recommended by the NRC Report has been done.
If it has not, then a strong case can be made for excluding the labo-
ratory's results either on grounds that they fail to meet the general
acceptance standard of Frye or that they are insufficiently validated
to constitute "scientific knowledge" under Daubert.
B. NEW FORENSIC TECHNIQUES MUST BE EXPOSED TO BROAD AND
OPEN SCIENTIFIC SCRUTINY
Exaggerated claims about the new tests probably arose, in part,
from proponents' enthusiasm about a promising new technique.
The claims were then perpetuated by commentators who confused
319 See, e.g., supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text for the claim that DNA tests are
incapable of producing a false positive and for the claim that loci on different chromo-
somes are necessarily in linkage equilibrium. Compare testimony of Dr. Patrick Con-
neally, in People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) with NRC
REPORT, supra note 12, at 77-82, and Lewontin & Hartd, supra note 10, at 1747.
320 See, e.g., supra note 214 and accompanying text for the claim that VNTR alleles are
statistically independent.
321 The erroneous statement that DNA profiling is incapable of producing a false pos-
itive, for example, has been remarkably persistent. See, e.g., People v. Wesley, 589
N.Y.S.2d 197, 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) ("[Ijt is impossible under the RFLP procedure to
obtain a false positive result, i.e., to identify the wrong individual as the contributor of
the DNA being tested.").
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the commercial hyperbole of laboratories marketing the new tests
with scientific fact.
1. Forensic Science has Inadequate Internal Mechanisms for Detecting
Problems and Correcting Errors
The persistence of inadequately validated assertions may also
reflect flawed error-checking mechanisms in the field of forensic sci-
ence. Forensic DNA tests were initially shielded from broad scru-
tiny by the scientific community. They were developed by
commercial laboratories whose procedures were proprietary, whose
work product was generally not available for examination by outsid-
ers (except when used in a court hearing), and whose laboratory
protocols were initially available only by court order. The forensic
scientists who developed and validated the techniques in both com-
mercial and government laboratories were well aware that they
would be called upon to defend the new tests when their admissibil-
ity was challenged in litigation, and that they had a professional
stake in the outcome of that litigation.322 In that atmosphere, they
had little incentive to air and discuss problems, and strong incentive
to suppress doubt and uncertainty for fear that candid statements
would be used against them in court.
It is not surprising, then, that the emergence of DNA profiling
tests was accompanied by what one commentator called "scientific
happy talk" rather than critical evaluation.3 23 Until recently, there
has been almost no discussion in the scientific literature of the novel
aspects of forensic DNA tests (particularly the matching and statisti-
cal procedures) that have become controversial. Given the institu-
tional structure of forensic science, future innovations are likely to
emerge in the same manner.
2. Scientific Critics May be Slow to Emerge
At first, nearly all of the academic scientists who tesified about
DNA evidence were supportive; some defense lawyers reported they
were unable to find any scientists who were critics. Proponents of
DNA evidence were undoubtedly more successful in recruiting ex-
perts, at first, because they were helped by the forensic laboratories,
while opponents were left to their own devices. Many criminal de-
322 Burk, supra note 309, at 79-80 (Employees of forensic labs "have a clear pecuniary
interest in the acceptance of DNA evidence by the courts. The success of their employ-
ers and the stability of their own employment depends upon continued use of DNA
testing.").
323 Statement of Eric Lander at the meeting of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers (March 16, 1990).
1993]
WILLIAM C. THOMPSON
fense lawyers wasted their time in a fruitless search for scientists
who would challenge the fundamental principles and theory of DNA
testing, not realizing that the real issue is not the validity of the un-
derlying theory but the reliability of the scientific protocols
designed to implement the theory. Of course, most academic scien-
tists also did not realize that this was an issue, because they were
unaware of the details of the forensic procedures. In most of the
hearings that occurred before 1989, the defense failed to produce a
single witness to challenge the reliability or general acceptance of
forensic DNA tests, and efforts of defense lawyers to raise concerns
through cross-examination were notably ineffective. 324
Defense counsel eventually recruited experts from the ranks of
academic scientists. None of these defense experts had any previ-
ous experience in forensic testing. Some learned about forensic
DNA testing from the published articles and conference presenta-
tions of those engaged in forensic DNA testing; most, however, first
became familiar with the details of forensic DNA testing only upon
being retained by criminal defense lawyers to examine DNA evi-
dence and give a second opinion.
Some of these experts were slow to appreciate the full range of
problems that might arise in forensic testing because they often saw
only one or two cases. Their limited exposure to casework gave
them little basis for assessing the range of possible results for a par-
ticular procedure and limited opportunity to observe and document
problems that might occur in some cases but not others. Experts
who speculated about problems that might occur (but had not oc-
curred in the case at hand) were dismissed as having raised "hypo-
thetical problems." 325  In fact, problems dismissed as
"hypothetical" in early cases often appeared in later cases. This ex-
perience should alert courts, particularly appellate courts, to the
danger of foreclosing challenge to a new procedure before casework
experience, and critical scrutiny by independent scientists, reveal
the full range of problems.
3. Evaluation of New Forensic Techniques is Impeded by Secrecy
Efforts of defense experts to evaluate the tests were also im-
peded by the secrecy of forensic laboratories. Protracted battles
over discovery erupted in 1989 and 1990 as defense lawyers, guided
by their new experts, sought more information. Information
emerged piecemeal and fueled a running dispute that pitted groups
324 Hoeffel, supra note I1, at 511-15.
325 People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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of critics and supporters against each other in one hearing after
another.
Generally, defense experts have been allowed to see the labora-
tory reports, lab notes and autoradiographs in the case in ques-
tion.3 26 However, questions over access to laboratory protocols,
population data bases, and the raw data underlying laboratory vali-
dation studies and proficiency tests have led to extensive contro-
versy and protracted litigation.
The forensic laboratories have resisted disclosing these materi-
als on a variety of grounds, including claims that the materials are
legally irrelevant,3 27 constitute trade secrets3 28 and are privi-
leged.3 29 The fight against disclosure has been led by prosecutors
with the active assistance of private lawyers hired by the commercial
laboratories and FBI staff counsel.
Defense lawyers fought hard for disclosure and gradually
gained ground. In several early cases, defense lawyers spent more
time and money in efforts to obtain information which their experts
had requested than they did in litigating the substantive issues. A
ruling of the Minnesota Supreme Court holding the Cellmark DNA
test inadmissible based, in part, on Cellmark's refusal to disclose
information requested by the defense, marked an important early
326 However, this has not always been the case. In one capital case in Texas, which
the author has studied, the prosecutor provided to the defense in advance of trial only
his own expurgated (and incorrect) summary of what the laboratory report stated. Hicks
v. State, 860 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), aff'g No. 88-134-CR (Freestone Co.,
Tex. 1989). The prosecutor's actions are discussed in Simon Ford & William Thomp-
son, Letter, Reply, ScIENcEs July/Aug. 1990, at 10.
327 A summary of some of the legal arguments may be found in the order of a federal
magistrate, granting discovery to the defense in United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629
(N.D. Ohio 1990).
328 The trade secret argument lost its force after commentators pointed out the fun-
damental incompatibility of the claim that protocol is a trade secret and the claim that it
is generally accepted by the scientific community within the meaning of the Fiye
standard:
On the one hand, [forensic laboratories] seek admissibility for their tests, arguing
that their procedures are sufficiently known and proven to be regarded as generally
accepted by the scientific community. On the other hand, they seek to keep their
tests confidential, arguing that they contain procedures or processes sufficiently
unique and innovative to constitute trade secrets. Courts would be well advised to
tell these companies that they cannot have it both ways. If they wish to assert that
their procedures are accepted, they must open themselves to scrutiny by the scien-
tific community so that their assertion can be put to the test.
Thompson & Ford, supra note 18, at 60.
329 The FBI claimed that some of the scientific studies it had conducted to check the
accuracy of its DNA tests were privileged, arguing that forced disclosure of the results of
such research would deter the agency from doing such research in the future and would
therefore be a bad policy. See 'ee, 129 F.R.D. at 629.
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victory for defense lawyers. 330 An Iowa District Court helped de-
fense lawyers gain more ground when it compelled the FBI to dis-
close results of its proficiency testing studies. 33' The most
important discovery ruling, however, came in United States v. Yee,
where a federal magistrate granted the defense access to the raw
data underlying the FBI's validation research and population data
bases.332 The wisdom of this ruling quickly became apparent when
defense experts found instances in which conclusions published in
scientific journals by FBI employees were not supported by the un-
derlying data. Nevertheless, efforts to obtain discovery of such data
have met strong resistance and have only been partly successful.
Even when courts have ordered discovery, compliance has been
grudging. Internal memoranda obtained through court-ordered
discovery from the FBI show that the agency contemplated destroy-
ing its own scientific data concerning the performance of its DNA
test in proficiency trials rather than turn the data over to defense
lawyers. 333 The adversarial nature of the discovery process has en-
gendered game-playing by the litigants. Some defense lawyers have
made unnecessarily broad discovery requests in the hope of at least
obtaining something; the forensic laboratories have stonewalled,
provided information in misleading formats, exaggerated the time
and expense required to produce materials, 334 and generally re-
330 "The fair trial and due process rights are implicated when data relied upon by a
laboratory in performing tests are not available to the opposing party for review and
cross examination .... The defense request for ... specific information regarding its
methodology and population data base was denied by Cellmark." State v. Schwartz, 447
N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989).
331 Record Vol. II at 57, State v. Smith, No. 41733 (Polk Co., Iowa Dist. Ct. Dec. 18,
1989). When the judge in Smith held a hearing on a defense request for discovery of the
results of the FBI's internal proficiency tests in late 1989, FBI administratorJames Kear-
ney, Section Chief of the FBI's Forensic Science Research and Training Center, flew to
Des Moines, along with FBI Legal Counsel L.W. McFarland, to argue against such an
order. In his testimony during a pretrial hearing, Kearney suggested that a court order
compelling disclosure could spell the end of meaningful internal proficiency testing in
forensic laboratories; labs would be reluctant to do such work because the results could
be used in court "to pistol-whip us." Id. at 64. The Court nevertheless granted the
discovery request, becoming the first court in the United States to do so. Id. at 57.
332 United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1991). Courts should be mindful
of fears expressed by some that "retrospective validation by a laboratory already heavily
invested in a particular technology or procedure will be half-hearted, goal-directed, self-
congratulatory, or even deceitful." Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 151.
333 Memorandum from FBI Legal Counsel to Assistant Director, FBI Laboratory Divi-
sion (April 20, 1990) (introduced in evidence in 1ee).
:334 In a recent civil paternity action, for example, one commercial laboratory esti-
mated the cost of complying with a request for information about studies validating its
procedures to be $684,925. After a lengthy hearing on the issue, the court found that
the laboratory's response to discovery "lacked credibility" and that the laboratory had
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leased data in a piecemeal manner that has made it difficult for ex-
perts in any particular case to become fully informed.
Scientific scrutiny of the forensic tests was also impeded by the
use of protective orders. In cases where courts have ordered exten-
sive disclosure of information by forensic laboratories, prosecutors
have often requested that the court also issue a confidentiality order
to protect alleged trade secrets and prevent defense experts from
taking unfair advantage of information provided to them in discov-
ery.3 3 5 In some cases, these orders have placed severe limits on
what use defense experts could make of the information by forbid-
ding them from discussing it with anyone not involved in the case
and specifically barring them from making reference to the informa-
tion in any publication, lecture or conversation about forensic DNA
testing.33 6 Defense lawyers complain that forensic laboratories have
used these protective orders to frustrate defendants' preparation of
their cases, prevent necessary consultation among scientific experts
and keep problems in their techniques secret.
Scientific discussion has also been impeded by concerns about
who has the right to comment upon-and publish data that is made
public in court hearings. For example, in two instances the FBI has
refused to allow defense experts to cite or rely upon unpublished
FBI data in academic publications. 337 These refusals were appar-
ently based on a desire to protect the FBI employees' right of first
publication of data which they collected (at government expense).
However, the refusal to allow defense experts to use the data pre-
vented much-needed public scrutiny and commentary upon the
wanted "to charge defendant money to produce ... information that did not exist."
Rodick v. Cazale, No. 379-874 (Parish ofJefferson, La. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 1991).
335 Forensic scientists have expressed fears that their unpublished data may be "sto-
len" by defense experts or used in a manner or for purposes they disapprove. Fear of
disclosure is also said to hinder efforts of forensic scientists to establish collaborations
because "[o]ther scientists ... are afraid we will be forced to turn [their data] over in
discovery before they have had a chance to finish their studies, formulate valid and sub-
stantiated interpretations, and personally present the results." Affidavit of FBI em-
ployee Bruce Budowle in support of the Government's motion opposing the defendant's
discovery request at 8, Yee, 129 F.R.D. at 629.
336 See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, No. 591717 (St. Louis Co., Mo. Cir. Ct.June 25, 1991)
(Order relating to discovery of DNA typing material).
337 One episode is described in Christopher Anderson, FBI Attaches Strings to its D.\-4
Database, 357 NATURE 618 (1992). Professor Seymour Geisser was told that he might
publish an analysis of the FBI's database only if he allowed an FBI scientist (Dr.
Budowle) to be co-author and granted him right of final approval over the content of the
article. Geisser rejected this arrangement and, as a result, was unable to publish the
data. A nearly identical case had arisen earlier. Professor Laurence Mueller sought the
FBI's permission to publish an analysis of some data from the FBI's database and re-
ceived and rejected an identical offer from the FBI.
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FBI's procedures. The data had repeatedly been relied upon in liti-
gation but has not been (and may never be) published.
The recent report of the National Research Council argues
powerfully for greater openness and public scrutiny of the tech-
niques used in DNA testing. Noting that some laboratories had
used methods that "were not experimentally supported," the NRC
Report traced the problem to the absence of "open scientific scru-
tiny" and to "the failure to publish a detailed explanation and justi-
fication of methods."
338
Presenting scientific conclusions in a criminal court is at least as seri-
ous as presenting scientific conclusions in an academic paper. Accord-
ing to long-standing and wise scientific tradition, the data underlying
an important scientific conclusion must be freely available, so that
others can evaluate the results and publish their own findings, whether
in support or in disagreement. There is no excuse for secrecy con-
cerning the raw data. Protective orders are inappropriate, except for
those protecting individual's names and other identifying information,
even for data that have not yet been published or for data claimed to
be proprietary. If scientific evidence is not yet ready for both scientific
scrutiny and public re-evaluation by others, it is not yet ready for
court.
3 3 9
The DNA war would have been shorter and more productive had
the NRC's recommendations been followed from the beginning.
4. Evaluation of New Forensic Techniques may be Impeded by Active
Efforts to Suppress Criticism and Discredit Critics
The acrimony that has made litigation over DNA evidence a
"war" stems, in part, from proponents' efforts to silence or discredit
critics 340 in order to prevail under the Frye standard, and from crit-
ics' resentment at being treated in such a fashion. The nasty, per-
sonal nature of exchanges between prosecutors and defense
experts, both inside and outside the courtroom, has been widely
noted. 34' For example, prosecutors and FBI personnel have been
accused of making threatening comments and spreading false ru-
mors about scientists who have testified for the defense. Perhaps
the most disturbing allegations, however, are that proponents of
DNA testing have attempted to corrupt the peer-review process in
338 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 56.
339 Id. at 93-94.
340 See generally Gina Kolata, Critic of 'Genetic Fingeiprint" Tests Tells of Pressure to Withdraw'
Paper, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at A1; Leslie Roberts, Prosecutor v. Scientist: A Cat-and-
Mouse Game, 257 SCIENCE 733 (1992); Anderson, supra note 14, at 753.
341 Roberts, supra note 9, at 753.
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order to prevent the publication of articles critical of the forensic
tests.
In one episode, a federal prosecutor twice called Professor
Daniel Hard and allegedly pressured him to withdraw an article that
had already been accepted for publication by Science.342 According
to Hard, who found the calls "chilling," the prosecutor cited the
"4political consequences" of publishing the article and "possible dis-
asterous consequences for future DNA fingerprint-based prosecu-
tions. '3 43 After Hard refused to withdraw the paper, a prominent
scientific supporter of DNA testing, Dr. Thomas Caskey, who has
been a frequent prosecution witness, persuaded the editor of Science
to reconsider publication of the article. 344 It was eventually pub-
lished, but only after Hartl and his co-author, Richard Lewontin
agreed to "tone down" their criticisms.3 45 Furthermore, at Caskey's
recommendation, the editor took the unusual step of soliciting a re-
buttal article from two proponents of DNA testing, which was pub-
lished in the same issue. Caskey told Nature that he had intervened
in the editorial process of Science because "he was concerned that
'publishing defence testimony in a scientific journal' gives it such
weight that courts might reopen, perhaps to overturn convictions
obtained on the basis of DNA evidence."
3 46
Another defense witness, Professor Laurence Mueller, has been
the target of numerous public attacks by a California prosecutor.
347
The prosecutor has sent a series of letters criticizing Mueller to edi-
tors considering publication of Mueller's scientific articles and to
Mueller's department chair and University Chancellor. The letters
make disparaging statements about the quality of Mueller's scientific
testimony and suggest that he is an unethical individual whose work
warrants special scrutiny. The prosecutor characterizes Mueller's
ideas as "knuckle-headed" and claims that they "could conceivably
result in a vicious, violent criminal being freed to continue to prey
on society." 348
In yet another episode, a Minneapolis prosecutor was tipped off
that a defense witness, Professor Seymour Geisser, had submitted
an article to Genetics, and that the article had been rejected based on
342 Kolata, supra note 340, at Al; Roberts, supra note 7, at 732; Anderson, supra note 7,
at 753.
343 Anderson, supra note 7, at 500.
344 Roberts, supra note 7, at 735.
345 Anderson, supra note 7, at 500.
346 Id.




negative reviews.3 49 The prosecutor apparently learned about the
bad reviews before Geisser himself. Fifteen minutes before Geisser
received, by fax, the comments of the editor and reviewers on his
article, he received a fax from the prosecutor requesting that he
bring the reviews with him to court when he came to testify the fol-
lowing week. Subsequent inquiry revealed that the author of the
most negative review was Dr. Ranajit Chakraborty, a frequent prose-
cution witness, who often is at loggerheads with Geisser in the
courtroom. Chakraborty has collaborated with FBI scientists on re-
search designed to validate the FBI's DNA test, of which Geisser has
been critical, and was co-recipient of a $200,000 grant from the De-
partment of Justice to support additional validation research. He
did not inform the editor of Genetics of any potential conflict when he
was asked to review Geisser's article.
350
These efforts to suppress criticism probably stemmed from pro-
ponents' attempts to meet the general acceptance standard imposed
by Frye. The Frye standard is designed to block the admissibility of
evidence about which there is a serious scientific controversy. As
the California Supreme Court once put it, if "scientists significant
either in number or expertise publicly oppose ... [a scientific tech-
nique] as unreliable," a court may safely conclude that it should not
be presented to the jury. 35' Consequently, the admissibility of the
technique in court is threatened when scientists begin speaking out
in opposition to it.
The only effective way to deal with critics is to silence them or
discredit them. Proponents cannot simply argue that the critics are
wrong (although they may sincerely believe this). Under the general
acceptance standard, courts are not supposed to decide which scien-
tists are right and which are wrong in a scientific dispute; the mere
existence of a serious dispute over the fundamental value of scien-
tific evidence renders it inadmissible. If proponents debate the crit-
ics in a respectful manner they implicitly admit the existence of the
dispute, which is fatal to their cause. Therefore, name-calling and
personal assault, rather than respectful debate, persists in this area.
Courts should recognize this unfortunate reality and not assume
that experts targeted by disparaging attacks are necessarily unwor-
thy of notice.
349 Christopher Anderson, Coincidence or Conspiraor?, 355 NATURE 753 (1992); Roberts,
supra note 7, at 736.
350 Id.
:'451 People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1377 (Cal. 1982).
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is hard to disagree with Eric Lander's observation that,
"when you try to manage the quality of scientific evidence, the legal
system is a very, very blunt instrument. " 3 52 The legal debate po-
larized the scientific community and created perverse incentives for
secrecy, posturing, personal attacks and other behavior contrary to
the norms and values of science. The great majority of pretrial
hearings have been poorly organized, poorly funded affairs in which
scientists (often recruited at the last minute and placed on the stand
after only minimal consultation) were questioned by lawyers with a
fuzzy understanding of the scientific issues. Important advances in
the litigation have come in only a relative handful of hearings in
which defense counsel managed to retain experts in advance, obtain
information through pretrial discovery, and present it in an organ-
ized manner. As the inefficiencies of the current approach become
more apparent, so will the need for a better approach to evaluating
novel scientific evidence. Like most wars, the DNA war evokes a
powerful feeling in retrospect that there must have been a better
way.
Nevertheless, the courtroom debates have served a useful pur-
pose. Forensic laboratories have been forced to open themselves to
much-needed scientific scrutiny. For all of its disadvantages, the ad-
versarial system at least assured that someone looked at the new
techniques with critical eyes and tried to explore their limitations.
Perhaps the real problem is that we rely too heavily on admissi-
bility hearings for screening new scientific innovations. These hear-
ings would be less costly and more manageable if new forensic
procedures received broader scrutiny before they came to court.
The NRC Report makes a number of helpful suggestions to this
end. First, the report condemns the sort of secrecy that has sur-
rounded RFLP-based tests and urges that laboratory protocols, data
bases and validation studies be open and available for public scru-
tiny.3 5 3 Second, the report urges the creation of a National Com-
mittee on Forensic DNA Typing, consisting of distinguished
independent scientists and legal experts, that would provide advice
to forensic laboratories and review new technologies before they
went to court.3 54 The new committee would have no formal regula-
tory authority, but would be a body to which courts might look for
authoritative guidance when evaluating the admissibility of a new
352 Roberts, supra note 7, at 736.
353 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 56, 93-94.
354 Id. at 70-72.
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technique. Third, the report suggests that a formal system be devel-
oped for accreditation of laboratories doing forensic DNA testing,
that admissibility of test results in court be contingent on the labora-
tory being accredited, and that accreditation depend on complying
with rigorous standards for quality assurance, such as participation
in externally administered proficiency tests.355
These proposals have great merit. They would not eliminate
the need for judicial review of new innovations, but would help as-
sure that future DNA wars are more limited than the first.
355 Id. at 97-110.
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